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ABSTRACT
Index funds own an increasingly large proportion of American public
companies. The stewardship decisions of index fund managers—how they
monitor, vote, and engage with their portfolio companies—can be expected
to have a profound impact on the governance and performance of public
companies and the economy. Understanding index fund stewardship, and
how policymaking can improve it, is thus critical for corporate law
scholarship. In this Article we contribute to such understanding by providing
a comprehensive theoretical, empirical, and policy analysis of index fund
stewardship.
We begin by putting forward an agency-costs theory of index fund
incentives. Stewardship decisions by index funds depend not just on the
interests of index fund investors but also on the incentives of index fund
managers. Our agency-costs analysis shows that index fund managers have
strong incentives to (i) underinvest in stewardship and (ii) defer excessively
to the preferences and positions of corporate managers.
We then provide an empirical analysis of the full range of stewardship
activities that index funds do and do not undertake. We analyze four
dimensions of the Big Three’s stewardship activities: the limited personnel
time they devote to stewardship regarding most of their portfolio companies;
the small minority of portfolio companies with which they have any private
communications; their focus on divergences from governance principles and
their limited attention to other issues that could be significant for their
investors; and their pro-management voting patterns.
We also empirically investigate five ways in which the Big Three could
fail to undertake adequate stewardship: the limited attention they pay to
financial underperformance; their lack of involvement in the selection of
directors and lack of attention to important director characteristics; their
failure to take actions that would bring about governance changes that are
desirable according to their own governance principles; their decision to stay
on the sidelines regarding corporate governance reforms; and their avoidance
of involvement in consequential securities litigation. We show that the body
of evidence is, on the whole, consistent with the incentive problems that our
agency-costs framework identifies.
Finally, we put forward a set of reforms that policymakers should
consider in order to address the incentives of index fund managers to
underinvest in stewardship, their incentives to be excessively deferential to
corporate managers, and the continuing rise of index investing. We also
discuss how our analysis should reorient important ongoing debates
regarding common ownership and hedge fund activism.
The policy measures we put forward, and the beneficial role of hedge

fund activism, can partly but not fully address the incentive problems that we
analyze and document. These problems are expected to remain a significant
aspect of the corporate governance landscape and should be the subject of
close attention by policymakers, market participants, and scholars.
JEL Classification: G23; G34; K22.
Keywords: Index funds, passive investing, institutional investors,
corporate governance, stewardship, engagement, monitoring, agency
problems, shareholder activism, hedge fund activism.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ................................................................................................. 1
I. An Agency-Costs Theory of Index Fund Stewardship .......................... 11
A. Index Funds and Stewardship ........................................................ 12
1. Index Funds ............................................................................ 12
2. Stewardship ............................................................................ 13
B. The Promise of Index Fund Stewardship ....................................... 14
C. The Value-Maximization and Agency-Costs Views ....................... 17
D. Incentives to Underinvest in Stewardship ...................................... 19
1. The Value-Maximization Benchmark .................................... 19
2. The Manager’s Fraction of Value Increases ........................... 21
3. The Limited Effects of Competition for Funds ...................... 25
E. Incentives to be Excessively Deferential ........................................ 28
1. The Value-Maximization Benchmark .................................... 29
2. Business Ties with Corporate Managers ................................ 31
3. The Private Costs of Section 13(d) Filer Status ..................... 34
4. Fears of Backlash ................................................................... 36
F. Limits on the Force of Distorting Incentives .................................. 40
1. Fiduciary Norms .................................................................... 41
2. Reputational Constraints ........................................................ 42
II. Evidence ............................................................................................... 45
A. What the Big Three Do, and How They Do It ............................... 46
1. Stewardships Budgets and Personnel ..................................... 46
(a) Current Levels of Stewardship Investment .................... 48
(b) Assessing Current Investment Levels ............................ 51
2. Private Engagements .............................................................. 56
3. Focusing on Divergences from Governance Principles ......... 61
4. Pro-Management Voting ........................................................ 64
B. What the Big Three Fail to Do Adequately .................................... 68
1. Monitoring Business Performance ......................................... 68
2. Influencing Director Identity.................................................. 70
3. Eliminating Divergences from Governance Principles .......... 75
4. Contributing to Corporate Governance Legal Reforms ......... 80
(a) SEC Comment Letters ................................................... 81
(b) Amicus Curiae Briefs in Precedential Litigation ........... 84
5. Involvement in Securities Litigation ...................................... 87
III. Policy .................................................................................................. 91
A. Regulatory Reforms ....................................................................... 92
1. Letting Index Fund Managers Vote ........................................ 92
(a) Taking voting power from index funds .......................... 92
(b) Taking voting power from index fund managers ........... 93

2. Encouraging Investment in Stewardship................................ 95
(a) Charging Stewardship Costs to the Index Fund ............. 95
(b) Sharing Outside Research Services ............................... 96
(c) Mandating Minimum Stewardship Expenses ................ 97
3. Business Relationships with Public Companies .................... 97
(a) Limiting Business Relationships .................................... 98
(b) Disclosing Business Relationships ................................ 98
4. Bringing Transparency to Private Engagements .................... 99
(a) The Value of Transparency ........................................... 100
(b) Objections to Transparency? ........................................ 102
5. Rethinking Section 13(d) Rules ........................................... 102
6. Size Limits ........................................................................... 104
B. Implications for Key Debates ....................................................... 107
1. The Debate on Common Ownership .................................... 107
2. The Debate on Hedge Fund Activism .................................. 109
(a) The Limits of Index Fund Stewardship ........................ 110
(b) The Limits of Hedge Fund Activism ........................... 112
C. Recognition and Reality ............................................................... 114
Conclusion .............................................................................................. 115
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Stewardship Personnel and Portfolio Companies ....................... 48
Table 2. Stewardship Investments Relative to Investment Manager Fees 49
Table 3. Stewardship Per Portfolio Company ........................................... 51
Table 4. Private Engagement .................................................................... 60
Table 5. Big Three “No” Votes in S&P 500 Say-on-Pay Votes ............... 65
Table 6. Big Three and Active Manager “No” Votes in S&P 500 Say-onPay Votes .................................................................................. 66
Table 7. Actual and Proposed Director Nominations ............................... 72
Table 8. Big Three Positions of 5% or More ............................................ 73
Table 9. Submission of Shareholder Proposals ......................................... 78
Table 10. Involvement in SEC Proposed Rules Regarding Corporate
Governance ............................................................................... 83
Table 11. Amicus Curiae Briefs, 2007–2018 ............................................ 86
Table 12. Securities Class Action Cases ................................................... 89

2019] INDEX FUNDS AND THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

1

INTRODUCTION
Index funds—investment funds that mechanically track the performance
of an index1—hold an increasingly large proportion of the equity of U.S.
public companies. The sector is dominated by three index fund managers—
BlackRock, Inc. (BlackRock), State Street Global Advisors, a division of
State Street Corporation (SSGA), and the Vanguard Group (Vanguard), often
referred to as the “Big Three.”2 In a recent empirical study, The Specter of the
Giant Three, we document that the Big Three collectively vote about 25% of
the shares in all S&P 500 companies;3 that each holds a position of 5% or
more in a vast number of companies;4 and that the proportion of equities held
by index funds has risen dramatically over the past two decades and can be
expected to continue growing substantially.5 Furthermore, extrapolating from
past trends, we estimate in that article that the average proportion of shares
in S&P 500 companies voted by the Big Three could reach as much as 40%
within two decades and that the Big Three could thus evolve into what we
term the “Giant Three.”6
The large and steadily growing share of corporate equities held by index
funds, and especially the Big Three, has transformed ownership patterns in
the U.S. public market. How index funds make stewardship decisions—how
they monitor, vote in, and engage with portfolio companies—has a major
1.
2.

For a more detailed definition of index funds, see infra section I.A.1.
The term “Big Three” has been used in reference to Vanguard, SSGA, and
BlackRock (or, prior to 2009, Barclays Global Investors, which BlackRock acquired in that
year) for more than a decade. For early uses of the term in the financial press, see Rebecca
Knight, Irresistible Rise of the Flexible Fund, Fin. Times (Apr. 19, 2006) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review). For the academic study that seems to have been the first to introduce
the term to the academic literature, see Jan Fichtner, Eelke M. Heemskerk & Javier GarciaBernardo, Hidden Power of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-Concentration of
Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 Bus. & Pol. 298, 298 (2017).
3. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99 B.U. L.
Rev. 721, 736 (2019) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Hirst, Specter of the Giant Three]. That article
substantially expands on the evidence regarding the “bigness” of the Big Three that Fichtner
et al., supra note 2, provided by, among other things, analyzing past trends, expected future
trends in the growth of the Big Three, and the key factors likely to lead to their continued
dominance of the industry. See Bebchuk & Hirst, Specter of the Giant Three, supra, at 723–
24.
4. Bebchuk & Hirst, Specter of the Giant Three, supra note 3, at 735 (presenting
evidence that the Big Three held, in aggregate, 1,118 positions of 5% or more at S&P 500
companies in 2017).
5. Id. at 732–40.
6. Id. at 737–40.
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impact on the governance and performance of public companies and the
economy. Understanding these stewardship decisions, as well as the policies
that can enhance them, is a key challenge for the field of corporate
governance. This Article contributes to such an understanding.
Leaders of the Big Three have repeatedly stressed the importance of
responsible stewardship and their strong commitment to it. For example,
then-Vanguard CEO William McNabb stated that “[w]e care deeply about
governance” and that “Vanguard’s vote and our voice on governance are the
most important levers we have to protect our clients’ investments.”7 Similarly,
BlackRock CEO Larry Fink stated that “our responsibility to engage and vote
is more important than ever” and that “[t]he growth of indexing demands that
we now take this function to a new level.”8 The Chief Investment Officer
(CIO) of SSGA stated that “SSGA’s asset stewardship program continues to
be foundational to our mission.”9
The Big Three leaders have also stated both their willingness to devote
the necessary resources to stewardship and their belief in the governance
benefits that their investments produce. For example, Vanguard’s McNabb
has said, of governance, that “[w]e’re good at it. Vanguard’s Investment
Stewardship program is vibrant and growing.”10 Similarly, BlackRock CEO
Larry Fink has stated that BlackRock “intend[s] to double the size of [its]
investment stewardship team over the next three years. The growth of
[BlackRock’s] team will help foster even more effective engagement.”11
The stewardship promise of index funds arises from their large stakes
and their long-term commitment to the companies in which they invest. Their
large stakes provide these funds with significant potential influence and
imply that by improving the value of their portfolio companies they can help
bring about significant gains for their portfolios. Furthermore, because index
funds have no “exit” from their positions in portfolio companies while those
companies remain in the index, they have a long-term perspective and are not
tempted by short-term gains at the expense of long-term value. This long7. Bill McNabb, The Ultimate Long-Term Investors, Vanguard (Jul. 5, 2017),
https://global.vanguard.com/portal/site/institutional/nl/en/articles/research-andcommentary/portfolio-construction/ultimate-long-term-investors-uk
[https://perma.cc/76PC-AV8P].
8. Larry Fink, 2018 Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose, BlackRock (Jan. 16, 2018),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
9. State St. Glob. Advisors, Annual Stewardship Report 2016 Year End 3 (2017),
https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-social-governance/2017/2016Annual-Stewardship-Report-Year-End.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3BE-RMQ4] [hereinafter
State St. Glob. Advisors, Annual Stewardship Report 2016].
10. McNabb, supra note 7.
11. Fink, supra note 8.
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term perspective has been stressed by Big Three leaders12 and applauded by
commentators.13 Jack Bogle, Vanguard’s founder and the late elder statesman
of index investing, has stated that index funds “are the . . . best hope for
corporate governance.”14
Will index funds deliver on this promise? Do any significant
impediments stand in the way? How do legal rules and policies affect index
fund stewardship? Given the dominant and growing role that index funds play
in the capital markets, these questions are of first-order importance and are
the focus of this Article.
In particular, the Article seeks to make three contributions. The first
contribution is to provide an analytical agency-cost framework for
understanding the incentives of index fund managers. Our analysis
demonstrates that index fund managers have strong incentives to (i)
underinvest in stewardship and (ii) defer excessively to the preferences and
positions of corporate managers. The incentive analysis builds on, and further
develops, the analytical framework put forward in The Agency Problems of
Institutional Investors, a 2017 article we coauthored with Alma Cohen.15
The second contribution is to provide the first comprehensive evidence
of the full range of stewardship decisions made by index fund managers,
especially the Big Three. We find that this evidence is, on the whole,
consistent with the incentive problems that our analytical framework
identifies. The evidence thus reinforces the concerns suggested by this
framework.
The third contribution is to explore the policy implications of the
incentive problems of index fund managers that we identify and document.
We put forward a number of policy measures to address these incentive
problems and explain why some other measures do not merit serious
12. See infra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Engagement—Succeeding in the New Paradigm for

Corporate Governance, Harvard Law Sch. Forum on Corp. Governance & Fin. Regulation
(Jan. 23, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/01/23/engagement-succeeding-in-thenew-paradigm-for-corporate-governance/ [https://perma.cc/NBP4-GNXG] [hereinafter
Lipton, New Paradigm for Corporate Governance] (“[T]he BlackRock letter is a major step
in rejecting activism and short[-]termism . . . .”). For a detailed account by one of us of the
appeal that “long-termism” has had to corporate law scholars and practitioners, see generally
Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 Colum.
L. Rev. 1637, 1646–51 (2013) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Long-Term Value].
14. Christine Benz, Bogle: Index Funds the Best Hope for Corporate Governance,
Morningstar.com (Oct. 24, 2017), http://www.morningstar.com/videos/830770/bogle-indexfunds-the-best-hope-for-corporate-gove.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
15. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, The Agency Problems of
Institutional Investors, 31 J. Econ. Persp. 89 (2017) [hereinafter Bebchuk et al., Agency
Problems of Institutional Investors].
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consideration. We also explain how recognition of these incentive problems
should inform and influence important ongoing debates, such as those on
common ownership and hedge fund activism.16
This Article’s analysis is organized as follows. Part I develops our
agency-costs theory of index funds stewardship. We begin by discussing the
nature of index funds and stewardship. We proceed to discuss the features of
index funds, such as large stakes and long-term perspectives, that have given
rise to high hopes for index fund stewardship. We then explain that these
hopes are founded on the premise that the stewardship decisions of index fund
managers are largely focused on maximizing the long-term value of their
investment portfolios and that agency problems are thus not a key driver of
those decisions. We contrast this “value-maximization” view with an
alternative “agency-costs” view that we put forward.
In the agency-costs view, because the stewardship decisions of index
funds are not made by the index funds’ own beneficial investors (to whom
we refer below as the “index fund investors”), but rather by their investment
16. The research that is most closely related to this Article consists of four current or
recent works that focus on index fund stewardship but differ considerably from this Article
in terms of scope, methodology, approach, and normative position.
To begin, a study by John C. Coates also focuses on the increasing concentration of
ownership in the hands of a small number of institutional investors. See generally John C.
Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve (Harvard Pub.
Law Working Paper No. 19-07 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3247337 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review). However, unlike this Article, Coates’s study seems to be concerned
that these investors will exercise too much power, rather than underinvest in stewardship and
be excessively deferential to corporate managers; see infra note 269 and accompanying text
and see generally Coates, supra.
In addition, studies by Jill E. Fisch, Assaf Hamdani, and Steven Davidoff Solomon, and
by Edward B. Rock and Marcel Kahan, take issue with our analysis and view index fund
stewardship much more favorably than we do. But as we explain in various places below
(see infra notes 58, 60, 65–66, 69-70, 87, 108, 126, 134–136, 139, 143, 162, 172–174, 180,
184–188, 193, 197, 200–201, 210, 288, 291 and accompanying text), each of these studies
fails to recognize some of the major problems with the stewardship that our analysis
identifies. See generally Jill E. Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The New
Titans of Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, U. Pa. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3192069 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Index Funds and Corporate Governance: Let
Shareholders Be Shareholders (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 18-39, 2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3295098 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
Finally, a study by Dorothy Shapiro Lund shares our concerns about how little the Big Three
invest in stewardship, but it differs substantially from our incentive analysis, empirical
investigation, and policy recommendations. See generally Dorothy Shapiro Lund, The Case
Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. Corp. L. 493 (2018); see also infra notes 109, 223–
230 and accompanying text.
These four studies, as well as our own work, build on the substantial earlier body of
literature on institutional investors discussed infra note 17.
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advisers (whom we label “index fund managers”), the incentives of index
fund managers are critical. The remainder of Part I is devoted to developing
the elements of the agency-costs theory. In particular, we analyze two types
of incentive problems that push the stewardship decisions of index fund
managers away from those that would best serve the interests of index fund
investors.
The first type is incentives to underinvest in stewardship. Stewardship
that increases the value of portfolio companies will benefit index fund
investors. Index fund managers, however, are remunerated with a very small
percentage of their assets under management and thus would capture a
correspondingly small fraction of such increases in value. They therefore
have much more limited incentives to invest in stewardship than their
beneficial investors would prefer. Furthermore, if stewardship by an index
fund manager increases the value of a portfolio company, rival index funds
that track the same index (and investors in those funds) will receive the
benefit of the increase in value without any expenditure of their own. As a
result, an interest in improving financial performance relative to rival index
fund managers does not provide any incentive to invest in stewardship. In
addition, we explain that competition with actively managed funds cannot be
expected to address the substantial incentives to underinvest in stewardship
that we identify.
The second type of incentive problems concerns incentives to be
excessively deferential. When index fund managers face qualitative
stewardship decisions, we show that they have incentives to be excessively
deferential—relative to what would best serve the interests of their own
beneficial investors—toward the preferences and positions of the managers
of portfolio companies. This is because the choice between deference to
managers and nondeference not only affects the value of the index fund’s
portfolio but could also affect the private interests of the index fund manager.
We then identify and analyze three significant ways in which index fund
managers might benefit privately from such deference. First, we show that
existing or potential business relationships between index fund managers and
their portfolio companies give the index fund managers incentives to adopt
principles, policies, and practices that defer to corporate managers. Second,
we explain that in the many companies in which the Big Three hold positions
of 5% or more of the company’s stock, taking certain nondeferential actions
would trigger obligations that would impose substantial additional costs on
the index fund manager. Finally, and importantly, the growing power of the
Big Three means that a nondeferential approach would likely encounter
significant resistance from corporate managers, which would create a
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substantial risk of regulatory backlash.17
Although we focus on understanding the structural incentive problems
that afflict the stewardship decisions of index fund managers, we stress that
in some cases, fiduciary norms, or a desire to do the right thing, could lead
well-meaning index fund managers to take actions that differ from those
suggested by a pure incentive analysis. Furthermore, index fund managers
also have incentives to be perceived as responsible stewards by their
beneficial investors and by the public—and thus, to avoid actions that would
make salient their underinvestment in stewardship or their deference to
corporate managers. These factors could well constrain the force of the
problems that we investigate. However, the structural incentive problems that
we identify should be expected to have significant effects, and the evidence
we present in Part II demonstrates that this is, in fact, the case.
As with any other theory regarding economic and financial behavior, the
test for which of the value-maximization view or the agency-costs view is
valid is the extent to which those views are consistent with and can explain
the extant evidence. Part II, therefore, puts forward evidence on the
stewardship decisions of the Big Three. We provide a detailed picture of what
they do, how they do it, and what they fail to do. We combine hand-collected
data and data from various public sources to piece together this broad and
detailed picture.
The first half of Part II considers four dimensions of the stewardship that
the Big Three actually undertake and how they do so. First, we examine
actual stewardship investments. Our analysis provides estimates of the
stewardship personnel, in terms of both workdays and dollar cost, devoted to
particular companies. Whereas supporters of index fund stewardship have
17. In analyzing the incentives of index funds, our work, as well as other current
writings on index fund stewardship, builds on a substantial body of earlier literature on
institutional investors and their potential benefits and agency costs. For well-known early
works that analyze the potential benefits and limitations of institutional investors as monitors
of portfolio companies, see generally Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The
Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 811 (1992) [hereinafter Black,
Agents Watching Agents]; Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich.
L. Rev. 520 (1990) [hereinafter Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined]; John C. Coffee,
Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 Colum. L.
Rev. 1277 (1991); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional
Shareholder Activism, 79 Geo. L.J. 445 (1991).
For recent works in this literature, see generally Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon,
The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of
Governance Rights, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 863 (2013); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by
Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of
Corporate Law, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 449 (2014); Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental
Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term
Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 Bus. Law. 1 (2010)
[hereinafter Strine, One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question].
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focused on recent increases in the stewardship staff of the Big Three, our
analysis examines personnel resources in the context of the Big Three’s assets
under management and the number of their portfolio companies. We show
that the Big Three devote an economically negligible fraction of their fee
income to stewardship and that their stewardship staffing levels enable only
limited and cursory stewardship for the vast majority of their portfolio
companies.
Second, we consider behind-the-scenes engagements. Supporters of
index fund stewardship view private engagements by the Big Three as
explaining why they refrain from using certain other stewardship tools
available to shareholders. However, we show that the Big Three engage with
a very small proportion of their portfolio companies, and only a small
proportion of portfolio companies have more than a single engagement in any
year. Furthermore, refraining from using other stewardship tools also has an
adverse effect on the small minority of cases in which private engagements
do occur. The Big Three’s private engagement thus cannot constitute an
adequate substitute for the use of other stewardship tools.
Third, we describe the Big Three’s focus on divergence from governance
principles. Our review of the proxy voting guidelines and engagements of the
Big Three demonstrates that they largely focus on the existence or absence of
divergences from governance principles. But value-maximizing stewardship
decisions would require also paying attention to additional company-specific
information, including information about financial performance or the
suitability of particular directors up for election.
Fourth, we discuss pro-management voting. We focus on votes cast by
the Big Three on matters of central importance to managers, such as executive
compensation and proxy contests with activist hedge funds. We show that the
Big Three’s votes on these matters reveal considerable deference to corporate
managers. For example, the Big Three very rarely oppose corporate managers
in say-on-pay votes and do so significantly less frequently than other large
investment fund managers.
In the second half of Part II, we analyze in turn five dimensions of
stewardship activities that the Big Three fail to undertake adequately. First,
we examine their limited attention to business performance. Our analysis of
the voting guidelines and stewardship reports of the Big Three indicates that
their stewardship focuses on governance structures and processes and pays
limited attention to financial underperformance. While portfolio company
compliance with governance best-practices serves the interests of index fund
investors, those investors would also benefit substantially from stewardship
aimed at identifying, addressing, and remedying financial underperformance.
Second, we analyze how the Big Three pay limited attention to some
important characteristics of directors and to the choice of individual
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directors. Index fund investors could benefit if index fund managers
communicated with the boards of underperforming companies about
replacing or adding certain directors. However, our examination of director
nominations and Schedule 13D filings over the past decade indicates that the
Big Three have refrained from such communications.
Third, we explain that the Big Three fail to adequately bring about
improvements favored by their own governance principles. Shareholder
proposals have proven to be an effective stewardship tool for bringing about
governance changes at large numbers of public companies. Many of the Big
Three’s portfolio companies persistently fail to adopt the governance bestpractices that the Big Three support. Given these failures, and the Big Three’s
focus on divergences from governance principles, it would be natural for the
Big Three to submit shareholder proposals to such companies aimed at
addressing such failures. But our examination of shareholder proposals over
the last decade indicates that the Big Three have completely refrained from
submitting such proposals.
Fourth, we analyze the frequent tendency of the Big Three to stay on the
sidelines of governance reforms. Index fund investors would benefit from
involvement by index fund managers in corporate governance reforms—such
as supporting desirable proposed changes and opposing undesirable
changes—that could materially affect the value of many portfolio companies.
We therefore review all of the comments submitted on proposed rulemaking
regarding corporate governance issues by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) as well as the filing of amicus briefs in precedential
litigation. We find that the Big Three have contributed very few such
comments and no amicus briefs over the past decade and were much less
involved in such reforms than asset owners with much smaller portfolios.
Fifth, we consider the Big Three’s passing on all opportunities to
influence consequential securities litigation. Legal rules encourage
institutional investors with “skin in the game” to take on lead plaintiff
positions in securities class actions; this serves the interests of their investors
by monitoring class counsel, settlement agreements and recoveries, and the
terms of governance reforms incorporated in such settlements. We therefore
examine the lead plaintiffs selected in the large set of significant class actions
over the past decade. Although the Big Three’s investors often have
significant skin in the game, we find that the Big Three refrained from taking
on lead plaintiff positions in any of these cases.
Taken together, this body of evidence is difficult to reconcile with the
value-maximization view. On the whole, however, the documented patterns
are consistent with, and can be explained by, the agency-costs view put
forward in Part I.
Part III turns to the policy implications of our theory and evidence. In
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section III.A we put forward for consideration five measures for addressing
the incentive problems of index fund managers and discuss measures that we
believe would be counterproductive—in particular, prohibiting index funds
from voting or having index fund investors determine funds’ votes. The set
of approaches that we consider includes measures designed (i) to encourage
stewardship investments; (ii) to address the distortions arising from business
ties between index fund managers and public companies; (iii) to bring
transparency to the private engagements conducted by index fund managers
and their portfolio companies; and (iv) to redesign the rules governing the
disclosure of stakes of 5% or more in portfolio companies.
We further discuss placing limits on the fraction of equity of any public
company that could be managed by a single index fund manager. The
expectation that the proportion of corporate equities held by index funds will
continue to rise18 makes it especially important to consider the desirability of
the Big Three’s continued dominance. For instance, we explain that if the
index fund sector continues to grow and index fund managers come to control
45% of corporate equity, having each of the “Giant Three” holding 15%
would be inferior to having each of a “Big-ish Nine” holding 5%.
Section III.B discusses the significant implications of our analysis for
two important ongoing debates. First, we consider the debate over influential
but controversial claims that the rise in common ownership patterns—
whereby institutional investors hold shares in many companies in the same
sector—can be expected to have anticompetitive effects. We explain that our
analysis indicates that these claims are unwarranted and that focusing
regulatory attention on them would be counterproductive.19
With respect to the debate on hedge fund activism, our analysis also
undermines claims by opponents of such activism that index fund
stewardship is superior to—and should replace—hedge fund activism; rather,
the incentive problems of index fund managers make the role of activist
18. See infra notes 26–28 and accompanying text.
19. We were invited by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to discuss the

implications of our work for the common ownership debate at an FTC hearing on the subject.
The slides of our presentation are available in Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Misguided
Attack on Common Ownership (Harvard Pub. Law Working Paper No. 19-10, 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3298983 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter
Bebchuk & Hirst, Misguided Attack on Common Ownership].
For recent attempts by a leading critic of common ownership to engage with the
arguments regarding common ownership made in this Article, see Einer Elhauge, The Causal
Mechanisms of Horizontal Shareholding 49–58 (2019) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3370675 (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter Elhauge, The Causal Mechanisms of Horizontal Shareholding]; Einer Elhauge,
How Horizontal Shareholding Harms Our Economy—And Why Antitrust Law Can Fix It
48–70 (Aug. 2, 2019) (unpublished working paper), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3293822 (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
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hedge funds especially important.
Part III concludes by highlighting another way in which we hope our
analysis could contribute to improving index fund stewardship. Because
index fund managers have an interest in having their stewardship viewed
favorably by their investors and others, increased recognition of the agency
problems of index fund managers could by itself induce such managers to
reduce divergences from value-maximizing stewardship decisions. Although
the policy measures we put forward would improve matters, the problems
that we identify and document can be expected to remain an important
element of the corporate governance landscape. Acquiring a full
understanding of these problems is thus essential for policymakers and the
field of corporate governance.
We have been fortunate to receive reactions and responses to our work
from many academics, both in their writings and in various fora in which
earlier versions of this Article were presented, as well as from practitioners,
including index fund officers. Throughout our analysis, we attempt to engage
with and respond to comments, objections, and arguments raised by such
commentators.20
Before proceeding, we would like to clarify the nature of our normative
claims. First, we do not argue that index fund stewardship produces worse
outcomes for the governance of the economy’s operating companies than the
outcomes that would occur if the shares of the index funds were instead held
by dispersed individual investors. On the contrary, we believe that, despite
the problems we identify and document with index fund stewardship, the
concentration of shares in the hands of index funds produces substantially
better oversight than would result from the shares currently held through
index funds instead being owned directly by dispersed individual investors.
The evolution from the dispersion of ownership highlighted by Adolf Berle
and Gardiner Means21 to the concentration of ownership among institutional
investors created the potential for improved oversight. Our interest is in
realizing that potential to the fullest extent possible.
Similarly, we do not claim that index fund stewardship produces worse
outcomes than those that would occur if the shares currently held by index
funds were instead held by active mutual funds. We have shown elsewhere
20. For examples of our engagement with arguments or counterarguments related to our
work that have been raised by others, see, e.g., infra notes 58, 60–62, 65–66, 69–71, 87, 108–
109, 115–117, 119–120, 126, 134–141, 143, 145, 162–164, 172–174, 180, 184–188, 193,
197, 200–201, 205, 210, 215, 217, 222–225, 227–229, 231, 269, 278–279, 288, 291 and
accompanying text.
21. For the classic work documenting and lamenting the dispersion of ownership prior
to the rise of institutional investors, see generally Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The
Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932).
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that the agency problems afflicting active mutual funds indicate that these
problems are also substantial.22 We do not view the stewardship decisions of
index funds as generally inferior to those of active mutual funds, and we do
not advocate measures to favor actively managed funds over index funds.
Instead, we focus on comparing the current stewardship decisions of
index fund managers with the stewardship decisions that would best serve the
interests of index funds’ investors. We believe that comparing current
stewardship decisions to this (no-agency-costs) benchmark can improve our
understanding of the shortcomings of current stewardship decisions, the
nature and significance of these shortcomings, and the best ways to address
them. If agency problems are indeed a first-order driver of stewardship
decisions, as we argue, then the agency-costs framework can substantially
contribute to a fuller understanding of stewardship decisions. Furthermore,
the agency-costs framework can provide a basis for putting forward
arrangements to limit the agency costs we identify and improve index fund
stewardship. These improvements would, in turn, serve the interests of the
index fund investors and contribute to the performance of the public
companies in which they hold shares.
I. AN AGENCY-COSTS THEORY OF INDEX FUND STEWARDSHIP
This Part develops our agency-costs theory of index fund stewardship.
We start by explaining the nature of index funds and the stewardship activities
they undertake in section I.A. We describe views that have been expressed
about the significant promise that the nature of index funds holds for
stewardship in section I.B. We explain that this is the basis for the “valuemaximization view” of index fund stewardship, and we put forward our
competing “agency-costs” view in section I.C. We then develop the agencycosts view, showing how this view indicates that index fund managers will
have incentives to underinvest in stewardship in section I.D, as well as
incentives to be excessively deferential to managers of portfolio companies
in section I.E. Finally, we consider two potential limits—arising from
fiduciary norms and reputational considerations—on the force of these
incentives in section I.F.

22. For analyses of these substantial problems, see Bebchuk et al., Agency Problems of
Institutional Investors, supra note 15, at 95–104; Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Are Active
Mutual Funds More Active Owners than Index Funds?, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Harvard
Law Sch. Forum on Corp. Governance & Fin. Regulation (Oct. 3, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/10/03/are-active-mutual-funds-more-active-ownersthan-index-funds/ [https://perma.cc/G6FQ-EDG7] [hereinafter Bebchuk & Hirst, Active
Mutual Funds].
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A. Index Funds and Stewardship
1. Index Funds
Index funds are a special type of investment fund. Investment funds pool
the assets of many individuals and entities and invest those assets in
diversified portfolios of securities. Actively managed investment funds buy
and sell securities of companies in accordance with their views about whether
those companies are under- or overvalued.23 By contrast, index funds invest
in portfolios that attempt to track the performance of specified benchmark
indexes, such as the S&P 500 or the Russell 3000.24 The term “index fund”
encompasses both mutual funds and exchange traded funds (ETFs), or any
other investment vehicle that mechanically tracks an index.25 Well-known
examples of index funds include the Vanguard S&P 500 Mutual Fund,
SSGA’s SPDR S&P 500 ETF, and BlackRock’s iShares Core S&P 500 ETF.
While some index funds also track indexes of debt securities, this Article
focuses on those that invest in equity securities.
As we analyze in detail in our recent empirical study, The Specter of the
Giant Three, the index fund sector is heavily concentrated and is dominated
by the Big Three.26 In that study we explain that such concentration is to be
expected and should be expected to persist.27 The dominant incumbents have
significant structural advantages that derive from the economies of scale of
23. For a discussion of the approaches of actively managed funds and how they
compare with index funds, see Fid. Invs., Active and Passive Funds: The Power of Both, The
Street (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.thestreet.com/story/14451001/1/active-and-passivefunds-the-power-of-both.html [https://perma.cc/4QV5-39C2].
24. For a discussion of the strategy used by one of the largest index funds, see Vanguard,
Vanguard
500
Index
Fund
Prospectus
8–12
(2019)
https://personal.vanguard.com/pub/Pdf/p040.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5SXN-2NN6].
For
discussions of the general workings of indexes, see Gabriel Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein,
Index Theory: The Law, Promise and Failure of Financial Indices, 30 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 6–
23 (2013), and of indexes underlying index funds specifically, see Scott Hirst & Kobi Kastiel,
Corporate Governance by Index Exclusion Symposium, 99 B.U. L. Rev. 1229, 1231–32
(2019); Adriana Z. Robertson, Passive in Name Only: Delegated Management and Index
Investing, Yale J. on Reg. 795, 799–809 (2019).
25. For a discussion of the rules governing mutual funds and ETFs, see Lois Yurow,
Timothy W. Levin, W. John McGuire & James M. Storey, Mutual Funds Regulation and
Compliance Handbook § 4:1 (2017); William A. Birdthistle, The Fortunes and Foibles of
Exchange-Traded Funds: A Positive Market Response to the Problems of Mutual Funds, 33
Del. J. Corp. L. 69, 76–86 (2008).
26. See Bebchuk & Hirst, Specter of the Giant Three, supra note 3, at 727–31. For
example, that study documents that forty-five of the fifty largest ETFs (by assets under
management) are managed by BlackRock, Vanguard, or SSGA. Id. at 730–31.
27. Id. at 729–31.
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operating index funds; the funds’ branding; and—in the case of ETFs—the
liquidity benefits for funds with large asset bases. In addition, there are no
significant opportunities for new entrants to attract business from the
incumbents by introducing new products that would be difficult for the
incumbents to imitate.28
2. Stewardship
In the literature on institutional investors, stewardship refers to the
actions that investment managers can take in order to enhance the value of
the companies that they invest in on behalf of their own beneficial investors.29
Most advanced economies now have stewardship principles or codes that
seek to provide guidance to institutional investors.30 We focus here on
stewardship that aims to enhance the value of the company.31 Stewardship by
institutional investors, including by the index funds that are the focus of this
Article, includes three components: monitoring, voting, and engagement.
Monitoring involves evaluating the operations, performance, practices,
and compensation and governance decisions of portfolio companies. It
28. For an analysis of these structural advantages, see id.
29. See, e.g., BlackRock, The Investment Stewardship Ecosystem

6 (2018)
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-investmentstewardship-ecosystem-july-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G4KA-QLA9]
[hereinafter
BlackRock, Stewardship Ecosystem] (defining stewardship as “engagement with public
companies to promote corporate governance practices that are consistent with encouraging
long-term value creation for shareholders in the company” and stating that “[p]roxy voting
is often associated with investment stewardship, however, voting is not the only form that
stewardship can take”).
30. For recent efforts in the United Kingdom and the United States, see generally Fin.
Reporting
Council,
UK
Stewardship
Code
(2012),
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/d67933f9-ca38-4233-b603-3d24b2f62c5f/UKStewardship-Code-(September-2012).pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review); About
the Investor Stewardship Group and the Framework for U.S. Stewardship and Governance,
Institutional Stewardship Grp., https://isgframework.org/ [https://perma.cc/SFP8-5U4P]
(last visited Aug. 5, 2019).
31. Some institutional investors, such as socially responsible investment funds, might
have goals other than enhancing value. We do not discuss this type of stewardship in this
Article. For a discussion of such stewardship by one of us, see generally Scott Hirst, Social
Responsibility Resolutions, 43 J. Corp. L. 217, 222–34 (2018).
We also note that some investors in indexed products seek to screen out some companies
from the portfolio in which they invest, and index fund managers therefore also manage
portfolios that follow such exclusions. Investor demands for exclusion of certain
investments, and the impact they might have on corporate behavior, are outside the scope of
this Article, as we focus on the stewardship decisions of index fund managers with respect
to those companies that are included in managed portfolios. For an article discussing index
exclusions, see generally Hirst & Kastiel, supra note 24.
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provides the informational basis for the voting and engagement decisions of
index funds.
Voting at shareholder meetings is a key function of index fund managers
and other shareholders. Shareholders vote on the election of directors to
manage the corporation; charter and bylaw amendments; mergers,
dissolutions, and other fundamental changes in the corporation; and advisory
votes on executive compensation and shareholder proposals. 32 Index funds
(along with other investment funds) generally vote on these matters, and
index fund managers determine how their funds vote.33
Engagement refers to interactions between index fund managers and
their portfolio companies in ways other than voting—for example, by
submitting shareholder proposals, nominating directors, and undertaking
proxy contests. Among other forms of engagement, index fund managers
(and other shareholders) can communicate publicly or privately with
managers and directors of their portfolio companies. These communications
can be proactive and initiated by the investor, or reactive, as when an investor
responds to contact from a portfolio company or other investors.
In the remainder of Part I, we will distinguish between two types of
decisions that index fund managers must make regarding stewardship
activities. One type of decision is quantitative: determining the level of
investment that the index fund manager will make on stewardship activities.
The other type of decision is qualitative: determining the level of deference
that the index fund manager will give to the corporate managers that lead
particular portfolio companies. In sections I.D and I.E, below, we discuss the
respective value-enhancing benchmarks for each of these two types of
decisions.
B. The Promise of Index Fund Stewardship
The leaders of the Big Three, and supporters of index fund stewardship,
have expressed the view that such stewardship can be expected to produce
significant benefits.34 As we explain in this section, this view seems to be
32. For a well-known article on shareholder voting, see generally Frank H. Easterbrook
& Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & Econ. 395 (1983).
33. For the Department of Labor’s interpretation of investment manager voting
requirements, see Dep’t of Labor, Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Exercise of
Shareholder Rights and Written Statements of Investment Policy, Including Proxy Voting
Policies or Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.2601-01 (2019).
34. For example, Vanguard has stated that “[G]ood governance and effective
stewardship can add value . . . . Good governance is good for investors.” Glenn Booraem,
What
We
Do.
How
We
Do
It.
Why
It
Matters.
2
(2019),
https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/perspectives-and-
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based on three characteristics of index funds in general, and the Big Three in
particular: (i) their large and growing stakes in publicly traded companies;
(ii) their inability to exit poorly-performing companies, rather than trying to
fix their governance problems; and (iii) their long-term focus. Below we
discuss each of these three factors in turn.
To begin, the large and growing stakes held by each of the Big Three
give them significant influence over the outcomes of corporate votes. This
influence leads, in turn, to their substantial influence over the decisions of
corporate managers, even before matters come to a vote.
A priori, we would expect the large stakes that each of the Big Three
holds in their portfolio companies to motivate them to maximize the value of
those companies. A standard “free-rider” problem in corporations is that the
benefits of improving corporate value are shared with other investors.35 A
very large investor like a Big Three index fund family will capture a larger
fraction of these benefits than a smaller investor. For instance, an index fund
family that holds 5% of the shares of a particular company will capture ten
times as much from an increase in the value of that company than a smaller
investment fund family holding 0.5% of the same company.36 As a result, the
interests of the investors of the large index fund manager might call for a
larger investment in stewardship than the interests of the investors of the
smaller investment fund family.
The second relevant characteristic of index funds is the lack of an exit
option. If other types of investors are dissatisfied with the performance of
their portfolio companies they can take the “Wall Street walk” and sell their
shares.37 By contrast, because index funds replicate their benchmark index,
they are unable to exit from a particular portfolio company while it remains
commentary/what_how_why.pdf [https://perma.cc/83AA-AZHM] [hereinafter Booraem,
What We Do]. SSGA’s CEO has stated that “[o]ur focus in recent years has been on good
governance.” Letter from Cyrus Taraporevala, CEO, SSGA, to Portfolio Company Board
Members 1 (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-socialgovernance/2019/01/2019%20Proxy%20LetterAligning%20Corporate%20Culture%20with%20Long-Term%20Strategy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2UHZ-JTKN] [hereinafter Letter from Cyrus Taraporevala].
35. For a classic and influential discussion of the free-rider problem, see Robert Charles
Clark, Corporate Law 389–400 (1986).
36. For an explanation of fund families, see infra note 51 and accompanying text.
37. For an excellent review of the financial economics literature on exit, see Alex
Edmans & Clifford G. Holderness, Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence, in
Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance 541, 574-82 (Benjamin E. Hermalin
& Michael S. Weisbach eds., 2017); Alex Edmans, Blockholders and Corporate Governance,
2014 Ann. Rev. Fin. Econ. 23, 28–32. As Edmans has highlighted, exit decisions by other
investors can affect corporate behavior. For surveys of his and others’ work on exit decisions
and governance, see id. at 26–44.
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in the index. Indeed, SSGA’s CEO has referred to SSGA as representing
“essentially permanent capital,”38 and Vanguard’s then-CEO William
McNabb has described Vanguard’s index funds as being “permanent
shareholders.”39 The lack of an exit option increases the relative importance
of stewardship and engagement. BlackRock CEO Larry Fink has stated that
“BlackRock cannot express its disapproval by selling the company’s
securities as long as that company remains in the relevant index. As a result,
our responsibility to engage and vote is more important than ever.”40
A third characteristic of index funds that is potentially attractive to
supporters of their stewardship is their long-term investment horizon. Both
BlackRock and Vanguard have referred to themselves as “the ultimate longterm investors.”41 There is significant debate in the literature about the extent
to which the existence of investors with short-term horizons has adverse
effects on corporate governance.42 The long-term investment horizons of
index funds obviate any such concerns and therefore makes stewardship by
index fund managers especially attractive to commentators who are
concerned about short-termism.43 Consistent with this view, SSGA states that
they “actively engage with [their] portfolio companies to promote the longterm value of [their clients’] investments.”44 Vanguard states that it is “the
ultimate long-term investor,”45 and that its “emphasis on investment
38. Cyrus Taraporevala, Index Funds Must Be Activists to Serve Investors, Fin. Times,
(July 24, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/4e4c119a-8c25-11e8-affd-da9960227309 (on
file with the Columbia Law Review). Supporters of index fund stewardship have also focused
on the lack of exit options for index funds. See, e.g., Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript
at 43) (“Passive investors must . . . rel[y] on voice, rather than exit.”).
39. F. William McNabb III, Getting to Know You: The Case for Significant Shareholder
Engagement, Harvard Law Sch. Forum on Corp. Governance & Fin. Regulation (June 24,
2015),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/06/24/getting-to-know-you-the-case-forsignificant-shareholder-engagement/ [https://perma.cc/5QZL-VZCY].
40. Fink, supra note 8.
41. Booraem, What We Do, supra note 34, at 6 (“Vanguard is the ultimate long-term
investor.”); Fink, supra note 8 (“[I]ndex investors are the ultimate long-term investors.”).
42. For an exchange on this subject between one of us and Delaware Supreme Court
Chief Justice Leo Strine, Jr., see Bebchuk, Long-Term Value, supra note 13, and Strine, One
Fundamental Corporate Governance Question, supra note 17.
43. For instance, Martin Lipton has stressed that “BlackRock, State Street and Vanguard
have continued to express support for sustainable long-term investment.” Martin Lipton,
Activism: The State of Play, Harvard Law Sch. Forum on Corp. Governance & Fin.
Regulation (Sept. 23, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/09/23/activism-the-stateof-play/ [https://perma.cc/4KEA-JUFB] [hereinafter Lipton, State of Play]. For a detailed
review by one of us of the short-termism concerns expressed by many academics,
practitioners, and public officials, see Bebchuk, Long-Term Value, supra note 13, at 1658–
86.
44. State St. Glob. Advisors, Annual Stewardship Report 2016, supra note 9, at 3.
45. Booraem, What We Do, supra note 34, at 6.
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outcomes over the long term is unwavering.”46
Can the large stakes of index funds, their lack of exit options, and their
long-term perspective combine to enable them to deliver on the promise they
hold for corporate governance? In subsequent parts of this Article we analyze
the impediments to such delivery.
C. The Value-Maximization and Agency-Costs Views
In highlighting the above characteristics, index fund leaders and
supporters of index fund stewardship implicitly assume that the managers of
index fund families largely act to maximize the long-term value of the
portfolios they manage;47 we therefore refer to this view as the “valuemaximization” view of index fund stewardship. This view attaches limited
significance to potential agency problems within index funds and does not
view such problems as first-order drivers of stewardship decisions.
Below we put forward an alternative to the value-maximization view.
Because stewardship decisions are made by investment managers, we believe
that it is critical to assess their incentives regarding stewardship. An
examination of these incentives and the evidence we put forward regarding
investment managers’ stewardship decisions, indicates that agency problems
are a first-order driver of the stewardship decisions of index fund managers,
and that these decisions cannot be properly understood without recognizing
these agency problems.
Before examining the incentives of index fund managers, it is useful to
recognize several characteristics of index fund managers that play an
important role in our theory. To begin, index funds are generally structured
as corporations or statutory trusts, with their own directors or trustees. But
these directors or trustees have a very limited set of responsibilities, and the
key decisions in operating index funds are made by the funds’ investment
46. Vanguard, Investment Stewardship 2018 Annual Report 3 (2018),
https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/annual-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GFV4-RDD4] [hereinafter Vanguard, Annual Stewardship Report 2018].
47. For communications by Big Three officers making these premises explicit, see, e.g.,
BlackRock, BlackRock Investment Stewardship Engagement Priorities for 2019, at 2 (2019),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-stewardship-prioritiesfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/XW7G-7NLP] [hereinafter BlackRock, Stewardship Engagement
Priorities 2019] (“BlackRock, as a fiduciary investor, undertakes all investment stewardship
engagements and proxy voting with the goal of protecting and enhancing the long-term value
of our clients’ assets.”); BlackRock, Stewardship Ecosystem, supra note 29, at 6
(“BlackRock’s approach to investment stewardship is driven by our role as a fiduciary to our
clients, the asset owners.”); Booraem, What We Do, supra note 34, at 1, 6 (“[Vanguard has]
grown only more steadfast in our sense of responsibility for our clients and our safeguarding
of their interests . . . . We act in the best interest of Vanguard fund investors.”).
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advisors.48 We use the term “index fund managers” to refer to these
investment advisors of index funds, including BlackRock, Vanguard, and
SSGA, that make key decisions.49 It is the incentives and decisions of index
fund managers that are our focus in this Article.50
The economies of scale in investment management mean that most
investment managers now manage dozens or hundreds of investment funds,
often referred to collectively as “fund complexes” or “fund families.” While
some investment fund families consist largely of actively managed funds,
each of the Big Three fund families consists predominantly of index funds.51
For the Big Three, as with many other investment managers, the key
stewardship decisions are centralized in a dedicated stewardship department
of the index fund manager.52 An important component of the stewardship
48. For a detailed discussion of the governance of index funds, see Eric D. Roiter,
Disentangling Mutual Fund Governance from Corporate Governance, 6 Harv. Bus. L. Rev.
1, 13–24 (2016).
49. BlackRock is a public company, and SSGA is an operating unit of a public company,
so it is reasonable to assume that they both seek to maximize their profits and, in turn, the
value of their index fund management business. In contrast, Vanguard is owned by its
investment funds. For an explanation of Vanguard’s ownership structure, see Why
Ownership Matters at Vanguard, Vanguard, https://about.vanguard.com/what-setsvanguard-apart/why-ownership-matters/ [https://perma.cc/XS5E-TJDN] (last visited Aug.
30, 2019). Vanguard appears to operate by constraining its fees to the point that leaves its
business with no profit. This raises the interesting question of which objectives the business
leaders of Vanguard maximize. One plausible assumption, which is consistent with our
incentive analysis in this Part, is that these business leaders aim to be successful by
expanding the scale of their business. For Vanguard’s own view of how its ownership
structure affects its incentives, see Booraem, What We Do, supra note 34, at 7 (“This unique
structure aligns our interests with those of our investors . . . . It’s their money.”).
50. For early writing stressing the need to consider the incentives of institutional
investors, see Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, supra note 17, at 595–96; Jill E.
Fisch, Relationship Investing: Will It Happen? Will It Work?, 55 Ohio St. L.J. 1009, 1038–
47 (1994); Rock, supra note 17, at 469–78.
51. As of June 2017, the proportion of assets invested in index funds was 79% for
SSGA, 74% for Vanguard, and 66% for BlackRock. In contrast, only 14% of Fidelity’s assets
under management were invested in index funds. Hortense Bioy, Alex Bryan, Jackie Choy,
Jose Garcia-Zarate & Ben Johnson, Passive Fund Providers Take an Active Approach to
Investment
Stewardship
4
(2017),
https://wwwprd.morningstar.com/content/dam/marketing/shared/pdfs/Research/Morningstar-PassiveActive-Stewardship.pdf [https://perma.cc/RQY2-F68E].
52. See, e.g., Fichtner et al., supra note 2, at 316–17 (showing empirically that the
centralized stewardship departments of each of the Big Three produce highly consistent
voting within fund families); Booraem, What We Do, supra note 34, at 3 (“Historically, proxy
voting on behalf of all of Vanguard’s index and actively-managed funds has been
administered centrally by Vanguard’s Investment Stewardship team.”); State St. Glob.
Advisors, Stewardship Report 2018–2019, at 22 (2019), https://www.ssga.com/investmenttopics/environmental-social-governance/2019/09/annual-asset-stewardship-report-2018.pdf
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decision making of the index fund manager relates to the level of resources it
devotes to this department, as well as to the qualitative decisions that the
department makes.
The remainder of this Part develops an analytical framework for
understanding the incentives of index fund managers. Sections I.D and I.E
below analyze how the fact that investment managers manage other people’s
money incentivizes them to diverge from this benchmark in two important
ways. In particular, section I.D examines the index fund managers’ incentives
to underinvest in stewardship compared to the value-maximizing level.
Section I.E focuses on the qualitative stewardship decision of how deferential
to be toward corporate managers, and shows that index fund managers have
incentives to be excessively deferential. Finally, section I.F discusses some
constraints that limit the force of the distorted incentives that we identify.
D. Incentives to Underinvest in Stewardship
In this section we consider index fund managers’ incentives with respect
to the first dimension of stewardship decisions we identified in section I.A,
the level of investment in stewardship activities. Section I.D.1 discusses the
value-maximization benchmark—that is, the investment level that would best
serve the interests of index fund investors. Section I.D.2 discusses the
investment-level decisions that index fund managers will make, assuming,
for simplicity, that both the fee levels that index fund managers charge and
the size of their investment portfolio are fixed. Section I.D.3 relaxes this
assumption and considers how the possibility of a competitive benefit from
stewardship could affect index fund manager incentives.
1. The Value-Maximization Benchmark
To assess the investment-level decisions of index fund managers, it is
first necessary to define a benchmark for desirable stewardship decisions.
The benchmark for value-enhancing stewardship decisions made by the
investment managers are those that would be best for investors in the index
funds. These are also the stewardship decisions that would be made if there
were no agency separation between the index fund manager and the investors
in the index fund—that is, in a “sole-owner” benchmark, in which the index
fund’s portfolio had a sole owner that managed the portfolio and was
expected to make all of the stewardship decisions that would enhance its
value.
[https://perma.cc/N37N-QM9D] [hereinafter State St. Glob. Advisors, Annual Stewardship
Report 2018] (“All voting and engagement activities are centralized within our Stewardship
Team . . . .”).
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Investment in a certain stewardship activity will be desirable to the
extent, and only to the extent, that the marginal gain to the index fund’s
portfolio, on an expected value basis, will exceed the marginal cost of this
investment. To formalize our analysis, we refer to the investment stewardship
activity as the “stewardship investment,” denoted by IS. We will refer to the
“expected gain from stewardship investment” to the portfolio of the index
fund as G(IS). As is standard in economics, it is reasonable to assume that the
marginal expected gain from additional investment is positive, but that this
marginal gain declines as the level of investment rises.53
From the perspective of the beneficial investors in an index fund, it will
be desirable for the investment fund manager to continue increasing the level
of investment IS as long as the marginal gain from each additional dollar of
investment exceeds one dollar. Thus, it will be desirable to set the level of
investment that is optimal for the beneficial investors, which we denote as
IS*. This is the level that occurs where G’(IS*) is equal to 1, that is, the
marginal gain from an extra dollar of stewardship investment is equal to one
dollar.
We wish to note two comments regarding this benchmark of the value
maximizing level IS*. First, the level that is optimal from the perspective of
the index fund’s beneficial investors, IS*, is generally lower than the socially
desirable stewardship investment level. That is because the gain produced by
this stewardship for the index fund’s portfolio is only a fraction of the increase
in the value of the portfolio company. Because the index fund investors will
not fully capture the gains to the portfolio company from the investment in
stewardship, the optimal level of investment from the perspective of these
investors would not take into account the positive externalities that the index
fund stewardship would confer on other shareholders in the portfolio
company. This divergence reflects the free-rider problem among investors
that has long been recognized.54
Second, although the level of the stewardship investments that would be
best from the perspective of the index fund’s beneficial investors would not
take into account benefits to other shareholders, the stewardship investment
53. This is an application of the so-called “law of diminishing returns.” For an
examination of the history of the law of diminishing returns, see generally Stanley L. Brue,
Retrospectives: The Law of Diminishing Returns, 7 J. Econ. Persp. 185 (1993). For examples
of the use of the standard assumption in a standard textbook, see, e.g., N. Gregory Mankiw,
Principles of Economics 525 (8th ed. 2017) (“The traditional view of the production process
is that capital is subject to diminishing returns: As the stock of capital rises, the extra output
produced from an additional unit of capital falls.”). Applying the standard premise to our
analysis, the formal assumption is that G’(IS) (the first derivative of G with respect to IS) is
positive, and that G’’(IS) (the second derivative of G with respect to IS) is negative.
54. See supra note 35.
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level could be substantial for index fund managers that have very large
amounts of assets under management. For instance, if an index fund manager
holds a stake of $1 billion in a portfolio company and stewardship is expected
to increase the value of the company by 0.1%, it would be desirable to make
an additional marginal investment of up to $1 million in such stewardship.
Even if the expected gain were as little as 0.01%, it would justify an
additional marginal investment in stewardship as long as that investment is
below $100,000. Each of the Big Three has positions of $1 billion or more in
numerous companies.55 As of June 30, 2019, the Big Three collectively held
more than 1,000 positions of $1 billion or more, with BlackRock holding
more than 400 such positions, Vanguard more than 500, and SSGA more than
250.56 From the perspective of a beneficial investor in a Big Three index fund,
substantial investments in stewardship are therefore likely to be value
enhancing in many cases.
2. The Manager’s Fraction of Value Increases
Let us first assume that index fund managers take their assets under
management and fee structures as given. This simplifying assumption
highlights a key driver of the gap between the interests of index fund
managers and those of beneficial investors in their funds. Index fund
managers generally cover the cost of investments in stewardship from the
stream of fee income that they receive over time from investment funds. As
we explain below, however, the increase in the present value of fee revenues
they can expect to receive is only a tiny fraction of the expected value
increase from stewardship.
Given our assumption that stewardship does not affect the level of assets
under management, the private benefits to index fund managers from
stewardship only come from the increased fees that would result from an
increase in the value of the index funds’ given assets. Under existing
arrangements, index fund managers charge their investors fees that are
usually specified as a very small fixed percentage of assets under
management.57 As a result, the index fund manager will be able to capture a
55. The median value of positions in S&P 500 companies for BlackRock, Vanguard,
and SSGA as of June 30, 2019 were $1.6 billion, $2.0 billion, and $1.0 billion, respectively.
Calculations are based on ownership data from FactSet Res. Sys., Ownership Database (last
visited Oct. 3, 2019) and S&P 500 constituency data from Compustat (last visited Oct. 3,
2019).
56. These calculations are based on ownership data from FactSet Res. Sys., Ownership
Database (last visited Oct. 3, 2019).
57. Amounts that investment managers charge to investors also include certain
expenses, such as legal expenses and expenses related to custody of portfolio assets. See
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gain that represents only a small fraction of the gain produced by the
stewardship.
To be sure, if stewardship produces a sustainable increase in value, the
index fund manager will benefit from a small increase in fees in future years
as well as the current year, but the present value of the stream of small fee
increases over time will still represent only a small fraction of the value
increase produced by the stewardship. To illustrate, consider an index fund
manager that has a $1 billion position; that expects a certain stewardship
investment to produce an expected (sustainable) value increase of 0.1% (that
is, $1 million); and that charges and expects to continue to charge an annual
fee of 0.1% of the value of assets under management. In this case, the
manager would expect to capture increased fees with an expected value of
$1,000 (0.1% × $1 million) each year. Assuming this stream is expected to
continue indefinitely, and that the discount rate is 10%, the present value of
an extra $1,000 a year is $10,000, which is equal to 1% of the expected value
increase of $1 million produced by the stewardship.
Formally, let us use the term “fractional fee,” which we will denote as θ,
for the fraction of any gain from stewardship that the index fund manager
will be able to capture.58 Given the fractional fee θ, if a stewardship
investment of IS is expected to produce an increase of G(IS) in the value of
the index fund manager’s position, then the index fund manager would be
able to capture for itself only θ × G(Is) of the expected gain to the portfolio.
From the perspective of the index fund manager, it will be desirable to
increase the level of investment in stewardship only up to the point after
which a further increase would produce a private marginal gain to the index
SEC, Form N-1A, https://www.sec.gov/files/formn-1a.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3MB-JNLB]
(last visited Aug. 30, 2019). These are all included in the annual fund operating expenses that
investment funds are required to disclose, see 17 C.F.R. § 274.11A (2019), which are
calculated as a percentage of investment, and commonly referred to as the “expense ratio.”
When we refer to fees charged to investors we include all amounts included in the expense
ratio.
58. Formally, denoting by α the (small) percentage of each dollar under management
that the index fund manager can expected to receive as fees each year, and denoting by r is
the relevant discount rate, the fractional fee θ is equal to the sum of α × 1 + α × 1 / (1+r) +
α × 1 / (1+r)2 + α × 1 / (1+r)2 . . . . Kahan and Rock argue that we understate the incentives
of index fund managers because we “assum[e] annual fees are earned for only one year.”
Kahan & Rock, supra note 16, at 15 n.59. However, as stated above and in earlier versions
of this Article, we use the present value of the stream of fees. This definition of the fractional
fee as the fraction of value represented by the present value of the increases in the stream of
fees was already included as an element in the analytical framework introduced in our work
with Alma Cohen on which this Article builds. See Bebchuk et al., Agency Problems of
Institutional Investors, supra note 15, at 97 (defining the fractional fee as the “fraction of the
increase in the value of a portfolio company that an investment fund will be able to capture,
in present value terms, from additional fees” (emphasis added)).
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fund manager that no longer exceeds the private cost to the manager from
such an increase. The private gain to the index fund manager from a marginal
$1 increase in stewardship investment is equal to θ × G’(Is) (as G’(Is), the
derivative of G with respect to Is, is the marginal increase in the value of the
index fund’s position as a result of the marginal $1 increase in stewardship
investment). Thus, the level of stewardship investment that will be desirable
from the perspective of the index fund manager, which we denote as IS**,
will occur when the marginal private gain of θ × G’(Is**) equal to the $1 cost
of an additional dollar of stewardship investment.
As a consequence, the level of investment that will be desirable from the
private perspective of the index fund manager, IS**, will generally be lower
than the level of investment that is desirable for the beneficial investors in the
index fund, IS*. This is because the investment fund manager will capture
only a fraction, θ, of the marginal gain to the beneficial investors in the index
fund. For the index fund manager’s private marginal gain to be equal to one,
the marginal gain in the value of the portfolio will not be one, but will be
much higher, 1 / θ. When the potential investment in stewardship is between
IS** and IS*, the marginal gain to the index fund portfolio from an additional
$1 investment will be more than $1. Such additional stewardship investment
would therefore be desirable from the perspective of the index fund’s
beneficial investors. But throughout this range, additional stewardship
investment will not be in the interest of the index fund manager.
What is the practical significance of this problem? In assessing this
critical question, it is important to recognize the very small quantum of the
fees that index funds charge. The average expense ratios for the Big Three—
the combined fees and expenses that they receive for their services as a
percentage of assets under management—are 0.30%, 0.09%, and 0.17% for
BlackRock, Vanguard, and SSGA, respectively,59 and the fee percentages are
even lower as these figures also include expenses. The tiny fee percentages
charged by index funds are attractive to investors and have driven their
phenomenal growth. As the analysis above has demonstrated, however, the
tiny fraction of expected gains captured by index fund managers through
these fees gives them a correspondingly tiny incentive to make additional
marginal investments in stewardship.
Recall the example of an index fund with a $1 billion position in a
company for which stewardship would generate a modest gain of 0.1%. Even
though the level of the expected gain is small, given the size of its position,
it would be value maximizing for the index fund to increase its marginal
investment in stewardship up to $1 million to achieve such a gain. That is,
the index fund should employ a team of professionals that would dedicate
59. Morningstar, Inc., U.S. Fund Fee Study 12 (2019) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
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significant time to stewardship at that particular company. But if the index
fund’s fractional fee, θ, is 1%, the index fund manager’s interests would not
be served by any additional marginal increase in stewardship investments
exceeding $10,000.
More generally, the highest level of additional marginal stewardship
investment that would serve the private interest of the index fund manager in
that case is 1% of the level at which additional marginal stewardship
investment would result in marginal stewardship gains for index fund
investors. Thus, the index fund manager would not have an incentive to
employ a team of professionals to spend significant time on stewardship for
that company, even though such stewardship would result in marginal gains
to the index fund portfolio. The $10,000 additional marginal investment in
stewardship that would serve the index fund manager’s interests could fund
only a limited fraction of a single person’s annual salary, and hence, their
time.
Consider now a situation in which the expected gain is a mere 0.01%. In
this case, it would be in the interests of the beneficial investors in the index
fund to make additional marginal stewardship investments of up to $100,000
to bring about this gain. But if the index fund manager’s fractional fee is again
1%, the index fund manager would have no incentive to make additional
marginal stewardship investments of more than $1,000.
We wish to stress that even though IS**, the investment level that best
serves the private interests of the index fund manager, is lower than the level
that is desirable for the beneficial investors, IS*, the level of investment that
would serve the interest of the index fund manager might well be significant
in many cases. This is the case even though the fractional share, θ, is small,
because the gain for the portfolio, G(IS), will be very large for an index fund
that has very large amounts of assets under management—as do each of the
Big Three.
Thus, in this respect, our analysis agrees with those academic
commentators engaging with our work who argue that the large stakes the
Big Three managers hold in many portfolio companies give them meaningful
incentives to invest in stewardship.60 However, those commentators fail to
60. See, e.g., Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript at 15) (“The size of the Big Three
enables them to capture outsize benefits from [investments in corporate governance].”);
Patrick Jahnke, Ownership Concentration and Institutional Investors’ Governance Through
Voice and Exit, 21 Bus. & Pol. 327, 338 (2019) (“[T]he Big Three asset managers have such
large asset bases . . . that the cost of engagement is minimal when compared to the proﬁts
they generate.” (footnote omitted)); Kahan & Rock, supra note 16, at 15 (noting that “even
these low fees [of index fund managers] generate incentives in the context of voting that
compare favorably to those of most other shareholders because the principal advisors to
equity index funds are very large . . . .”). In this respect, we take a different view than that of

2019] INDEX FUNDS AND THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

25

recognize the key point established by our analysis above: Even when the
stewardship investments of the Big Three are significant, they can be
expected to be significantly lower than the investment levels that are
desirable for the beneficial investors of the index fund.
For example, Patrick Jahnke has argued that the large stakes that the Big
Three hold in many companies “ensures sufficient return on any governance
investment.”61 However, our analysis indicates that this “sufficient return”
view is incorrect. Because the Big Three capture just a small fraction of the
benefits to their beneficial investors produced by investment in stewardship,
our analysis above indicates that the private returns from stewardship to the
index fund manager would generally be insufficient to induce the level of
stewardship investment that would best serve the interests of beneficial
investors. This insight follows from the general economic insight that an
economic agent who captures only a fraction of the benefits of an activity can
be expected to underinvest in this activity, and to set the activity at a
suboptimal level.62
3. The Limited Effects of Competition for Funds
So far, our analysis has assumed that index fund managers take their
assets under management and fees as given. We now relax this assumption
and examine how the competition to attract assets affects index fund
managers’ incentives to invest in stewardship. We first discuss competition
with other index funds and then turn to competition with actively managed
funds.
To begin, an index fund manager faces clear and direct competition with
other index fund managers.63 An investor in a given index fund could choose
the critics of index fund managers who argue that such managers follow an “unthinking”
mode of operations because of their lack of any incentives to invest in stewardship. See, e.g.,
Lund, supra note 16, at 513 (“[P]assive fund managers will be especially likely to adhere to
a[n] . . . unthinking approach to governance . . . .”).
61. Jahnke, supra note 60, at 329 (citing Fichtner et al., supra note 2).
62. This is a version of the general problem of private production of an activity that has
positive external benefits on others that the private producer is unable to capture. A canonical
example is that of a lighthouse; for a discussion of the history of this example and the
underlying concept by Ronald Coase, see R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L.
& Econ. 357, 357 (1974).
We are grateful to Alon Brav, the discussant of our article at the NYU Roundtable, for
encouraging us to stress this difference between the conclusions of our analysis and the
positions of commentators taking issue with our view.
63. For a study showing that the flow of assets into investment funds is significantly
influenced by performance relative to investment fund managers operating similar funds, see
Erik R. Sirri & Peter Tufano, Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows, 53 J. Fin. 1589, 1598–
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to invest instead in an index fund run by another manager that tracks the same
or a similar index. Index fund managers thus have an incentive to make their
funds as attractive as possible, and to perform as well as possible, relative to
other index funds.
However, competition with other index funds tracking the same index
gives index fund managers precisely zero additional incentive to invest in
stewardship for any of their portfolio companies. If the index fund manager
invests in stewardship that increases the value of a particular portfolio
company, the increase will be shared with all other investors in the company,
including rival index funds that replicate the same index. These rival index
funds will capture the same benefit even though they have not themselves
made any additional investment in stewardship. An index fund manager’s
investment in stewardship will therefore not result in any increase in the
fund’s performance compared to that of its rivals, and will not allow the fund
to attract investments from its rivals or to increase its fee levels.64
The index fund manager cannot even increase its fees or expenses to
cover the cost of the investment in stewardship: Since its gross returns are the
same as those of rival index fund managers, if it increases its fees or expenses,
its net returns will be below those of its rivals. Stewardship will therefore not
provide any competitive benefits to index fund managers and will not give
them any incentive to ameliorate their underinvestment in stewardship from
the level described in section I.D.2.
Finally, while the above analysis has implicitly assumed that index fund
investors care exclusively about the financial return from their investment,
some index fund investors might well have a preference for investing with an
index fund manager whose stewardship activities they view favorably, or at
least not unfavorably, and may expect index fund managers with which they
invest to be good stewards. The more widely held these preferences are, the
stronger the index fund managers’ incentives to be perceived as good
stewards. But incentives to be perceived as good stewards are quite different
from incentives to make desirable stewardship decisions.
Investors may not recognize certain deviations from optimal stewardship
decisions. As a result, accommodating their preferences would not
1601, 1619 (1998) (finding that “consumers of equity [mutual] funds disproportionately
flock to high performing funds”).
64. In this respect, index funds are different from actively managed funds. For analyses
of how the stewardship incentives of actively managed funds are influenced by competition
with other actively managed funds, see Bebchuk et al., Agency Problems of Institutional
Investors, supra note 15, at 97–100 (theoretical analysis), and Jonathan Lewellen &
Katharina Lewellen, Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance: The Incentive to Be
Engaged 13–28 (Tuck Sch. Bus., Working Paper No. 3265761, 2018),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3265761 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (empirical
analysis).
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necessarily discourage suboptimal stewardship. Although the interest of
index fund managers in being perceived as good stewards cannot eliminate
such deviations, it can be expected to affect index fund manager behavior, in
a way that we will return to in section I.F, below.
Turning to competition with actively managed funds, Jill Fisch, Assaf
Hamdani, and Steven Davidoff Solomon have recently offered support for
index fund stewardship, arguing that index fund managers compete for funds
“not only with each other but also with . . . active funds,” and that this
competition provides them with “the incentive to improve the governance of
companies in their portfolio.”65 According to this view, by improving the
governance of public companies, index fund managers may eliminate
potential advantages that actively managed funds may have—advantages that
may otherwise provide those funds with opportunities to outperform index
funds.66 But as we explain below, this argument provides little basis for
expecting index fund managers to have significant incentives to invest in
stewardship.
A key driver of the movement from actively managed funds to index
funds has been the understanding, backed by empirical evidence in the
financial literature, that actively managed funds significantly underperform
index funds on average.67 To the extent that this understanding leads investors
to switch from actively managed funds to index funds, the relevant
competition for any given index fund manager is other index funds that track
the same or similar indexes.
Of course, substantial assets under management are still invested in
actively managed funds; this is mainly because, even though actively
managed funds underperform (on average) whichever index they use as a
benchmark, some such funds do outperform these indexes.68 As Fisch,
65. Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript at 12).
66. See, e.g., id. at 16 (“[Passive funds] lack . . . active funds’ ability to generate alpha

through investment choices. Passive investors also do not have the firm-specific information
or expertise necessary to address operational issues. Instead, passive investors compete by
using their voice and seeking to improve corporate governance.”).
67. See, e.g., Russ Wermers, Mutual Fund Performance: An Empirical Decomposition
into Stock-Picking Talent, Style, Transactions Costs, and Expenses, 55 J. Fin. 1655, 1655–
56 (2000) (reporting that “the majority of studies now conclude that actively managed
funds . . . on average, underperform their passively managed counterparts”).
68. For studies by financial economists on such occasional outperformance, see, e.g.,
Jonathan B. Berk & Jules H. van Binsbergen, Mutual Funds in Equilibrium, 9 Ann. Rev. Fin.
Econ. 147, 158–62 (2017) (describing evidence regarding the relationship between
management skill and investor performance); Hyunglae Jeon, Jangkoo Kang & Changjun
Lee, Precision about Manager Skill, Mutual Fund Flows, and Performance Persistence, 40
N. Am. J. Econ. & Fin. 222, 229–36 (2017) (describing evidence regarding the effects of
imprecision in management skill).
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Hamdani, and Davidoff Solomon note, some actively managed funds
“continue to attract substantial new assets” despite the existence of lowerpriced index funds.69 Importantly for our purposes, even if index fund
stewardship increases value in some or all of their portfolio companies, some
actively managed funds will still outperform their benchmark indexes. The
constituent companies in any given index can be expected to perform very
differently, depending on their industry and the success of their strategies,
services, and products. Active managers that disproportionately hold
positions in companies that outperform the index will outperform index funds
that track that index.
Indeed, to the extent that stewardship by index fund managers brings
about expected governance gains in a subset of portfolio companies, those
active managers that disproportionately hold those companies in their
portfolios will outperform the index. As a result, an interest in lowering the
performance of actively managed funds relative to index funds should not be
expected to provide index fund managers with substantial incentives to
undertake value-maximizing stewardship.70
E. Incentives to be Excessively Deferential
Section I.D discussed one key dimension of stewardship decisions: the
choice of how much to spend on stewardship investments and the incentives
that index fund managers have to underinvest in stewardship. In this section
we turn to a second key dimension: the choice between deference to corporate
managers and nondeference. As we show, the private interests of index fund
managers are likely to affect their deference/nondeference choices in ways
that could well distort these choices. Below we first discuss this problem in
general; we then proceed to discuss three significant ways in which the
private interests of index fund managers, and especially the Big Three, could
be served by being excessively deferential.71
69. Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript at 14).
70. For additional criticisms of the argument that the desire to compete with actively

managed funds encourages stewardship by index funds, see J.B. Heaton, All You Need is
Passive: A Response to Professors Fisch, Hamdani, and Davidoff Solomon (Jul. 7, 2018)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3209614 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review). Other prominent commentators who generally look favorably at index fund
stewardship take issue with the argument by Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript at 6, 12–
20), that competition with actively managed funds provides substantial incentives for
stewardship. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 16, at 26–28.
71. In a response to this Article provided to the Financial Times, an SSGA
representative expressed doubt with respect to our excessive deference concerns, stating that
“I doubt that you would be able to obtain a company that says that State Street is a pushover.”
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1. The Value-Maximization Benchmark
The second important dimension, which is qualitative in nature, is the
level of deference that index fund managers give to the views and preferences
of the managers of their portfolio companies. Such deference/nondeference
decisions include whether to vote for or against a company’s say-on-pay
proposal; whether to vote for or against a company’s director slate in a proxy
contest against an activist; whether to support or withhold support from the
directors on the company slate in uncontested elections; whether to vote for
or against shareholder proposals opposed by the managers of a company; and
whether to submit shareholder proposals to a company.
Deference/nondeference decisions may also involve the choice of general
principles, policies, or practices that apply to a wide range of situations, such
as proxy voting guidelines.72
Some deference/nondeference decisions—such as voting—are purely
qualitative; they will involve the same resource cost regardless of the level of
deference chosen. For other decisions—such as submitting a shareholder
proposal—the nondeferential choice requires greater resources. While there
is thus some interaction between the choice of investment level and the choice
between deference and nondeference, we discuss the two choices separately
for the sake of conceptual clarity. Similarly, for simplicity of exposition, we
discuss deference/nondeference as a binary decision, but the insights from
our analysis are equally applicable to situations in which the level of
deference involves a range of choices.
What is the deference/nondeference decision that would be valuemaximizing for index fund investors? In many cases, the positions preferred
by corporate managers would be viewed independently as value-enhancing
by the index fund manager. In some cases, the index fund manager may be
uncertain, but may rationally conclude that deferring to the views of corporate
See Owen Walker, BlackRock, Vanguard and SSGA Tighten Hold on US Boards, Fin. Times
(Jun. 15, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/046ec082-d713-3015-beaf-c7fa42f3484a (on
file with the Columbia Law Review). But even if a given company’s managers were to view
SSGA as a “pushover,” their interests would be best served by not stating this belief, and
instead not questioning the effectiveness of the investor oversight to which they are subject.
Furthermore, and importantly, the SSGA officer’s response does not engage with our analysis
in this section regarding the three drivers of excessive deference that we identify, nor with
the evidence consistent with excessive deference provided in Part II.
72. For simplicity, this section’s analysis assumes that the deference decision consists
of a binary choice: deference or nondeference. To be sure, in many situations, investors face
a continuum of choices and thus can be viewed as choosing the level of deference within a
range of possible levels. An analysis assuming that investors set the level of deference within
a continuum of possible choices yields a qualitative similar conclusions to the one presented
below: that index fund managers will have an incentive to be excessively deferential to
corporate managers.
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managers would likely be value-enhancing because of the corporate
managers’ superior information.
In some other cases, however, deferring to corporate managers may not
be value-enhancing. Nondeference will be value-enhancing if and only if its
expected effect on the value of the index fund’s position in the portfolio
company would be positive. Formally, we denote the expected change in
value from nondeference as ΔVND. The change in value from nondeference,
ΔVND, can be positive if certain deferential actions are value enhancing for
the company, but there can also be a loss from nondeference if deference to
portfolio company managers would be the best course of action in a particular
case. That is, nondeference will be value-enhancing if and only if ΔVND > 0.
When an index fund manager faces a binary choice between deference
and nondeference to a particular portfolio company’s managers, valuemaximizing stewardship calls for nondeference whenever the expected value
effect from nondeference is positive, and for deference whenever the
expected value effect from nondeference is negative. But the choice between
deference and nondeference may also affect the interests of the index fund
manager in other ways, some of which we discuss in sections I.E.2–I.E.4. Let
us suppose the expected change in the value of the portfolio from
nondeference, ΔVND, is positive, so nondeference would be desirable for the
beneficial investors in the index fund, but that nondeference imposes costs of
CND on the index fund manager. The index fund manager captures only the
fractional fee (θ) of the expected gain from nondeference: θ × ΔVND. Even
though nondeference is value-maximizing it does not benefit the index fund
manager when CND > θ × ΔVND. Thus, costs to index fund managers from
nondeference create a distortion: Value-enhancing nondeference would not
serve the interests of index fund managers if and only if:
0 < ΔVND < CND / θ.
It is useful to note the role that the fractional fee (θ) plays in determining
the range of situations in which the index fund manager will have distorted
incentives. Because the value of θ is likely to be very small for index fund
managers, CND / θ will likely be higher, and the range of distorting situations
will likely be wider. Because the fractional fee (θ) is likely to be very small,
the expected gain from nondeference (ΔVND) gets a substantially reduced
weight in the calculus of index fund managers’ incentives, and is thus more
likely to be outweighed by private costs from nondeference.
To illustrate, consider again the index fund with a $1 billion position, an
expected gain from nondeference of 0.1% (that is, $1 million), and a
fractional fee of 1%. Nondeference will be against the interests of the index
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fund manager if the cost of nondeference exceeds $10,000.73
The practical significance of distortions from private costs of
nondeference depends on the extent of those costs. In sections I.E.2–I.E.4 we
consider, in turn, the significance of three sources of costs: (i) business ties
with public companies; (ii) legal requirements that nondeferential index fund
managers make Schedule 13D disclosures; and (iii) the risk that, by “stepping
on the toes” of corporate managers or by making their own power more
salient, the Big Three could trigger a managerial and regulatory backlash.
2. Business Ties with Corporate Managers
Index fund managers, including the Big Three, have a web of financiallysignificant business ties with corporate managers, so they may pay close
attention to how corporate managers perceive them. One important source of
investment manager revenue that has received considerable attention relates
to defined contribution plans, commonly referred to as “401(k) plans.”74 The
assets under management in 401(k) plans are very large, and a majority of
those assets were held in mutual funds.75 Index fund managers derive a
substantial proportion of their revenues from 401(k) plans76 in two ways: (i)
by providing administration services to such plans,77 and (ii) by having their
index funds included in the menu of investment options available to plan
participants.78
73. In the second example used in section I.D.1, when the expected gain is only 0.01%,
nondeference would be against the interests of the index fund manager as long as the private
cost of nondeference is greater than $1,000.
74. 401(k) plans are so called for § 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code governing the
tax treatment of “qualified cash or deferred arrangement[s].” Internal Revenue Code, 26
U.S.C. § 401(k) (2012).
75. For evidence on the scale of assets in 401(k) plans, and the substantial proportion
invested in mutual funds, see Sean Collins, Sarah Holden, James Duvall & Elena Barone
Chism, The Economics of Providing 401(k) Plans: Services, Fees, and Expenses, 2016, ICI
Res. Persp., June 2017, at 1 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
76. According to the Pensions & Investments database, the proportion of U.S. client
assets under management for each of the Big Three that came from 401(k) plans in 2017 was
14%, 20%, and 17%, for BlackRock, Vanguard, and SSGA, respectively. See 2018 Survey
of Money Managers, Pensions & Invs., https://www.pionline.com/specialreports/moneymanagers/20180528 [https://perma.cc/E2N2-LHD8] (last visited July 11, 2018).
77. As of December 31, 2018, Vanguard ($454 billion in plan assets) was the fourthlargest provider of plan administration services, after Fidelity, TIAA, and Empower
Retirement. See 2019 Recordkeeping Survey, Plansponsor (July 18, 2019),
https://www.plansponsor.com/research/2019-recordkeeping-survey/ (on file with the
Columbia Law Review). A substantial proportion of these plan assets are likely to be
associated with public companies.
78. For evidence that an index fund that provides administration services is also more
likely to have its funds appear on the menus for 401(k) investments, see Veronika K. Pool,
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Index fund managers can reasonably expect that the extent to which
corporate managers view them favorably might influence their revenues from
401(k) plans. In public companies, a committee of employees often chooses
the plan administrator and the menu of investment options.79 Although these
choices are subject to fiduciary duties, the decision makers often have a
number of reasonable choices, and in such cases the views and preferences
of corporate managers could influence these employees’ decisions.
Furthermore, the incentives discussed below arise even if decisions are often
not influenced by the preferences of corporate managers, so long as index
fund managers believe that such influence might sometimes have an effect.
Turning to analyze how business ties provide incentives for deference,
we would like to distinguish two types of effects of business ties on
deference/nondeference decisions. The first type of effect, client favoritism,
has received significant attention in the literature,80 though—for the reasons
discussed below—we view it as less important. Index fund managers may be
more deferential to managers of particular companies with which they have
(or hope to have) business ties than they are to managers of other companies.
For example, an index fund manager may have incentives to support the sayon-pay proposal of a company that is a current or potential client, even if that
index fund manager would vote against such a proposal at other companies.
Indeed, client favoritism is consistent with the empirical evidence; for
example, a recent study by Dragana Cvijanović, Amil Dasgupta, and
Konstantinos Zachariadis finds that investment managers are more likely to
vote in support of portfolio company managers on closely contested
proposals when the investment manager has significant business ties to the
portfolio company.81

Clemens Sialm & Irina Stefanescu, It Pays to Set the Menu: Mutual Fund Investment Options
in 401(k) Plans, 71 J. Fin. 1779, 1787 tbl.2 (2016).
79. For smaller companies, the plan fiduciary is a staff member in the company’s human
resources or finance department. For a discussion of plan fiduciaries, see Stephen Davis, Jon
Lukomnik & David Pitt-Watson, What They Do with Your Money: How the Financial
System Fails Us and How to Fix It 104 (2016).
80. For early works discussing this type of effect, see, e.g., John Brooks, Corporate
Pension Fund Asset Management, in Abuse on Wall Street 224, 231–40 (The Twentieth
Century Fund 1980); Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, supra note 17, at 596–98;
Coffee, supra note 17, at 1321–22; Gerald F. Davis & Tracy A. Thompson, A Social
Movement Perspective on Corporate Control, 39 Admin. Sci. Q. 141, 161–62 (1994); Rock,
supra note 17, at 469–72. For a current discussion of this type of conflict, see Sean J. Griffith
& Dorothy S. Lund, Conflicted Mutual Fund Voting in Corporate Law, 99 B.U. L. Rev. 1151,
1181–86 (2019).
81. Dragana Cvijanović, Amil Dasgupta & Konstantinos E. Zachariadis, Ties That
Bind: How Business Connections Affect Mutual Fund Activism, 71 J. Fin. 2933, 2933 (2016)
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Responding to concerns about client favoritism problems, some
investment fund managers, including the Big Three, have put in place internal
“walls” separating stewardship personnel from the individuals who maintain
and cultivate business ties. For example, SSGA publishes “Conflict
Mitigation Guidelines” that explain how SSGA’s stewardship team is
insulated from others within the organization whose role is to develop and
maintain business ties with corporate managers.82 Even assuming that internal
walls can be expected to eliminate the problem of client favoritism
completely, such walls cannot eliminate other problems arising from business
ties.
In particular, although client favoritism has thus far received the most
attention,83 we would like to highlight another key channel that we view as
the most important for incentivizing deference. Setting general principles,
policies, and practices more deferentially enhances the likelihood that
corporate managers will view the index fund manager more favorably and
does so without producing any inconsistency in the treatment of clients and
nonclients. For example, rather than tending to vote at particular client
companies in ways that managers of those companies are likely to prefer, an
index fund manager can set its general principles, policies, and practices to
enhance the likelihood of supporting management in votes across all portfolio
companies. This reduces the likelihood that current or potential clients will
receive negative votes and therefore view the index fund manager
unfavorably.
We refer to this problem as “general management favoritism,” by
contrast to client favoritism, because it involves the manager’s interest in
business ties to induce the manager to be excessively deferential not only
toward managers of companies with which the manager has business ties but
toward corporate managers of public companies in general. We note the
existence of empirical evidence that is consistent with this problem. In
particular, empirical studies indicate that investment fund managers that have
greater business ties with issuers are more likely to vote in ways that favor
managers not only at client companies but at companies in general. In
particular, Rasha Ashraf, Narayanan Jayaraman, and Harley Ryan show that,
in voting on executive pay in public companies, the volume of business that
investment managers receive from companies is associated with voting more
(finding that “business ties signiﬁcantly inﬂuence promanagement voting at the level of
individual pairs of fund families and ﬁrms”).
82. 2019 State Street Global Advisors Conflict Mitigation Guidelines, State St. Glob.
Advisors (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.ssga.com/na/us/institutional-investor/en/ourinsights/viewpoints/2019-ssga-conflict-mitigation-guidelines.html [https://perma.cc/6ZXXRMYQ].
83. For studies considering the problem of client favoritism, see supra note 81.
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frequently in support of corporate managers.84 Similarly, a study by Gerald
Davis and E. Han Kim documented that, in voting on shareholder proposals
in public companies, “[a]ggregate votes at the fund family level indicate a
positive relation between business ties and the propensity to vote with
management.”85
Importantly, the general management favoritism we discuss could make
an index fund manager’s stewardship more deferential than desirable
substantially beyond the subset of companies that are current or potential
clients. Such general management favoritism will affect the stewardship
decisions of index fund managers with respect to public companies in
general. Furthermore, because decisions influenced by general management
favoritism do not manifest themselves in favoritism toward existing clients,
this problem cannot be addressed by internal walls and other policies aimed
at avoiding client favoritism.86 The breadth of this effect, and the difficulty of
addressing it through such policies, strengthens concerns about distortions of
the deference/nondeference decisions of index fund managers. Although
commentators taking issue with our views discuss the problem of client
favoritism, they have thus far not engaged with our identification of general
management favoritism as the problem that is likely to be more costly and
substantial.87
3. The Private Costs of Section 13(d) Filer Status
We now turn to a substantial cost of nondeference for the Big Three that
arises from the very large number of companies in which they hold stakes of
5% or more: 2,330 companies (BlackRock), 2,004 companies (Vanguard),
84. See Rasha Ashraf, Narayanan Jayaraman & Harley E. Ryan, Jr., Do Pension-Related
Business Ties Influence Mutual Fund Proxy Voting? Evidence from Shareholder Proposals
on Executive Compensation, 47 J. Fin. & Quantitative Analysis 567, 587 (2012).
85. Gerald F. Davis & E. Han Kim, Business Ties and Proxy Voting by Mutual Funds,
85 J. Fin. Econ. 552, 569 (2007) (examining voting on shareholder proposals and
documenting that “the more business ties a fund company has, the less likely it is to vote in
favor of shareholder proposals that are opposed by management . . . although individual votes
appear evenhanded, business ties affect the overall voting practices at the fund family level”).
For an additional empirical article based on evidence from another jurisdiction that shows
general favoritism reflected in an association between the business of institutional investors
and more pro-insider voting, see Assaf Hamdani & Yishay Yafeh, Institutional Investors as
Minority Shareholders, 17 Rev. Fin. 691, 700–13 (2013) (presenting evidence that
institutions that are potentially conflicted are more likely to vote for insiders proposals than
are standalone investors).
86. See supra note 84.
87. For articles by such commentators, see generally Fisch et al., supra note 16; Kahan
& Rock, supra note 16.
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and 183 companies (SSGA).88 For all of these companies, the Big Three have
incentives to avoid any nondeference that would require filing on Schedule
13D.89
Under section 13(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act, an investor that
obtains more than 5% of a public company is required to make certain
disclosures, either on Schedule 13D or on Schedule 13G.90 The criterion for
whether the investor must make detailed disclosure on Schedule 13D, rather
than more limited disclosure on Schedule 13G, is whether the investor makes
the acquisition “with the purpose [or] the effect of changing or influencing
the control of the [portfolio company].”91 A number of stewardship activities
by index fund managers could be viewed as having such a purpose, including
making proposals to sell or restructure the portfolio company, or engaging
with the portfolio company to propose or facilitate the appointment of
particular individuals as directors.
Schedule 13D filings must be made more frequently and are much more
extensive than Schedule 13G filings. Schedule 13D must be filed within ten
days after every acquisition and subsequent change in holdings, compared to
once per year for Schedule 13G.92 Schedule 13D filings also require
particularized disclosure of each acquisition for each entity, compared to
disclosure of aggregated positions for Schedule 13G.93 Schedules 13D and
13G apply not just to the index funds managed by the index fund manager
but to all the investments for which they have voting power, including
actively managed funds and separate client accounts.94
Given the frequency of trades in the Big Three’s portfolios, making the
additional extensive disclosures that Schedule 13D requires would be
88. See infra section II.B.2. Calculations are based on data from FactSet Res. Sys.,
Ownership Database (last visited Oct. 3, 2019).
89. For early discussions of the possibility that section 13(d) could deter stewardship,
see Alfred F. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism Symposium: Issues in
Corporate Governance, 22 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 117, 161–63 (1988); Mark J. Roe, A
Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 10, 26 (1991)
[hereinafter Roe, A Political Theory].
90. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d), (g) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(b) (2019). For an
analysis of the law and economics of blockholder disclosure, see generally Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, 2
Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 39 (2012).
91. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(b)(1)(i). For a general discussion of this rule and the
conditions for filing on Schedule 13G, see Arnold S. Jacobs, The Williams Act—Tender
Offers and Stock Accumulations § 2:64 (2019 ed.).
92. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(a), (b)(2).
93. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (Schedule 13D), with 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-102
(Schedule 13G).
94. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3(a).
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incredibly costly and time consuming. If a Big Three index fund manager has
a position of 5% or more in a company, nondeference that would require
filing Schedule 13D would impose significant costs, which would be borne
by the index fund manager rather than by the index fund. Such nondeference
would therefore be against the interests of the index fund manager, even
though it is desirable for the index fund.
4. Fears of Backlash
Finally, we turn to what we believe to be an especially strong factor
inducing the Big Three to be excessively deferential to corporate managers:
The Big Three’s substantial and growing power puts them at risk of public
and political backlash that might constrain index fund managers in ways they
would find detrimental.95 As explained below, deference could reduce the risk
of such backlash.
The Big Three’s dominance of the ever-growing index fund market puts
them in a very desirable position. The economies of scale and first-mover
advantage that they enjoy provide substantial protection for the dominance
of their firms in the index fund marketplace. Are there any clouds on the
horizon? Is there anything major that could go wrong for the leaders of the
Big Three?
The most significant risk is likely to be a backlash reaction to the growing
power of the Big Three.96 Business history suggests that the concentration of
power over “Main Street” companies in the hands of large “Wall Street”
interests can lead to a backlash. Referring to the current period as a “new era
of financial capitalism,” scholars have compared it to a chapter in American
history a century ago in which Wall Street interests, led by J.P. Morgan,
wielded substantial power.97 But this earlier chapter of finance capitalism
95. For a discussion of the concept of backlash in economic and legal systems generally,
and of how the risk of backlash affects decision making, see generally Mark J. Roe, Backlash,
98 COLUM. L. Rev. 217 (1998). For a media report discussing concerns about the size and
power of index funds, see, e.g., Robin Wigglesworth, Passive Attack: The Story of a Wall
Street Revolution, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/807909e2-032211e9-9d01-cd4d49afbbe3 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[S]ome detractors say
that index investing is an insidious disease.”).
96. For a recent expression of concern about the growing concentration of index funds
from the founder of Vanguard, see John C. Bogle, Bogle Sounds a Warning on Index Funds,
Wall St. J. (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bogle-sounds-a-warning-on-indexfunds-1543504551 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“I do not believe that such
concentration [of equity investments in the hands of the Big Three] would serve the national
interest.”).
97. See, e.g., Gerald F. Davis, A New Finance Capitalism? Mutual Funds and
Ownership Re-Concentration in the United States, 5 EUR. MGMT. REV. 11, 11 (2008) (stating
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ended with a strong regulatory backlash. As Mark Roe’s well-known work
has documented, vested interests were able to mobilize popular sentiments
against the concentrated power of Wall Street financiers, leading to an array
of legal rules that curtailed the power of financial blockholders and their
ability to intervene on Main Street for decades.98
Perhaps most telling for the purposes of our analysis is a more recent
chapter of business history that took place in the nineteen-eighties and nineties, when the rise of hostile takeovers led to a backlash that, in turn,
produced legislation protective of managers.99 Various scholars viewed the
possibility of hostile takeovers as potentially beneficial, facilitating the
replacement of some underperforming management teams and confronting
management teams in general with a disciplinary threat that could provide
incentives to be attentive to shareholder interests.100 But regardless of their
effect on shareholder interests, hostile takeovers threatened the interests of
incumbent managers.
As Mark Roe, Roberto Romano, and others have carefully documented,
management interests played an important and active role in bringing about
a wave of antitakeover legislation in a large majority of U.S. states—
legislation that produced severe impediments to hostile takeovers and
provided incumbents with substantial insulation from such threats.101
Pressure from advisers affiliated with incumbents also seems to have played
a role in encouraging the Delaware courts to develop doctrines that provided
incumbents with power to impede hostile takeovers.102 It is therefore natural
that the capital markets of the current era have ownership patterns “reminiscent” of those
existing in the era of “JP Morgan a century ago”); Fichtner et al., supra note 2, at 299
(remarking that the current concentration of ownership is “reminiscent of the early twentiethcentury” and citing Davis, supra).
98. For an influential work providing a historical account of backlash against Wall
Street, see Roe, A Political Theory, supra note 89, at 32–53.
99. For an account of this chapter in business history, see Mark J. Roe, Takeover
Politics, in The Deal Decade 332–47 (Margaret Blair ed., 1993) [hereinafter Roe, Takeover
Politics].
100. For articles discussing the potential benefits of hostile takeovers, see Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 973,
988–94 (2002); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1165–74 (1981); Henry
G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. Pol. Econ. 110, 112–14
(1965).
101. For significant contributions to this line of work, see generally Roe, Takeover
Politics, supra note 99, at 338–52; Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers:
Legislation and Public Opinion, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 457, 458–65 (1988).
102. For a discussion of the evolution of Delaware law in the direction favored by
managers, see Roe, Takeover Politics, supra note 99, at 340–47. A famous memo issued by
Martin Lipton warned that companies may reincorporate out of Delaware in light of the
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for leaders of the Big Three to consider the risk that their potential
stewardship activities could pose a substantial threat to incumbents’ power
and interests and could thereby lead to a regulatory backlash. Leaders of the
Big Three appear to be aware of concerns about the power of large index fund
managers,103 and have made statements that appear to reduce the salience of
their power.104
Let us consider how the approach of the Big Three may influence the
prospect of public or political backlash. Consider a hypothetical
interventional strategy in which the Big Three would seek to improve the
value of portfolio companies by (i) making executive compensation
incentives more tightly linked to performance, (ii) eliminating antitakeover
defenses, (iii) monitoring the business performance of CEOs very closely,
and (iv) forcing out CEOs who do not meet a relatively high standard of
performance. Let us further assume that the interventional strategy would be
expected to enhance the value of the Big Three portfolios by about 5%, and
that the Big Three know of this expected beneficial effect.
Of course, it might be argued that the interventional strategy would be
value decreasing rather than value enhancing. However, our focus here is not
on debating the merits of the interventional strategy, but rather on showing
that the Big Three would have incentives to avoid the strategy even under the
assumed scenario in which the strategy is expected to be beneficial for their
portfolios and the Big Three know this to be the case.
This interventional strategy would create a significant risk of a backlash.
Even though the interventional strategy would be expected to enhance value,
managers of portfolio companies would have strong incentives to resist it and
to mobilize against the Big Three because of the strategy’s adverse effect on
their power and private interests. Because managers control the massive
resources of Main Street companies, they are a formidable foe in the political
Delaware Chancery Court’s decision in City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco Inc., 551
A.2d 787, 799–800 (1988). Memorandum from Martin Lipton, Partner, Wachtell, Lipton,
Rosen & Katz, to Clients (Nov. 3, 1988) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). The
Delaware Supreme Court subsequently overruled the decision and adopted a position far
more protective of incumbents. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140,
1153 (Del. 1988).
103. See, e.g., Letter from Cyrus Taraporevala, supra note 34, at 1 (discussing “growing
concerns about the influence of large index managers”).
104. For a recent release by BlackRock that seems to downplay the power of the Big
Three, see BlackRock, Shareholders Are Dispersed and Diverse 1 (Apr. 2019),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/policy-spotlight-shareholdersare-dispersed-and-diverse-april-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8C5-RAMA] (“[I]ndex funds
and ETFs represent less than 10% of global equity assets. . . . As of year-end 2017, Vanguard,
BlackRock, and State Street . . . represent a minority position in the $83 trillion global equity
market.” (footnote omitted)).
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arena.105
Furthermore, management interests could be expected to receive
substantial public support. Even though we have stipulated that the
interventional strategy is expected to enhance value, this fact would not be
incontestable, and it may not necessarily be salient to the public. To the
contrary, corporate managers, and the groups, advisors, and researchers
associated with them, would be expected to argue forcefully that the
interventional strategy would destroy value. They may claim that the Big
Three would be excessively micromanaging or second-guessing the business
decisions of well-informed managers, creating distraction, or pressuring them
toward short-termism. Indeed, business history suggests that public opinion
would view with suspicion any substantial concentration of power over Main
Street companies by financial decision makers.106
Thus, pursuing any such strategy whereby the Big Three used their power
in ways that adversely affect corporate managers would have a significant
risk of backlash. Such backlash could lead to the imposition of considerable
legal constraints on the power and activities of large index funds and would
thereby have substantial adverse effects on the Big Three. Their leaders
therefore have a significant interest in reducing the risk of such backlash.
The Big Three can reduce the risk of a backlash by limiting the extent to
which their stewardship constrains the power, authority, compensation, and
other private interests of corporate managers. Indeed, a strategy of deference
would likely convert corporate managers into quiet allies rather than foes.
With such a strategy, corporate managers could be expected not to resist the
increasing equity concentration in the hands of the Big Three but rather to
view such concentration as favorable to their own interests. We note that
Martin Lipton, who has long been associated with support for takeover
defenses and other pro-management positions, has favorably described the
increasing influence of index funds.107
Substantial nondeference that would involve frequent resistance to
choices favored by corporate managers would also increase the salience of
the Big Three’s power, and with it, potential concerns from those parts of the
105. For a study of the political power of corporate managers in a historical context, see
Roe, A Political Theory, supra note 89, at 45–48. For an article coauthored by one of us that
develops a formal model of this issue and highlights the importance of the large resources of
public companies for the political influence of the managers of such companies, see generally
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Zvika Neeman, Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics, 23
Rev. Fin. Stud. 1089 (2010).
106. See supra notes 95–102 and accompanying text
107. See, e.g., Lipton, State of Play, supra note 43 (praising the Big Three for their
“continued . . . support for sustainable long-term investment”); Lipton, New Paradigm for
Corporate Governance, supra note 13 (praising the 2018 letter by BlackRock CEO Larry
Fink as “a major step in rejecting activism and short-termism”).
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public that are resistant to large concentrations of financial power. Thus, even
when significant nondeference would serve the financial interests of index
fund investors, index fund managers would recognize that such nondeference
could be costly to their private interests by triggering opposition not only
from corporate managers but also from parts of the public that are resistant
to concentrations of power. Thus, as long as excessive deference does not
become so salient that it imposes significant reputational costs (as discussed
below), deference would serve the interests of Big Three managers by
reducing the risk of backlash.
***
Our analysis above of the private interests of index fund managers
identifies three sources of incentives that can induce index fund managers,
and in particular the Big Three, to be excessively deferential toward corporate
managers. Our empirical analysis, described in section II, documents
evidence that is consistent with the presence of such incentives. But although
commentators taking issue with our view have attempted to engage with
concerns about underinvestment in stewardship, they have thus far not
attempted to respond to concerns about excessive deference.108 Indeed, even
those writers who have recently criticized index fund stewardship have
tended to focus on concerns regarding underinvestment rather than concerns
regarding excessive deference.109
In our view, however, the problem of excessive deference that we analyze
and document deserves the close attention of anyone who is interested in
index fund stewardship. Indeed, even if index funds were to devote adequate
resources to stewardship, to the extent that their qualitative choices (such as
how they vote) are afflicted by excessive deference, that alone would have
substantial adverse effects on public companies and on the interests of the
funds’ beneficial investors.
F. Limits on the Force of Distorting Incentives
Thus far we have focused on the significant incentives that index fund
managers, and especially the Big Three, have to underinvest in stewardship
and to defer excessively to corporate managers. We conclude this Part with
some comments on two factors that may limit the force and the potentially
108. For articles that engage with the former concern but not the latter, see, e.g., Fisch et
al., supra note 16, at 11 (engaging with arguments regarding underinvestment made in an
earlier version of this Article); Kahan & Rock, supra note 16, at 6 (same).
109. See, e.g., Lund, supra note 16, at 531 (basing a proposal for those investing in
passive funds to abstain from voting on the funds’ “low-cost” mode of operations rather than
any deference inclinations).
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damaging consequences of these distorting incentives.
1. Fiduciary Norms
To begin, in addition to index fund managers’ economic incentives,
fiduciary norms and individuals’ desire “to do the right thing” may well have
a significant influence on index fund managers.110 This may lead to behavior
that is more desirable for their investors than that suggested by a pure
incentive analysis. Analyzing the strength of such motivations is beyond the
scope of this Article, but we wish to stress that these motivations might have
a significant effect on behavior. They should not, however, be expected to
eliminate the agency problems we identify, for two reasons.
First, fiduciary norms regarding beneficial investors may sometimes be
in tension with fiduciary norms regarding shareholders. Some index fund
managers (including BlackRock and the parent company of SSGA, State
Street Corporation) are public companies. Fiduciary norms call for executives
of those index funds to maximize the value of the fund management company.
For the reasons we have explained in this Part, the value of the fund
management company might be maximized by the index fund manager
underinvesting in stewardship and displaying deference to the managers of
portfolio companies.
Second, and more importantly, the premise underlying most corporate
governance arrangements is that incentives matter. If we could rely
exclusively on fiduciary norms many key corporate law arrangements would
be unnecessary. To illustrate, if fiduciary norms were sufficient to induce
desirable behavior by managers, then there would be no reason to adopt
executive pay arrangements aimed at generating incentives. The voting
guidelines of index fund managers encourage such executive pay
arrangements and give significant consideration to the incentives they create
in determining how to cast say-on-pay votes.111 Thus, even fully accepting
110. See, e.g., Booraem, What We Do, supra note 34, at 7 (“[Vanguard] act[s] in the best
interest of Vanguard fund investors. Doing the right thing is part of our DNA.”).
111. See, e.g., BlackRock, BlackRock Investment Stewardship’s Approach to Executive
Compensation
1
(Jan.
2019),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-commentary-our-approachto-executive-compensation.pdf [https://perma.cc/V479-F5YA] (“The key purpose of
executive compensation is to attract, reward, and retain competent directors, executives and
other staff . . . with reward for executives contingent at least in part on controllable outcomes
that add value”); Vanguard, Proxy Voting Guidelines for U.S. Portfolio Companies 12
(2019),
https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/portfolio-companyresources/proxy_voting_guidelines.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4T4Z-KM62]
[hereinafter
Vanguard, Proxy Voting Guidelines] (“Compensation policies linked to long-term relative
performance are fundamental drivers of sustainable, long-term value for a company’s
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that fiduciary norms and a desire to do the right thing play a role in shaping
behavior, it remains important to analyze carefully the incentives of index
fund managers.
2. Reputational Constraints
As we have noted, index fund managers might care about how their
stewardship is perceived, not just by the managers of their portfolio
companies but also by their current and potential customers.112 While some
index fund investors will choose their index fund manager solely on the basis
of financial considerations, other current and potential investors—such as
public pension funds, endowments, and individuals with nonfinancial
preferences—might also base their choices among index fund managers on
nonfinancial considerations.113 In particular, such investors might base their
choice partly on nonfinancial considerations, such as their perceptions
regarding the stewardship quality of the index fund managers they use or are
considering.
To the extent that some investors disfavor investing with index fund
managers that they believe to be inferior stewards, even if the investors’
returns are the same as from other index fund managers, index fund managers
will have an incentive to avoid being perceived as inferior stewards.114 Thus,
index fund managers will have an incentive to emphasize their commitment
to stewardship in their public communications. This might also lead index
fund managers to take positions on subjects that they expect to appeal to such
investors.”); 2019 Proxy Voting and Engagement Guidelines: North America (United States
& Canada), State St. Glob. Advisors (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.ssga.com/ourinsights/viewpoints/2019-proxy-voting-and-engagement-guidelines-north-america.html (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter State St. Glob. Advisors, Proxy Voting and
Engagement Guidelines 2019] (“We support management proposals on executive
compensation where there is a strong relationship between executive pay and performance
over a five-year period.”).
112. Vanguard has stated, “We are not a public company, but we must continuously earn
and maintain the public trust. We do that by taking a stand for all investors, by treating them
fairly, and by giving them the best chance for investment success.” Booraem, What We Do,
supra note 34, at 14.
113. For a recent example of public pension fund clients raising concerns about the
stewardship activities undertaken by index fund managers, see Jennifer Thompson, Pension
Funds Raise Concern over Index Manager Stewardship, Fin. Times (June 23, 2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/f75459e3-3a6d-383e-843b-6c7141e8442e (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (“Passive fund managers are failing to fulfil their stewardship duties,
according to their pension scheme clients . . . .”).
114. See, e.g., Booraem, What We Do, supra note 34, at 7 (“In addition to professional
investment management, what people expect when they invest in a mutual fund is
professional investment stewardship.”).
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investors, such as gender diversity on boards and climate change
disclosure.115
These incentives are also likely to discourage behavior on the part of
index fund managers that would make more salient their incentives to
underinvest in stewardship or to be deferential to corporate managers. But as
we have stressed above, most investors are unlikely to have sufficient
expertise or resources to evaluate the many stewardship decisions made by
index fund managers. As a result, incentives to avoid being perceived as
inferior stewards are unlikely to eliminate the many nonsalient ways that the
incentives described by the agency-costs view affect the behavior of index
fund managers.
Consistent with our analysis that the Big Three have an incentive to make
their power less salient, communications by the Big Three have sought to
downplay their power. For example, a recent release by BlackRock seeks to
challenge views that “index fund managers may wield outsized influence
over corporations due to the size of their shareholdings in public
companies.”116 The release presents a detailed empirical analysis showing
that a large majority of votes are determined by margins larger than the stake
held by any given index fund manager. It concludes that “claims that index
fund managers are determining the outcome of most proxy votes is not
supported by the data.”117 However, a finding that a particular index fund
manager frequently does not have decisive power over the outcome of
shareholder votes does not imply that the manager does not wield substantial
power and influence. Indeed, even though the Big Three managers often do
not have decisive power to determine by themselves the outcome of
shareholder votes, their significant influence on the outcome leads issuers and
their advisors to pay close attention to the Big Three’s positions and voting
behavior.118
115. See, e.g., John Gapper, Index Fund Managers Are Too Big for Comfort, Fin. Times
(Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/ad8c8a12-fd5f-11e8-aebf-99e208d3e521 (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (“The Big Three have realised they cannot keep quiet
and hope that no one will notice them.”). For a view that passive investors devote attention
to stewardship to “boost their ﬁrm’s image,” see Dick Weil, Passive Investors, Don’t Vote,
Wall St. J. (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/passive-investors-dont-vote1520552657 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
116. See BlackRock, Proxy Voting Outcomes: By the Numbers 1 (2019),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/policy-spotlight-proxy-votingoutcomes-by-the-numbers-april-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6HU-DBJW] [hereinafter
BlackRock, Proxy Voting Outcomes].
117. Id.
118. For media reports that pay close attention to the positions of the Big Three, see, e.g.,
Cara Lombardo & Dawn Lim, Vanguard to Take Tougher Stance Against Overextended
Board Members, Wall St. J. (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/vanguard-to-take-
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Similarly, another release by BlackRock seeks to downplay the impact
that it and other Big Three managers have on executive pay arrangements.119
The release explains that not only do index fund managers not have a decisive
impact on whether say-on-pay votes pass but there are other players that
could have more impact. The release stresses that boards of directors,
compensation committees, and independent compensation consultants for
such committees play important roles in shaping pay arrangements, and that
say-on-pay votes are merely “non-binding advisory votes by shareholders.”120
But although say-on-pay proposals are formally nonbinding, issuers seek to
avoid having a significant proportion of shares voted against say-on-pay
proposals, and they are therefore likely to pay attention to the preferences and
positions expressed by shareholders in their say-on-pay votes and in their
guidelines with respect to executive compensation.121 In any event, putting
tougher-stance-against-overextended-board-members-11554980403 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (reporting on an update to Vanguard’s proxy voting guidelines);
Andrew Ross Sorkin, World’s Biggest Investor Tells C.E.O.s Purpose Is the ‘Animating
Force’
for
Profits,
N.Y.
Times
Dealbook
(Jan.
17,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/17/business/dealbook/blackrock-larry-fink-letter.html
[https://perma.cc/F5HK-54J5] (reporting on BlackRock CEO Larry Fink’s letter to
companies).
For posts on the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial
Regulation by various advisors that report on and expect companies to pay close attention to
positions expressed and votes cast by the Big Three, see, e.g., Pamela L. Marcogliese,
Elizabeth K. Bieber & Brennan K. Halloran, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP,
Synthesizing the Messages from BlackRock, State Street, and T. Rowe Price, Harvard Law
Sch. Forum on Corp. Governance & Fin. Regulation (Feb. 28, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/28/synthesizing-the-messages-from-blackrockstate-street-and-t-rowe-price/ [https://perma.cc/96L2-JA9J] (commenting on governance
letters issued by BlackRock and SSGA); Ellen J. Odener & Aabha Sharma, Weil, Gotshal &
Manges LLP, Updated BlackRock Proxy Voting Guidelines, Harvard Law Sch. Forum on
Corp.
Governance
&
Fin.
Regulation
(Feb.
9,
2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/02/09/updated-blackrock-proxy-voting-guidelines/
[https://perma.cc/D86F-Z7V4] (discussing changes to BlackRock’s voting guidelines).
119. See BlackRock, Executive Compensation: The Role of Public Company
Shareholders 1 (Apr. 2019), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/
policy-spotlight-executive-compensation-the-role-of-public-company-shareholders-april2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/9N6G-YV8N].
120. Id.
121. The BlackRock release also stresses that proxy advisors have “considerable
influence” on the outcome of say-on-pay votes, and might influence 15–25% of the votes.
Id. (“[R]ecommendations by proxy advisory firms can determine between 15-25% of a sayon-pay vote.”). But recent academic work estimates that the influence of proxy advisors is
substantially lower than 15–25%. See Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power
of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869, 906 (2010) (“Overall, we consider
it likely that an ISS recommendation shifts 6% to 10% of shareholder votes . . . .”). Of
course, if a 15–25% influence amounts to “considerable influence,” then the Big Three’s
shares of votes cast should also be viewed as wielding “considerable influence.”
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aside the merits of the substantive arguments in this release, BlackRock’s
issuance of this release is consistent with our argument that the Big Three
have an incentive to downplay and reduce the salience of their power as much
as possible.
Finally, we note that this discussion carries significant implications for
the potential value of this Article. To the extent that our analysis serves to
inform investors of index fund manager incentives and disincentives
regarding stewardship quality, it could contribute to reducing deviations from
desirable stewardship decisions. We return to this issue in section III.C below.
II. EVIDENCE
In this Part we turn from theory to evidence. As we stressed in the
Introduction, the critical test for any financial and economic theory is
empirical. Are the predictions of our incentive analysis borne out? Does the
agency-costs view fit and explain the evidence better (or worse) than the
value-maximization view? We consider these questions below.
Our empirical investigation puts forward evidence regarding the full
range of stewardship activities that the Big Three do and do not undertake.
We combine data from various providers with hand-collected data. We focus
on the Big Three because they manage most of the index assets under
management by investment managers and because their stewardship reports
enable an empirical assessment of their stewardship activities.
Section II.A begins by examining four dimensions of the stewardship
activities that the Big Three do undertake, and how they do them. Section
II.B then considers five stewardship activities that the Big Three do not
adequately undertake.
In the course of our analysis, we assess the extent to which the evidence
is consistent with the value-maximization and agency-costs views of index
fund stewardship. On the whole, the empirical patterns we document in this
Part are inconsistent—or at least in tension—with the value-maximizing
view. As we explain below, however, these empirical patterns are consistent
with—and can be explained by—the predictions generated by the agencycosts view: that index fund managers have considerable incentives to both
underinvest in stewardship and defer excessively to corporate managers.
In assessing the evidence on index fund stewardship, we consider
arguments that the absence or infrequency of some stewardship activities is
consistent with value maximization because such activities are outside the
“business models” of the Big Three. As we explain, however, such arguments
raise the question of why such activities are outside the business models. The
“business models” of the Big Three and the stewardship activities they choose
to undertake are not exogenous. Rather, they are a product of choices made
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by index fund managers, and thus they follow from the incentives that we
analyze.
A. What the Big Three Do, and How They Do It
Section II.A examines what the Big Three do in terms of stewardship,
and how they do it. The four dimensions of stewardship activities that we
examine are (i) their level of investments in stewardship; (ii) their private
engagements; (iii) their focus on divergences from governance principles;
and (iv) their voting decisions.
1. Stewardships Budgets and Personnel
In recent years, the Big Three have substantially increased the resources
they devote to stewardship.122 Vanguard’s stewardship “team has doubled in
size since 2015,”123 and BlackRock has announced its intent “to double the
size of [its] investment stewardship team over the next three years.”124 The
Big Three have also noted the significant numbers of stewardship personnel
that they employ, the number of corporate meetings at which they vote, and
the number of companies with which they engage.125 Supporters of index fund
stewardship have viewed these figures as reassuring and promising.126
However, any assessment of the Big Three’s stewardship activities must
122. A survey of investment fund managers conducted in October 2017 showed that,
from 2014 to 2017, the number of stewardship team members (excluding environmental,
social, and governance (ESG) analysts and portfolio managers of investment teams)
increased from twenty to thirty-three at BlackRock, from ten to twenty-one at Vanguard, and
from eight to eleven at SSGA. See Bioy et al., supra note 51, at 19 exh.10 (2017),
https://wwwprd.morningstar.com/content/dam/marketing/shared/pdfs/Research/Morningstar-PassiveActive-Stewardship.pdf [https://perma.cc/RQY2-F68E].
123. Vanguard, Investment Stewardship 2017 Annual Report 2 (2017),
https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/annual-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V8KK-TZ6D] [hereinafter Vanguard, Annual Stewardship Report
2016-17].
124. Fink, supra note 8.
125. For instance, a senior Vanguard officer stated that, in 2018, “[w]e voted [our] funds’
proxies at nearly 20,000 meetings and engaged directly with more than 700 portfolio
companies.” Vanguard, Annual Stewardship Report 2017-18, supra note 46, at 2. Vanguard’s
then-CEO F. William McNabb III stated that Vanguard’s investment stewardship team “held
more than 950 engagements with company leaders” in 2017. Vanguard, Annual Stewardship
Report 2016-17, supra note 123, at 1.
126. For discussions by commentators taking issue with our view and who favorably cite
the Big Three’s statements on the scale of their activities, see Fisch et al., supra note 16
(manuscript at 25–26).
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consider both the vast number of portfolio companies in which they invest
and the many such companies in which they hold substantial stakes with
significant monetary value. We conduct such an assessment below and find
that it raises significant concerns that the Big Three substantially underinvest
in stewardship.127
127. For the empirical analyses in section II.A.1, including the results reported in Tables
1–3, we used the most recent data that we were able to obtain for each of the Big Three
relating to (a) level of personnel, (b) total number of portfolio companies, (c) number of U.S.
portfolio companies, (d) total equity assets under management, (e) equity under management
invested in U.S. portfolio companies, and (f) fees and expenses:
(a) Data on the number of stewardship personnel for BlackRock were obtained from the most
recent annual stewardship report; for SSGA, from a recent article in the Wall Street Journal;
and for Vanguard, from Bioy et al.
(b) Data on the total number of portfolio companies for Vanguard are from its annual
stewardship report. BlackRock and SSGA do not disclose the total number of their portfolio
companies. We estimate those figures as the number of company meetings at which
BlackRock and SSGA voted, multiplied by the ratio of the number of meetings at which
Vanguard voted to the number of Vanguard’s portfolio companies.
(c) Data on the number of U.S. portfolio companies for BlackRock and Vanguard are from
their annual stewardship reports, and, for SSGA, from FactSet Res. Sys., Ownership
Database (last visited Oct. 3, 2019).
(d) Data on total equity assets under management for BlackRock and SSGA are from their
most recent annual reports on Form 10-K, and, for Vanguard, from its annual stewardship
report.
(e) Data on the equity assets under management in U.S. companies are from FactSet
Ownership.
(f) Fees and expenses for each of the Big Three are estimated by multiplying total equity
assets under management by the average expense ratios for each of the Big Three. Average
expense ratios are from Morningstar.
See BlackRock, 2019 Investment Stewardship Annual Report 24 (2019),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-annual-stewardship-report2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/9C4S-EBWU] [hereinafter BlackRock, Annual Stewardship
Report 2018-19]; State St. Glob. Advisors, Annual Stewardship Report 2018, supra note 52,
at 9; Vanguard, Investment Stewardship: 2019 Annual Report 9, 29 (2019) [hereinafter
Vanguard, Annual Stewardship Report 2018-19], https://about.vanguard.com/investmentstewardship/perspectives-andcommentary/2019_investment_stewardship_annual_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NAW8CD9G]; Dawn Lim, Index Funds Are the New Kings of Wall Street, Wall St. J. (Sep. 18,
2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/index-funds-are-the-new-kings-of-wall-street11568799004 (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Bioy et al., supra note 51, at 19
exh.10 (stewardship personnel data); BlackRock, Annual Report for the Year Ended
December 31, 2018 (Form 10-K), at 2 (filed Feb. 28, 2019); State St. Corp., Annual Report
for the Year Ended December 31, 2018 (Form 10-K), at 71 (filed Feb. 21, 2019); Fast Facts
About
Vanguard,
Vanguard,
https://about.vanguard.com/who-we-are/fast-facts/
[https://perma.cc/CN8M-HB35] (last visited Sept. 21, 2019); Morningstar, supra note 59, at
12. We refer to BlackRock, Vanguard, and SSGA stewardship reports collectively as the “Big
Three Stewardship Reports.”

48

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 119:1

(a) Current Levels of Stewardship Investment. Table 1 below uses data
from Morningstar and the most recent stewardship reports of the Big Three
to present the number of stewardship personnel that each manager employs,
and the number of portfolio companies that each manages in the United States
and abroad.
Table 1. Stewardship Personnel and Portfolio Companies
BlackRock

Vanguard

SSGA

45

21

12

Portfolio Companies
(Worldwide)

11,246

13,225

12,191

Portfolio Companies (U.S.)

3,896

3,836

3,311*

Stewardship Personnel

* Estimated

We next estimate the total investment in stewardship by each of the Big
Three. We assume, conservatively, that the average cost of each stewardship
staff member (including benefits and payroll loading rates) is $300,000 per
year.128 Table 2 shows the estimated cost of each of the Big Three’s
stewardship departments and that cost as a proportion of the estimated fees
from managing these assets. As the Table shows, the estimated investment in
stewardship by BlackRock and Vanguard is below $15 million each, and that
of SSGA is below $5 million. All three stewardship budgets are less than onefifth of 1%—only 0.2%—of the estimated fees that each of the Big Three
charge for managing equity assets. Thus, although the Big Three stress the
importance of stewardship, their stewardship budgets are not economically
significant in the context of their operations and relative to the fees that they
charge. Clearly, the stewardship budgets of each of the Big Three could be
increased multiple times without creating any material funding problem or
requiring any material change in fee levels.

128. According to Glassdoor.com, the average base salary at Blackrock is $76,273 for
analysts; $100,196 for associates; $132,409 for vice presidents; $173,398 for directors; and
$218,898
for
managing
directors.
See
BlackRock
Salaries,
Glassdoor,
https://www.glassdoor.com/Salary/BlackRock-Salaries-E9331.htm
[https://perma.cc/C56M-DUQQ] (last visited Oct. 9, 2019). Furthermore, BlackRock’s own
disclosure indicates that the total median pay for BlackRock employees in 2018 was
$136,313. BlackRock, 2019 Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 83 (2019). These sources
suggest that our assumption of an average per-person cost of $300,000 is likely to be
conservative. Our understanding from conversations with investment manager employees is
that employees in corporate governance positions receive lower salaries, on average, than
those in investment positions.
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Table 2. Stewardship Investments Relative to Investment Manager Fees
BlackRock

Vanguard

SSGA

Stewardship Investment as % of Estimated
Fees
Estimated Stewardship Investment ($m)

$13.5

$6.3

$3.6

Estimated Fees & Expenses ($m)

$9,107

$3,467

$2,625

Stewardship as % of Fees & Expenses

0.15%

0.18%

0.14%

In addition to stewardship personnel expenses, the Big Three also pay
proxy advisors (including ISS and Glass Lewis) for their services. But these
payments are unlikely to affect the economic significance of the Big Three’s
stewardship spending. Furthermore, whereas the Big Three’s stewardship
operations likely make some use of the reports issued by the proxy advisory
firms, Big Three officers regularly stress that they do not defer to proxy
advisor conclusions, but rather that they make their own decisions.129
Financial economists have empirically confirmed that institutional investors
with large assets under management such as the Big Three often do not follow
the recommendations of proxy advisors.130
129. See, e.g., BlackRock, Stewardship Ecosystem, supra note 29, at 10–11 (presenting
data on differences between BlackRock’s voting record and the recommendations of Glass
Lewis and ISS); Barbara Novick, BlackRock Makes Its Own Proxy-Voting Choices, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/blackrock-makes-its-own-proxyvoting-choices-1538075415 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (same); see also
BlackRock,
Proxy
Voting
and
Shareholder
Engagement
FAQ,
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/fact-sheet/blk-responsible-investment-faqglobal.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3MN-A2PX] (last visited Sept. 8, 2019) (“We do not follow
any single proxy advisor’s voting recommendations.”); Booraem, What We Do, supra note
34, at 11 (“We don’t . . . vote in lockstep with proxy advisor recommendations.”); SEC,
Roundtable on the Proxy Process 182 (2018) (comments of Rakhi Kumar, Senior Managing
Director and Head of ESG Investments and Asset Stewardship, SSGA),
https://www.sec.gov/files/proxy-round-table-transcript-111518.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NMU4-VLDS] (“[SSGA] use[s] the proxy advisory firms in three ways.
One is to execute our vote guidelines; two, as research insides [sic]; and three, for the
operational ease that they provide to their platform . . . . We have our own voting
guidelines . . . .”).
130. For empirical evidence that many large investment managers do not follow the
recommendations of proxy advisors ISS or Glass Lewis, see Peter Iliev & Michelle Lowry,
Are Mutual Funds Active Voters?, 28 Rev. Fin. Stud. 446, 465–66 (2015) (presenting
evidence that index fund voting differs significantly from ISS recommendations); Davidson
Heath, Daniele Macciocchi, Roni Michaely & Matthew Ringgenberg, Do Index Funds
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Another important dimension for assessing the levels of investment in
stewardship is the amount of personnel time that each of the Big Three
dedicates to particular portfolio companies. To estimate this amount, we
assume (conservatively) that each stewardship team member works on all
weekdays other than federal holidays (that is, they take no vacation or sick
days), for a total of 250 workdays per year. We also assume (again
conservatively) that stewardship personnel spend 100% of their time on
“pure” stewardship and no time at all on other activities, such as
administration, training, and reporting.
To estimate the amount of personnel time or stewardship budget devoted
to a given company we had to make assumptions regarding how the Big Three
allocate their stewardship time among their portfolio companies. In
particular, we examined four different potential allocation scenarios. Scenario
1 assumes that the Big Three divide their stewardship resources equally
among all of their portfolio companies. Because our focus is on
understanding the quality of corporate governance in U.S. public companies,
Scenario 2 assumes (conservatively) that the Big Three spend 75% of their
stewardship resources on U.S. portfolio companies (even though those
companies constitute less than 25% of each manager’s total portfolio
companies). Because index fund managers are likely to allocate more
stewardship time to portfolio companies in which their investments are larger,
Scenario 3 calculates how much time and investment the Big Three make for
each $1 billion equity position in their worldwide portfolios, and Scenario 4
calculates the stewardship time and investment for each $1 billion equity
position in U.S. public companies (again assuming that the Big Three devote
75% of their stewardship resources to U.S. companies).
For each of these four scenarios, Table 3 provides estimates of the
amount of personnel time and the dollar cost of this personnel time that the
Big Three allocated to stewardship. Table 3 indicates that, no matter the
scenario, each of the Big Three spent very limited resources on stewardship—
either in personnel time or in dollar cost—per portfolio company, including
for positions of significant monetary value. Even under the most conservative
assumptions, in order to oversee each of their billion-dollar positions,
BlackRock spent less than 4 person-days per year and less than $5,000 in
Monitor? 10–11 (Swiss Fin. Inst. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 19-08, 2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3259433 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (presenting
evidence of index funds voting against ISS recommendations for more than 50% of proposals
on which ISS disagrees with company management); Ryan Bubb & Emiliano Catan, The
Party Structure of Mutual Funds 13–14 (Mar. 10, 2019) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3124039 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (presenting
evidence of variation between Big Three voting and ISS recommendations). In section
II.A.4, infra, we provide empirical evidence on the divergence between say-on-pay votes of
the Big Three and those recommended by proxy advisors.
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stewardship costs per year, and each of SSGA and Vanguard spent less than
5 person-days per year and less than $2,500 in stewardship costs per year.
Table 3. Stewardship Per Portfolio Company
BlackRock

Vanguard

SSGA

Scenario 1: Equal Allocation of Stewardship
Time, per Portfolio Company (Worldwide)

1.00

0.40

0.25

Scenario 2: Stewardship Allocated 75% to U.S.
Companies, per U.S. Company

2.17

1.03

0.68

Scenario 3: Proportional Stewardship Allocation,
per $1bn Position Worldwide

3.71

1.36

1.94

Scenario 4: Proportional Stewardship Allocation,
per $1bn Position in U.S. Companies

3.81

1.57

1.77

Scenario 1: Equal Allocation of Stewardship
Time, per Portfolio Company (Worldwide)

$1,200

$476

$295

Scenario 2: Stewardship Allocated 75% to U.S.
Companies, per U.S. Company

$2,599

$1,232

$815

Scenario 3: Proportional Stewardship Allocation,
per $1bn Position Worldwide

$4,447

$1,635

$2,332

Scenario 4: Proportional Stewardship Allocation,
per $1bn Position in U.S. Companies

$4,575

$1,887

$2,128

Stewardship Time (Person-Days)

Stewardship Investment ($)

To be sure, it is possible to conceive of many other scenarios for
allocating personnel time among portfolio companies. For instance, the Big
Three might devote more time to companies that are targets of hedge fund
activists and less time to the (many more) companies that are not. Or the Big
Three might devote more time to companies that have been afflicted by
scandals or that have experienced poor financial performance, and less time
to the (many more) companies that have not. While these scenarios would
obviously involve shifting personnel time from some companies to others,
they would not affect the aggregate personnel resources devoted to
stewardship by each of the Big Three reported above. The question we
consider is whether these aggregate resources are sufficient for effective
stewardship.
(b) Assessing Current Investment Levels. Recall the factors that provide
the Big Three with incentives to underinvest in stewardship relative to what
would be desirable for their beneficial investors. Given that the Big Three

52

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 119:1

hold positions of about 5% or more in a large number of significant U.S.
companies,131 with many of these positions worth more than $1 billion, it
would be in the interest of index fund investors for those portfolio companies
to receive significant time and attention from the Big Three’s stewardship
personnel.
Recall the example, discussed in section I.D.1, of an index fund portfolio
with a sole owner-manager and a $1 billion investment in a particular
portfolio company. In that case it would be in the interests of the index fund’s
beneficial investors to make additional marginal investments in stewardship
up to $1 million if such spending could bring about a 0.1% increase in value.
But as we discussed in section I.D, an index fund manager that has a
fractional fee of 1% of assets under management would have an incentive to
make additional marginal investments in stewardship up to $10,000. The
concerns raised by this analysis are reinforced by the evidence presented in
Table 3. The levels of stewardship described in Table 2 and Table 3 would
enable only limited and cursory attention to a large majority of the Big
Three’s portfolio companies, including those in which they hold positions of
significant monetary value.
In assessing these concerns, we note that evaluation of the governance
and performance of each public company requires reviewing hundreds of
pages of documents, at a minimum. These include (i) the annual report and
proxy statement, (ii) the company’s long term plans and performance, (iii)
executive compensation arrangements, and (iv) management proposals and
shareholder proposals going to a vote. Investors with large stakes may also
want to review other materials, such as analyst reports and proxy advisory
assessments.132
We consider three possible responses to the above concerns. First, it
could be argued that our analysis of per-company personnel time assumes
that a certain amount of time must be spent with respect to every portfolio
company. But many portfolio companies—such as those that do not suffer
from a crisis or a major governance or performance problem—arguably may
not require any attention or investment in personnel time. In this view, the
131. See infra Table 8.
132. A recent study provides empirical evidence that “the largest five fund families

[including the Big Three] access governance-related filings of 29% of their portfolio firms.”
Peter Iliev, Jonathan Kalodimos & Michelle Lowry, Investors’ Attention to Corporate
Governance 3 (Mar. 6, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3162407
(on file with the Columbia Law Review). This finding indicates that Big Three personnel
might not even “access” governance-related filings for a majority of their portfolio
companies in which they are substantial shareholders. We note that “accessing” governancerelated filings does not by itself indicate that those filings were reviewed in ways that go
beyond mere cursory examination.
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time saved by ignoring these companies could be devoted to those companies
that do face such major problems with performance.133
However, the interests of index fund investors would not be served by
ignoring or paying little attention to the majority of public companies that do
not obviously suffer from such problems. Monitoring and engaging with such
companies could still improve value by addressing problems falling short of
a crisis or a governance failure and can also reveal the presence of substantial
problems before they become clearly apparent. This is especially the case
since the Big Three will generally be among the largest shareholders in the
company, and so would have to rely on smaller and potentially less-wellresourced shareholders to identify these problems.
Second, it could be argued that economies of scale (from dealing with
many portfolio companies with similar problems) allow the Big Three to
spend much less time on any individual company.134 When the stewardship
staff of a Big Three manager studies an issue that arises in numerous
companies, so the argument goes, the staff can apply their conclusions to all
of those many companies, thereby spreading the cost of their research.135 But
even with the use of some generally applicable insights, effective stewardship
also requires considering detailed, company-specific information, and using
it to make adjustments to general policies. Without such consideration, it is
not possible to make decisions that are best suited to the great variation in
circumstances of different portfolio companies.136

133. We are grateful to Mark Roe for encouraging us to respond to this objection.
134. For versions of this argument by commentators that view index fund stewardship

favorably, see, for example, Asaf Eckstein, The Virtue of Common Ownership in an Era of
Corporate Compliance, 105 Iowa L. Rev. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 8–9),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3194605 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that
institutional investors can enjoy the benefits of economies of scale with respect to macrolegal
risks common to their large portfolio of companies); Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript
at 7) (asserting that passive investors are able to spread the cost of obtaining information
across their portfolios); Kahan & Rock, supra note 16, at 34–35 (explaining that investment
managers with broad portfolios have economies of scope in considering issues that affect
many of those companies). We are grateful to John Coates for stressing the need to respond
to this objection.
135. See, e.g., Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript at 26) (“[G]iven the fact that passive
funds do not focus on individual firm-specific characteristics, the size of their governance
staffs offers substantial manpower to analyze governance issues.”).
136. Fisch, Hamdani, and Davidoff Solomon seek to defend the Big Three’s existing
levels of stewardship investment by arguing that “the total number of employees at many
hedge funds, which engage in significantly greater firm-specific research, is not dramatically
higher than full-time governance staff at the major passive investors.” Id. In making this
claim, Fisch, Hamdani, and Davidoff Solomon cite to a media report that activist hedge fund
Pershing Square reduced its total number of employees to 46. See id at n.160. But this
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Consider decisions whether to vote for or against a company’s executive
compensation arrangements at the company’s annual meeting. Clearly,
researching compensation arrangements at many companies gives the staff of
index fund managers experience and expertise that might reduce the average
time they require to make each individual voting decision. But effective
assessment of compensation arrangements requires staff members to obtain
and assess information about the details of the company’s financial
performance and compensation arrangements from the company’s disclosure
documents, and possibly to compare those arrangements to the compensation
arrangements of relevant peer companies.
To take another example, consider index fund managers’ decisions
regarding whether companies have appropriate mechanisms for dealing with
various legal and compliance risks. According to one supporter of index fund
stewardship, Asaf Eckstein, these decisions are a good example of an activity
that involves substantial economies of scale, and could therefore be
effectively and inexpensively carried out by a Big Three manager holding
positions in many companies.137 But the monitoring necessary for these
decisions cannot be effectively carried out using general principles
augmented with cursory examinations of company-specific information. To
illustrate, consider the list of compliance mechanisms that Eckstein argues
that pharmaceutical companies should put in place.138 Our review of this list

argument overlooks two critical differences between the stewardship of a Big Three index
fund and that of an activist hedge fund such as Pershing Square.
First, each of the Big Three index funds has trillions of dollars of equity investments,
whereas Pershing Square managed less than $10 billion in assets at the time of the media
report. Svea Herbst-Bayliss, Ackman Cuts Staff, Shuns Limelight as He Seeks to Turn
Around Fund, Reuters (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hedgefundsackman-exclusive-idUSKBN1FB32Y [https://perma.cc/BW4T-5JN3].
Second, each of the Big Three index funds has hundreds of positions that are valued at
more than $1 billion, see supra note 56 and accompanying text, whereas an activist hedge
fund such as Pershing Square is likely to have less than a handful of such positions at any
one time. See Bebchuk et al., Agency Problems of Institutional Investors, supra note 15, at
105. Indeed, as of the end of the month immediately prior to the media report cited by Fisch,
Hamdani, and Davidoff Solomon, Pershing Square held positions exceeding $1 billion in
value in only two companies (a position in a third company was valued at $995 million). See
Pershing Square Capital Mgmt., L.P., Information Table (Form 13F) (Feb. 14, 2018). For
these reasons, the stewardship investment level that would best serve the interests of the
beneficial investors of each of the Big Three index funds would likely be substantially higher
than the level of stewardship investment that would best serve the interest of the beneficial
investors of an activist hedge fund such as Pershing Square.
137. For Eckstein’s detailed account of this argument, see Eckstein, supra note 134
(manuscript at 30–53).
138. This list includes:
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indicates that monitoring whether any given company adequately maintains
such mechanisms would require obtaining and assessing detailed companyspecific information.139
Third, it might be argued that some stewardship activities of the Big
Three that are not very expensive may produce benefits in a large number of
companies, generating a relatively large impact for the amount spent. For
example, the Big Three’s proxy voting guidelines and their materials
expressing their general views on certain corporate governance matters could
affect many companies for a limited per-company cost.140 But our analysis
does not question that Big Three stewardship produces significant benefits.
The problem on which we focus is that, in addition to the stewardship
activities that can be undertaken at very low per-company cost, there are some
value-enhancing stewardship activities that require consideration of detailed
company-specific information. Consistent with the evidence in this section,
the Big Three have incentives to underinvest in these activities, such that the
total benefit produced by their stewardship is less than would be desirable for
their beneficial investors.

“the establishment of a system to monitor transactions with members of the healthcare
community, an improved anti-corruption training program, a third-party due diligence
program, independent control functions, creating an office charged with addressing reports
of misconduct and a dedicated Global Compliance Audit group; as well as improved
mechanisms to ensure that no illegal influence will be made through means that seem to be
legitimate such as marketing events, educational seminars and medical studies.”
Id. (manuscript at 29–30) (footnote omitted).
139. Kahan and Rock, who also take issue with our view, acknowledge that there are
many matters in which company-specific information is valuable. See, e.g., Kahan & Rock,
supra note 16, at 36 (“The information that is material to a vote on any particular issue
consists of some mix of issue-specific information [and] company-specific
information . . . .”). But they argue that company-specific information is included in proxy
statements. See id. at 39 (“[O]n many matters on which company specific information is
valuable . . . a significant amount of company-specific information and analysis will be
publicly disclosed in proxy statements and other campaign materials.”). Although we agree
that significant company-specific information is provided in proxy statements (as well as in
other company disclosures, proxy advisor reports, and other materials), absorbing and
evaluating all the relevant company-specific information often requires significant time and
attention.
140. In a response to an earlier draft of this Article that an SSGA officer discussed with
the Wall Street Journal, the SSGA officer stressed the “extensive thought-leadership work
that [SSGA] believes influences corporate behavior.” Simon Constable, Index-Fund Firms
Gain Power, but Fall Short in Stewardship, Research Shows, Wall St. J. (July 8, 2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/index-fund-firms-gain-power-but-fall-short-in-stewardshipresearch-shows-11562637900 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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2. Private Engagements
Later in this Part we discuss evidence that the Big Three largely refrain
from using valuable stewardship tools. Before doing so, however, we
consider the argument that “behind-the-scenes” engagement with portfolio
companies is an effective substitute for these other stewardship tools.141 Over
the last several years, Big Three executives have stressed the central role that
private engagement plays in their stewardship, and have expressed their view
that private, behind-the-scenes engagement is a superior stewardship tool.142
Academic commentators who view index fund stewardship favorably have
also emphasized the significance of the private engagement channel.143
141. Responding in the same Wall Street Journal article, Vanguard stressed the critical
importance of engagement to the Big Three’s stewardship activities. Commenting on the
evidence we provide on pro-management voting by the Big Three, Vanguard stated that
voting is “only one part of the larger corporate governance process. We regularly engage
with companies on our shareholders’ behalf and believe that engagement and broader
advocacy, in addition to voting, can effect meaningful changes that generate long-term value
for all shareholders.” See id.
142. For comments by senior officers of BlackRock stressing the central role of
engagement, see, for example, BlackRock, Investment Stewardship Report: 2017 Voting and
Engagement
Report
2
(2017),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-2017-annual-voting-andengagment-statistics-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/WAE4-3CVX] [hereinafter BlackRock,
Annual Stewardship Report 2016-17] (“The key to effective engagement is constructive and
private communication.”); BlackRock, Stewardship Ecosystem, supra note 29, at 7
(“Engagement is core to our stewardship program.”); Matthew J. Mallow & Jasmin Sethi,
Engagement: The Missing Middle Approach in the Bebchuk–Strine Debate, 12 N.Y.U. J.L.
& Bus. 385, 392 (2016) (“Engaging with boards and firm executives . . . can bring about
change through incremental, non-confrontational means.”); Sarah Krouse, David Benoit &
Tom McGinty, Meet the New Corporate Power Brokers: Passive Investors, Wall St. J. (Oct.
24,
2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-corporate-power-brokers-passiveinvestors-1477320101 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[M]eetings behind closed
doors can go further than votes against management . . . .”). For similar comments by a senior
officer of Vanguard, see Glenn Booraem, Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners, Vanguard
(June 20, 2013), https://global.vanguard.com/portal/site/institutional/ch/en/articles/researchand-commentary/topical-insights/passive-investors-passive-owners-tlor
[https://perma.cc/RS9T-RUT4] (“[Private engagement is] perhaps [the] more important . . .
component of [Vanguard’s] governance program; . . . [it] provides for a level of nuance and
precision that voting, in and of itself, lacks . . . [and] is where the action is . . . [engagement]
is the foundation of our Investment Stewardship Program.”).
143. For a discussion of private engagements by such supporters, see, for example, Fisch
et al., supra note 16 (manuscript at 24–25) (“In recent years, private engagement by mutual
funds has grown dramatically. . . . The engagement of the large passive investors has
particularly increased.” (footnote omitted)). But Fisch, Hamdani, and Davidoff Solomon do
not engage with the evidence provided in this section that such private engagement still takes
place in only a small minority of the Big Three’s portfolio companies.
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This section therefore examines private engagements.144 Any assessment
144. The analyses in section II.A.2, including the results reported in Table 4, are based
on data from the Big Three Stewardship Reports. We use this data to obtain or estimate, for
each of the Big Three, in each year from 2017 to 2019, (a) how many portfolio companies
they had, (b) how many of those companies they engage with, and (c) how many of those
companies had more than one engagement. For (a) we use the data for the number of portfolio
companies used in section II.A.1 and Table 1 and described in supra note 127. Below we
explain how we derive (b) and (c) for each of the Big Three.
SSGA provides information regarding the number of companies with which it engaged
and the number of companies with which it had multiple engagements for each year from
2017 to 2019 in its Annual Stewardship Reports.
BlackRock’s 2019 Annual Stewardship Report provides data on the number of
companies with which it engaged, and the proportion of those companies with which it had
multiple engagements, but in prior years that data is not available. In 2018 BlackRock
disclosed the number of companies with which it engaged, but not the number of companies
with which it had multiple engagements. We infer that number by assuming, conservatively,
that BlackRock conducted no more than two engagements with any portfolio. This allows us
to deduce the maximum number of companies with which BlackRock held multiple
engagements. This estimate is conservative because if BlackRock held more than two
engagements with any companies then the number of companies with which it held multiple
engagements would be fewer than we estimate. Indeed, our approach would result in an
estimate of 40.6% of the companies it engaged with having multiple engagements, whereas
by its own disclosure the actual proportion was 25%. In 2017 BlackRock disclosed the total
number of its engagements, but not the number of companies it engaged with or the number
of companies that had multiple engagements. We estimate the number of companies engaged
and the number of multiple engagements by assuming that the proportion of companies that
BlackRock engaged with in 2017 that involved multiple engagements was the same as for
2018.
Vanguard’s 2017 Annual Stewardship Report disclosed the number of its engagements
and the number of companies with which it held engagements in that year. We use that data
to infer the maximum number of multiple engagements in the same way as for BlackRock.
Vanguard did not disclose its total number of engagements for 2018 or 2019. We therefore
estimate the proportion of its portfolio with which it held multiple engagements by assuming
that the proportion of the companies it engaged with that involved multiple engagements was
the same in 2018 and 2019 as it was in 2017.
See BlackRock, Annual Stewardship Report 2016-17, supra note 142, at 20; BlackRock,
BlackRock
Investment
Stewardship
2018
Annual
Report
20
(2018)
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-annual-stewardship-report2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/VAK5-ZBGV] [hereinafter, BlackRock, Annual Stewardship
Report 2017-18]; BlackRock, Annual Stewardship Report 2018-19, supra note 127, at 4;
State St. Glob. Advisors, Annual Stewardship Report 2016, supra note 9, at 5; State St. Glob.
Advisors, Stewardship 2017, at 6–7 (2018), https://www.ssga.com/investmenttopics/environmental-social-governance/2018/07/annual-stewardship-report-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VY47-TF8R] [hereinafter, State St. Glob. Advisors, Annual Stewardship
Report 2017]; State St. Glob. Advisors, Annual Stewardship Report 2018, supra note 52, at
13–14; Vanguard, Annual Stewardship Report 2016-17, supra note 123, at 15; Vanguard,
Annual Stewardship Report 2017-18, supra note 46, at 8; Vanguard, Annual Stewardship
Report 2018-19, supra note 127, at 7.
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of the significance of the private engagement channel requires an evaluation
of the scale and nature of those private engagements undertaken by the Big
Three. The annual stewardship reports of the Big Three (which we refer to,
collectively, as the Big Three Stewardship Reports) indicate that these
managers conduct private communications with hundreds of companies, and
supporters of index fund stewardship have highlighted these absolute
numbers.145 But the number of companies with which the Big Three privately
engage should be examined in relation to the very large number of the Big
Three’s portfolio companies. We undertake such an examination below.
Table 4 reports our findings regarding the proportion of their portfolio
companies with which each of the Big Three companies had engagements for
each of the last three years, and the average for each of the Big Three over
that period.146 Panel A of Table 4 shows the proportion of each of the Big
Three’s portfolio companies with which it had no engagement in each of the
last three years. From 2017 through 2019, the average proportion of portfolio
companies with no engagement were 88.9% for BlackRock, 94.2% for
Vanguard, and 94.5% for SSGA. Thus, on average, the Big Three had no
engagement with 92.5% of their portfolio companies during the period from
2017 through 2019.
Panel B of Table 4 reports the proportion of each of the Big Three’s
portfolio companies in each year in with which it had a single engagement.
During the period from 2017 through 2019, BlackRock had single
engagements with an average of 7.2% of its portfolio companies, Vanguard
3.5%, and SSGA 5.0%. On average, over this period, the Big Three held
single engagements in a given year with 5.2% of their portfolio companies
on average.
Panel C of Table 4 shows the proportion of companies in the portfolios
145. For such a discussion stressing the number of engagements, see, for example,
Eckstein, supra note 134 (manuscript at 43–45).
146. BlackRock’s 2017 and 2018 reports divided its engagements by the resource level
they involved. “Basic” engagements were “generally a single conversation on a routine
matter,” and “Moderate” or “Extensive” engagements involved more than one conversation.
Basic engagements constituted 56.8% of BlackRock’s 2017 engagements and 67.8% of its
engagements in 2018. See BlackRock, Voting and Engagement Report 2017, supra note 142,
at 3; BlackRock, Investment Stewardship Report: 2018 Voting and Engagement Report 3
(2018),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/blk-voting-andengagment-statistics-annual-report-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/EW6Q-MDWZ]. Vanguard
and SSGA did not provide such detail about how their investment of time and resources
varied among their engagements.
BlackRock’s and Vanguard’s Annual Stewardship Reports are for the twelve month period
that ended June 30, 2019; SSGA’s Annual Stewardship Report is for the 2018 calendar year.
Averages for years and managers reported in the table are the average of the proportions in
those years, or for those managers, and are not weighted by number of engagements or assets
under management.
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of each of the Big Three with which they had multiple engagements in a
particular year. From 2017 through 2019, BlackRock had multiple
engagements with an average of 3.9% of its portfolio companies, Vanguard
2.3%, and SSGA 0.6%. On average, the Big Three had multiple engagements
with only 2.3% of their portfolio companies over this period.
Thus, the Big Three engage with only a small minority of their portfolio
companies, and have multiple engagements in a given year with an even
smaller minority of companies in their portfolios. The incidence of
engagement is especially low for Vanguard and SSGA, which had any
engagement with fewer than 6% of their portfolio companies each year from
2017 to 2019. Although BlackRock’s level of engagement was higher, the
percentage of its portfolio companies with which it had any engagement in a
given year was less than 12%, on average, during the period from 2017
through 2019.
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Table 4. Private Engagement
Panel A: Portfolio Companies with No Engagement
Year

Big Three Avg.

BlackRock

Vanguard

SSGA

2017

94.1%

92.5%

94.8%

95.0%

2018

91.8%

87.1%

94.3%

94.0%

2019

91.6%

87.0%

93.4%

94.4%

Average

92.5%

88.9%

94.2%

94.5%

Panel B: Portfolio Companies with a Single Engagement
Year

Big Three Avg.

BlackRock

Vanguard

SSGA

2017

4.0%

4.4%

3.1%

4.6%

2018

5.5%

7.6%

3.4%

5.4%

2019

6.2%

9.7%

3.9%

4.9%

Average

5.2%

7.2%

3.5%

5.0%

Panel C: Portfolio Companies with Multiple Engagements
Big Three Avg.

BlackRock

Vanguard

SSGA

2017

1.9%

3.1%

2.1%

0.4%

2018

2.7%

5.3%

2.3%

0.6%

2019

2.2%

3.2%

2.6%

0.7%

Average

2.3%

3.9%

2.3%

0.6%

For the large majority of cases in which each of the Big Three had no
engagement with the portfolio company, private engagement cannot be
argued to have provided a substitute for the use of other stewardship tools.
Furthermore, even in those cases in which private engagement does occur,
there are reasons for concern that the effectiveness of such private
engagement is reduced by the Big Three’s reluctance to use other stewardship
tools.147 For example, private communication by a Big Three manager in
favor of a given change—either a strategic change, or a governance change
147. For a report indicating that the use of shareholder proposals “ignites and amplifies
investors’ engagement efforts,” see Jackie Cook, The Proxy Process: Raising the Investor
Voice
to
Address
New
Risks
19
(2019),
http://www.shareholderforum.com/access/Library/20190208_Morningstar.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7VQN-27R5].
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such as moving to majority voting or annual elections—would make clear to
corporate managers that a substantial shareholder supported the change. But
if corporate managers expected that failing to make the change would cause
the Big Three manager to nominate director candidates or submit a
shareholder proposal, they would presumably be more likely to make the
change. Conversely, current expectations that the Big Three manager will not
take such actions if corporate managers fail to make such a change (as we
discuss below) make private engagement less effective than it could be.148
3. Focusing on Divergences from Governance Principles
This section focuses on the substantial extent to which the Big Three’s
stewardship activities focus on divergences from governance principles.149
The practice of comparing the practices and arrangements of portfolio
companies with general governance principles is commonly referred to as
“check-the-box” governance.150 As we explain below, focusing on
divergences from governance principles serves certain private incentives of
index fund managers. To be sure, it may sometimes be desirable for investors
148. For instance, in a recent statement of its stewardship priorities, BlackRock has
explicitly stated that “[w]e seek to engage in a constructive manner . . . , but we do not [] tell
companies what to do . . . . [W]e explain our concerns and expectations [to companies] . . .
and then allow time for a considered response.” BlackRock, Stewardship Engagement
Priorities 2019, supra note 47, at 3. But in a separate release, BlackRock officers emphasize
that “our patience is not infinite—when we do not see progress despite ongoing engagement,
or companies are insufficiently responsive to our efforts . . . we will exercise our right to vote
against management recommendations.” BlackRock, Stewardship Ecosystem, supra note 29,
at 7. This statement indicates that, even if BlackRock faces no progress or insufficient
responsiveness in an ongoing engagement, BlackRock will consider voting against
management recommendations but not initiating a shareholder proposal.
149. The analyses in section II.A.3 are based on a review of the Big Three Stewardship
Reports and the proxy voting guidelines of each of the Big Three.
See BlackRock, BlackRock Investment Stewardship Global Corporate Governance
Guidelines
&
Engagement
Principles
(Jan.
2019),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/fact-sheet/blk-responsible-investmentengprinciples-global.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y53Q-WX73]; State St. Glob. Advisors, Proxy
Voting and Engagement Guidelines 2019, supra note 111; Vanguard, Proxy Voting
Guidelines, supra note 111, at 12. We refer to the proxy voting guidelines of each of the Big
Three collectively as the “Big Three Proxy Voting Guidelines.”
150. For uses of the term “check-the-box,” see, for example, Robert A.G. Monks & Nell
Minow, Corporate Governance 172 (5th ed. 2011); Ian R. Appel, Todd A. Gormley & Donald
B. Keim, Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners, 121 J. Fin. Econ. 111, 134 (2016)
[hereinafter Appel et al., Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners]; Martin Lipton, Corporate
Governance: The New Paradigm, Harvard Law Sch. Forum on Corp. Governance & Fin.
Regulation (Jan. 11, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/11/corporategovernance-the-new-paradigm/ [https://perma.cc/35HH-5P6A].
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to make decisions based on how company activities vary from general
governance principles. As we explain below, however, some valuemaximizing stewardship decisions require additional company-specific
information that goes beyond check-the-box stewardship.
Consider the proxy voting guidelines that the Big Three follow in
determining whether to support incumbent directors standing for reelection
or to withhold their support.151 Each of the Big Three’s guidelines lists
situations and conditions that would lead to a withhold vote. Our review of
these guidelines indicates that, for each of the Big Three, the important
decision whether to support a director or withhold support is based
exclusively on the existence or absence of certain divergences from good
governance principles.
For example, Vanguard’s proxy voting guidelines call for withholding
votes from one or more directors if the board or a specific director deviates
from certain governance principles in one or more specified ways, such as:
(i) the board failing to have a majority of independent directors; (ii) the board
failing to have audit, compensation, nominating, or governance committees
that are fully independent; (iii) a specific director serving on five or more
public company boards; or (iv) a specific director failing to attend more than
75% of board or committee meetings.152 BlackRock and SSGA’s approaches
differ in some details but are similarly based on comparison with good
governance principles.153
Furthermore, the Big Three Stewardship Reports indicate that the Big
Three’s private, behind-the-scenes engagements—when they do occur—also
focus on companies that diverge significantly from desirable governance
principles. For example, SSGA indicates that its engagement seeks to provide
“principles-based guidance.”154 BlackRock indicates that its engagement
might occur when a company lags behind its peers on environmental, social,
or governance matters; when it is in a sector with a thematic governance issue
material to value; or for other reasons that do not include financial
underperformance.155 Vanguard in turn states that its stewardship focuses on
151. For releases providing the Big Three Proxy Voting Guidelines, see supra note 149.
152. For Vanguard’s voting guidelines regarding these matters, see Vanguard, Proxy

Voting Guidelines, supra note 111, at 3–6 (listing as reasons for withholding votes from
directors these and other specified deviations from governance principles).
153. For the voting guidelines of BlackRock and SSGA listing their criteria for
withholding support from directors, see BlackRock, Stewardship Engagement Priorities
2019, supra note 47; State St. Glob. Advisors, Proxy Voting and Engagement Guidelines
2019, supra note 111, at 3.
154. State St. Glob. Advisors, Annual Stewardship Report 2016-2017, supra note 9, at 3.
155. BlackRock, Voting and Engagement Report 2017, supra note 142, at 3. In its
Investment Stewardship Priorities for 2019, BlackRock lists its five engagement priorities as
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board composition, governance structures, executive compensation, and
board processes for oversight of risk and strategy.156
In assessing this focus on divergences from governance principles, we
do not question the relevance and importance of such divergences for voting
or engagement decisions. It is clearly valuable to take information regarding
such divergences into account. In our view, however, value-maximizing
decisions on these matters would also require consideration of other types of
information. As we discuss in sections II.B.1 and II.B.2 below, valuemaximizing voting and engagement decisions would also incorporate
detailed information about the business performance of the portfolio
company and the qualifications, expertise, and experience of its directors.
Importantly, the proxy voting guidelines of the Big Three call for
consideration of detailed company-specific information regarding business
performance and the characteristics of particular directors in the case of a
proxy contest over director elections between incumbents and a challenger’s
competing slate. To illustrate, for such contested director elections,
Vanguard’s proxy voting guidelines call for “case-by-case” decisions based
on considerations including “[h]ow . . . the company [has] performed relative
to its peers,” and the extent to which the incumbent directors are “well-suited
to address the company’s needs” compared with the directors proposed by
the challenger.157 The proxy voting guidelines of BlackRock and SSGA
similarly call for using such information for voting in contested elections.158
But as we make clear above, the proxy voting guidelines of each of the Big
Three do not call for using such considerations and information where the
Big Three decide whether to support directors not facing a proxy challenger,
which constitute the vast majority of their voting decisions.
Although focusing on divergences from governance principles may not
be value-maximizing for an index fund’s beneficial investors, it could well
serve the private interests of the index fund’s managers that we analyzed in
“Governance,” “Corporate Strategy and Capital Allocation,” “Compensation that Promotes
Long-Termism,” “Environmental Risks and Opportunities,” and “Human Capital
Management,” and does not mention financial or operating performance. BlackRock,
Stewardship Engagement Priorities 2019, supra note 47, at 2.
156. Vanguard, Annual Stewardship Report 2018-19, supra note 127, at 4.
157. Vanguard, Proxy Voting Guidelines, supra note 111, at 5–6.
158. BlackRock’s voting guidelines regarding contested elections indicate that they “are
assessed on a case-by-case basis. We evaluate a number of factors, which may include: the
qualifications of the dissident and management candidates; [and] the validity of the concerns
identified by the dissident . . . .” Blackrock, Proxy Voting Guidelines for U.S. Securities 5
(2019),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/fact-sheet/blk-responsibleinvestment-guidelines-us.pdf [https://perma.cc/HN3U-2YDJ] [hereinafter Blackrock, Proxy
Voting Guidelines]. SSGA’s voting guidelines state that they “vote for the election/reelection of directors on a case-by-case basis after considering various factors.” State St. Glob.
Advisors, Proxy Voting and Engagement Guidelines 2019, supra note 111, at 2.
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Part I, for two reasons. First, the focus on divergences from governance
principles enables an index fund manager to avoid focusing significantly on
issues such as business performance and the individual characteristics of
directors. Assessing these issues would require detailed company-specific
information. Focusing on governance principles thus serves the interests of
the Big Three in limiting investments in stewardship.
Second, focusing on compliance or divergence relative to governance
principles that enjoy broad support avoids the need to make many
discretionary decisions or contestable judgments. Instead, the Big Three’s
decision making is supported by governance best practices that have
widespread support. This makes their use of their power less salient, and thus
reduces the risk of backlash.
4. Pro-Management Voting
Our analysis in Part II raises concerns that the Big Three index fund
managers have incentives to be excessively deferential to corporate managers
when they vote, especially with respect to issues affecting managers’
authority and private interests. This section investigates this concern
empirically by focusing on the voting decisions of the Big Three on say-onpay resolutions, a subject that is close to the hearts of corporate managers.159
We find that these voting decisions seem to exhibit pro-management
tendencies that are consistent with the predictions of our agency-costs view.
We gather evidence regarding the say-on-pay voting decisions of the Big
Three. Table 5 provides evidence of the incidence of “no” votes by each of
the Big Three in say-on-pay votes at S&P 500 companies in each full year
since the 2011 adoption of a say-on-pay mandate by the Dodd-Frank Act.160
159. The analyses in section II.A.4, including the results reported in Tables 5 and 6, are
based on voting data on say-on-pay proposals from ISS Voting Analytics (accessed Oct. 3,
2019). S&P 500 constituency data is from Compustat (last Oct. 3, 2019). Equity holdings of
investment managers is based on Form 13F data from FactSet Res. Sys., Ownership Database
(last visited Oct. 3, 2019).
We consider a fund manager to have voted “no” on a company’s say-on-pay proposal if
a plurality of their respective funds cast against votes on that proposal. Weighted averages of
vote proportions from different funds are weighted by the total assets under management in
U.S. equities. The largest active fund managers were determined based on their aggregate
ownership positions for all U.S. equities. Abstentions and proposals for which no vote was
recorded for a particular investment manager are excluded from the proportions presented,
but due to the negligible incidence of abstentions and non-votes, their inclusion would not
have any qualitative effect on the results.
160. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–1900 (2010) (adding to § 14A of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n–1 (2012)).
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As Table 5 indicates, each of the Big Three very rarely opposed say-on-pay
proposals: BlackRock opposed only 2.0% of such proposals over this period,
SSGA 4.5%, and Vanguard 3.0%.161
Table 5 also compares the voting behavior of the Big Three to the
recommendations of ISS, the leading proxy advisor. The three columns on
the right of Table 5 show the proportion of those say-on-pay proposals that
ISS recommended against which each of the Big Three actually voted against.
As Table 5 shows, each of the Big Three vote against only a minority of the
proposals that ISS recommends against.
Table 5. Big Three “No” Votes in S&P 500 Say-on-Pay Votes
Proposals with ISS “Against”
Recommendation

All Proposals
BlackRock

Vanguard

SSGA

BlackRock

Vanguard

SSGA

2012

2.5%

5.9%

3.3%

13.0%

37.0%

18.5%

2013

2.0%

2.2%

3.2%

14.6%

22.5%

31.7%

2014

2.3%

2.7%

5.9%

26.5%

32.4%

55.9%

2015

0.7%

2.1%

4.5%

7.5%

22.5%

35.0%

2016

1.6%

1.6%

5.1%

18.9%

16.2%

43.2%

2017

2.8%

3.6%

5.5%

26.7%

35.6%

48.9%

2018

2.2%

2.7%

3.7%

15.8%

23.7%

32.4%

Average

2.0%

3.0%

4.5%

17.6%

27.1%

37.9%

Of course, the patterns displayed in Table 5 are only suggestive and do
not demonstrate excessive deference. It could be argued that index fund
managers’ general support for say-on-pay proposals reflects the adequacy of
executive pay arrangements in the vast majority of S&P 500 companies, that
ISS is excessively critical of executive pay arrangements, and that the Big
Three serve the interests of index fund investors by voting in support of a
majority of say-on-pay proposals that ISS recommends against. But at a
minimum, the Big Three’s general support for executive pay in the
overwhelming majority of S&P companies is consistent with the deference
predictions of the agency-costs view.
161. For a recent report presenting similar results for a set of companies with especially
highly paid CEOs, see Rosanna Landis Weaver, The 100 Most Overpaid CEOs: Are Fund
Managers
Asleep
at
the
Wheel?
9–13
(2019),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/59a706d4f5e2319b70240ef9/t/5c6edf92971a180d1fef
1597/1550770069046/100MostOverpaidCEOs_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QKS-YVJV].
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To provide another benchmark for comparison, we gathered data on how
the investment managers of fund families that are largely actively managed
vote on say-on-pay proposals. Table 6 compares the votes of the Big Three
with the three largest active managers, Capital Group, Fidelity Investments
Inc., and T. Rowe Price Group, Inc., and the ten largest active managers, for
each year from 2012 to 2018. As Table 6 shows, the frequency of “no” votes
on say-on-pay proposals for the Big Three is less than half (and closer to onethird) of the frequency for the largest three active managers or the largest ten
active managers. Of course, it could still be argued that these active managers
are excessively critical of executive pay, and that the substantially more
deferential voting by the Big Three reflects a better assessment of pay
arrangements. Without clear reasons to expect large active managers to be
excessively critical and adversarial toward managers of S&P 500 companies,
however, the results reported in Table 6 are consistent with the prediction of
our incentive analysis and the agency-costs view: The Big Three’s voting
behavior is likely to be excessively deferential.
Table 6. Big Three and Active Manager “No” Votes
in S&P 500 Say-on-Pay Votes
Big Three

Largest 3 Active
Managers

Largest 10 Active
Managers

Unweighted

Weighted

Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted

2012

3.9%

3.8%

12.3%

12.8%

9.2%

10.1%

2013

2.4%

2.4%

9.6%

10.2%

7.3%

8.0%

2014

3.7%

3.4%

7.8%

8.4%

6.3%

6.9%

2015

2.4%

2.1%

5.2%

5.6%

6.8%

6.6%

2016

2.8%

2.4%

6.9%

7.3%

8.4%

8.1%

2017

4.0%

3.7%

7.3%

7.4%

8.5%

8.0%

2018

2.8%

2.7%

6.1%

6.6%

7.5%

7.2%

Average

3.1%

2.9%

7.9%

8.3%

7.7%

7.9%

Some of the commentators taking issue with our view and evaluating
index fund stewardship more favorably argue that, among the thousands of
votes that the Big Three cast each year at U.S. public companies, only a
limited number of votes—and substantially less than 100—are “potentially
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consequential” because they involve contested elections.162 Relatedly, a
recent BlackRock release stresses that the vast majority of ballot items are
not closely decided,163 and that say-on-pay votes are, in any event, not legally
binding.164 In our view, however, Big Three say-on-pay voting matters.
Companies pay close attention to say-on-pay votes and design their pay
arrangements with an eye toward avoiding significant negative say-on-pay
votes.165 Big Three voting on say-on-pay is therefore a potentially significant
instrument for influencing and improving pay arrangements. Accordingly,
nondeferential voting on say-on-pay resolutions could operate to improve pay
arrangements and thereby produce significant benefits for index fund
investors.
Our findings regarding voting decisions are consistent with those
reported by four other current empirical studies. Three studies—one by Ryan
Bubb and Emiliano Catan; another by Patrick Bolton, Tao Li, Enrichetta
Ravina, and Howard Rosenthal; and a third by Davidson Heath, Daniele
Macciocchi, Roni Michaely, and Matthew Ringgenberg—document that, in
general, index funds tend to vote in a more pro-management way than other
investment fund managers.166 Furthermore, a fourth study by Alon Brav, Wei
Jiang, and Tao Li finds that the votes of index funds are more promanagement than other investment managers in contested elections, another
162. See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, supra note 16, at 34 (“How many potentially
consequential votes are there? It is a little hard to tell because of settlements before a proxy
contest comes to a conclusion but the number is likely a two-digit figure (and likely in the
low two-digits).”).
163. See BlackRock, Proxy Voting Outcomes, supra note 116 (“The vast majority of
ballot items are won or lost by margins greater than 30%, meaning that even the three largest
asset managers combined could not change the vote outcome.”).
164. See id. (“[S]ay-on-pay is a mandatory, non-binding advisory vote . . . .”).
165. See, e.g., Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, A Say-on-Pay Update—Plus Strategies for
Responding to a Negative Recommendation by a Proxy Advisory Firm 1 (2018),
https://www.davispolk.com/files/2018-11-29-a_say-on-pay_update_plus_strategies.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V7D9-K2KZ] (“[P]erforming poorly on a say-on-pay vote is not only
disheartening, but can impact shareholder votes on election of directors[,] . . . result in greater
scrutiny of CEO performance, and require management and compensation committee
members to expend significant time and resources to address concerns reflected by the
vote.”).
166. See Patrick Bolton, Tao Li, Enrichetta Ravina & Howard Rosenthal, Investor
Ideology 4 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 557/2018, 2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3119935 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (characterizing
the voting behavior of BlackRock and Vanguard as close to that reflected by management
recommendations); Heath et al., supra note 130, at 12 (describing index funds as “more likely
to cede authority to firm management”); Bubb & Catan, supra note 130, at 3 (characterizing
the voting behavior of the Big Three as “support[ing] management at much greater rates”
than other investors).
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context in which vote outcomes are important for corporate managers.167 The
results of these studies are all consistent with and reinforce the deference
predictions of our incentive analysis.
B. What the Big Three Fail to Do Adequately
We now turn to discuss five types of stewardship activity that the Big
Three do not adequately undertake. The activities on which we focus are (i)
monitoring business performance; (ii) influencing director identity; (iii)
submission of shareholder proposals to facilitate changes favored by the
index fund’s own governance principles; (iv) contributing to corporate
governance reforms by filing comments to SEC rulemaking and amicus briefs
in precedential litigation; and (v) taking on lead plaintiff positions in
consequential securities cases.
1. Monitoring Business Performance
Enhancing the financial returns of portfolio companies is an important
objective for Big Three investors. Those investors would benefit from
stewardship that identifies underperforming portfolio companies, analyzes
changes that could improve their performance, and uses the substantial voting
power of the Big Three to bring about such changes.168 In discussing his view
that index funds offer “the best hope for corporate governance,” Vanguard
founder Jack Bogle stressed that “the new index fund rule is that if you don’t
like the management, fix the management because you can’t sell the stock.”169
However, as we explain in this section, in the vast majority of companies in
which a hedge fund activist is not agitating for change, the Big Three pay
little attention to whether a company suffers from financial or business

167. Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Tao Li & James Pinnington, Picking Friends Before Picking
(Proxy) Fights: How Mutual Fund Voting Shapes Proxy Contests 3 (European Corp.
Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 601/2019, 2019), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3101473
[https://perma.cc/62QQ-RS52] (describing “direct evidence that passive funds are
signiﬁcantly more ‘pro-management’ than active funds in proxy contests”).
168. A study by Diane Del Guercio, Laura Seery, and Tracie Woidtke provides evidence
that stewardship paying attention to underperformance could provide benefits, even if it
would just lead to increased vote withholding from directors of companies that
underperform. The study provides evidence, including “significant post-campaign operating
performance improvements” and “a forced CEO turn-over rate of 25% in target firms in the
1 year following a campaign.” Diane Del Guercio, Laura Seery & Tracie Woidtke, Do Boards
Pay Attention when Institutional Investor Activists “Just Vote No”?, 90 J. Fin. Econ. 84, 85
(2008).
169. See Benz, supra note 14.
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underperformance that might call for “fixing the management.”170
Consider the important decisions that index funds make in the vast
number of companies that hold uncontested elections in any given year—
whether to vote for the incumbent directors up for election, or to withhold
votes. As we explained in section II.A.3, each of the Big Three’s proxy voting
guidelines makes the decision to withhold votes conditional entirely on
certain specified divergences from governance principles. Importantly, our
review of the Big Three’s guidelines indicates that none of those guidelines
list financial underperformance, no matter how severe or persistent, as a basis
for withholding votes from directors.
Similarly, as we discussed in section II.A.2, the Big Three Stewardship
Reports indicate that the Big Three’s private, behind-the-scenes
engagements—in those relatively infrequent cases in which they do occur—
focus on addressing significant divergences from desirable governance
principles. Importantly, these private engagements do not target or focus on
business underperformance. We reviewed all of the examples of behind-thescenes engagements described in the Big Three Stewardship Reports. We
found zero cases where engagement was described as being motivated by
financial underperformance. To be sure, some Big Three engagements follow
interventions by activist hedge funds seeking to improve performance and
focus on those interventions.171 However, even in those cases, the Big Three
did not themselves identify underperformance but merely reacted to activist
hedge funds doing so and proposing to address it.
Writers supportive of index fund stewardship seek to justify their limited
attention to financial underperformance by arguing that index fund managers
“lack the expertise and the resources necessary to [identify and address firmspecific operational deficiencies] effectively.”172 But because such arguments
take such lack of “in-house expertise” as a given, they fail to recognize that
it is a product of the decisions made by index fund managers. Index fund
managers have the resources to obtain or develop any in-house expertise that
they might consider desirable.
Indeed, given the hundreds of companies in which the Big Three hold
170. The analyses in section II.B.1 are based on a review of the Big Three Stewardship
Reports and the Big Three Proxy Voting Guidelines.
171. Vanguard, Annual Stewardship Report 2016-2017, supra note 123, at 7.
172. Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript at 20); see also Charles M. Nathan,
Institutional Investor Engagement: One Size Does Not Fit All, Conf. Board (July 18, 2018),
https://www.conference-board.org/blog/postdetail.cfm?post=6826 [https://perma.cc/3KLKSQ9B] (explaining that the Big Three’s stewardship teams “are principally focused on big
picture environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues . . . [and] lack the skill-sets and
manpower necessary to deal in depth with company specific issues of strategy design and
implementation, capital allocation, M&A opportunities, and operational and financial
performance”).
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positions of $1 billion or more, the interests of their beneficial investors could
be well served by adding in-house personnel with financial expertise. Adding
a sufficient number of such personnel could allow the Big Three to identify
severe or persistent underperformance at particular portfolio companies.
Once such underperformance is identified, those personnel could generate
proposals for improving performance through changes in corporate
leadership or strategy, and they could facilitate those changes using the Big
Three’s power and influence. Why then do the Big Three not employ such
personnel on the significant scale that their holdings warrant? The lack of
such personnel is consistent with, and can be explained by, the agency-costs
view of index fund stewardship.
Some commentators taking issue with our view of index fund
stewardship have argued that index fund managers do not need to pay
attention to financial underperformance as they can count on activist hedge
funds to bring such underperformance to the attention of other investors and
to initiate proposals for improving performance.173 The empirical evidence,
however, indicates that companies often underperform for several years
before an activist emerges to push for change.174 The interests of index fund
investors are therefore not served by ignoring underperformance for long
periods in the hope that an activist hedge fund may choose to address it
sometime in the future.
Furthermore, as we discuss in section III.B.2(b), activist hedge funds
have incentives to engage only when performance problems are very large
and can be fixed quickly. The interests of index fund investors would be
served by having other performance problems addressed as well. Thus, while
the work of activist hedge funds often provides benefits to index fund
investors, it cannot fully substitute for work that index fund managers could
do themselves to address financial underperformance. Index fund managers
largely avoid such work at the moment, even though it could provide index
fund investors with significant additional benefits.
2. Influencing Director Identity
Directors matter. Their characteristics, background, and experience have
considerable influence on the governance and performance of companies.
173. For arguments that index funds rely on and interact with hedge funds that monitor
companies, identify problems at those companies that would benefit from changes, and make
proposals for such changes, see, for example, Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript at 27–
29); Kahan & Rock, supra note 16, at 5–6, 45.
174. For evidence that activist targets underperform significantly during the three years
prior to the emergence of an activist hedge fund, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei
Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1085, 1123–30
(2015) [hereinafter Bebchuk et al., Hedge Fund Activism].
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The Big Three’s governance principles impact the selection of directors, such
as by discouraging the selection of directors who did not consistently attend
past board meetings and encouraging gender diversity among directors. But
among the very many potential directors who would comply with the Big
Three’s principles, some candidates would clearly be better choices than
others given the particular portfolio company’s circumstances and needs.
A board with governance processes that accord completely with the Big
Three’s standards may sometimes select one or more individuals who are not
well suited to the company’s needs, or fail to select individuals likely to
improve board performance. When the Big Three hold large stakes in such a
company, their beneficial investors would be served by the index fund
managers identifying when changes to the individuals on the board are
desirable and facilitating those changes. Those changes might not require the
index fund manager to be represented on the board—adding or removing one
or more independent directors could be sufficient.175
In this section we therefore examine whether the Big Three do in fact
seek to influence the selection of directors of their portfolio companies.176 We
examine both (i) formal nominations of directors, and (ii) mere
communications to portfolio companies suggesting that particular directors
be added or removed. We find that the Big Three appear to avoid both types
of activities.
We begin by gathering data on director nominations. Table 7 shows that
there were approximately 3,800 director nominations at U.S. companies
during the twelve-year period from 2007 through 2018. Our review of these
nominations indicates that not a single nomination was made by any of the
Big Three.

175. For empirical evidence that a significant goal of activist hedge funds in negotiating
settlement agreements with managers of activism targets is to introduce new independent
directors into the boardroom, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Thomas
Keusch, Dancing with Activists, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 9-10, 20-25, 64),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2948869 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
176. The analyses in section II.B.2, including the results reported in Tables 7 and 8, are
based on data on director nominations from SharkRepellent.net (last visited Sept. 26, 2019)
and Schedule 13D filings from the SEC’s EDGAR database (last visited Sept. 16, 2019).
S&P 500 constituency data are from Compustat (last visited Oct. 3, 2019). Data regarding
Big Three positions of 5% or more are based on institutional ownership data from FactSet
Res. Sys., Ownership Database (last visited Oct. 3, 2019). Data for BlackRock for 2010
onwards includes positions held by Barclays Global Investors, which BlackRock acquired in
December 2009.
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Table 7. Actual and Proposed Director Nominations
Year

Director Nominations

Year

Director Nominations

2007

360

2013

354

2008

474

2014

349

2009

332

2015

315

2010

286

2016

282

2011

250

2017

241

2012

290

2018

259

Total (2007-2018): 3,792

Even though the Big Three did not formally nominate any directors it is
possible that they may have suggested that particular directors be added or
removed. To evaluate whether this was the case we reviewed the examples of
engagements described in their Stewardship Reports. Our review indicates
that such communications were not part of any of the numerous engagements
with named companies or examples of engagements with unnamed
companies in the Stewardship Reports.
We examine this issue more systematically by gathering data on positions
of 5% or more held by the Big Three during the twelve-year period from 2007
through 2018. As Table 8 indicates, the incidence of Big Three positions of
5% or more was large and increasing throughout the period, exceeding 2,000
in each year from 2009 and exceeding 4,000 each year from 2014.
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Table 8. Big Three Positions of 5% or More
BlackRock

Vanguard

SSGA

Total

2007

1,233

106

62

1,401

2008

1,666

158

91

1,915

2009

1,882

241

57

2,180

2010

1,975

432

68

2,475

2011

1,971

819

98

2,888

2012

1,979

1,302

142

3,423

2013

2,123

1,419

150

3,692

2014

2,188

1,721

186

4,095

2015

2,178

1,842

132

4,152

2016

2,274

1,903

197

4,374

2017

2,258

1,994

203

4,455

2018

2,373

2,051

183

4,607

As we discuss in section I.E, an index fund manager with a block of 5%
or more must file disclosure on Schedule 13D if its activities have the purpose
or effect of influencing the identity of the individuals serving on the board.177
We therefore gathered data on Schedule 13D filings over the same period.
We find that neither Vanguard nor SSGA made a single Schedule 13D
filing from 2007 through 2018. BlackRock made only nine Schedule 13D
filings during this twelve-year period, during which it had an average of more
than 1,000 5% positions per year. Of those nine Schedule 13D filings, seven
related to going-private transactions that a BlackRock-affiliated private
equity fund manager was party to, and the other two related to IPOs that a
BlackRock fund manager managed shares in. None of these cases related to
attempts to influence the composition of the board of directors of
“midstream” public companies. This is the case even though the Big Three
held thousands of positions of 5% or more in portfolio companies.178 This
177. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2012) (requiring the filing of disclosure on Schedule 13D
with the SEC); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(a) (2018) (same).
178. Our findings in this section were reinforced by the subsequent finding reported by
Heath et al., supra note 130, at 31–32, that index funds “are less likely to file Schedule 13D
and more likely to file Schedule 13G.” According to the evidence that we obtained, each of
the Big Three is not merely “less likely” to file Schedule 13D, but in fact two of the Big
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evidence supports our analysis in section I.E.3 concerning the Big Three’s
incentives to avoid filing on Schedule 13D. Furthermore, this evidence
indicates that the Big Three refrain from communications about particular
individuals who they believe should be added to or removed from boards of
directors in the vast number of cases where one or more of the Big Three had
positions of 5% or more in portfolio companies.179
As with the argument discussed in section II.A.3 that the Big Three may
not need to monitor financial performance because activist hedge funds do
so, it could be argued that the Big Three do not need to engage with
companies about adding or removing particular directors because activist
hedge funds take on this role.180 But the Big Three’s views on optimal board
members likely differ from those of activist hedge funds. For example, SSGA
has criticized portfolio companies that reach settlement agreements with
activist hedge funds to add directors favored by activists without consulting
other investors.181 The best way for the Big Three to increase the likelihood
that underperforming companies would make director additions that are
consistent with their views regarding value-maximization would be for a Big
Three manager itself to communicate with its portfolio companies about the
particular directors that it believes would be best for the company.
The Big Three’s reluctance to be involved in selecting directors is
difficult to reconcile with the value-maximization view. But it is consistent
with, and can be explained by, our incentive analysis and the agency-costs
view. Identifying directors who should be added or removed requires
significant time and resources. Avoiding such actions is consistent with the
Big Three’s incentives to underinvest in stewardship, and with the limited
resources they actually allocate to stewardship at particular portfolio
companies. Furthermore, deference to corporate managers on the choice of
Three completely avoided any such filing during the twelve-year period we examined, and
one of the Big Three almost entirely avoided such filings during that period.
179. This is also consistent with statements from the Big Three regarding what they do,
and what they do not. For instance, Vanguard states, “We don’t: Nominate directors or seek
board seats, [or] submit shareholder proposals . . . .” Booraem, What We Do, supra note 34,
at 11.
180. See, e.g., Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript at 26) (“[I]ndividual fund
complexes interact and rely upon . . . activist hedge funds to supplement their voice,
monitoring and information gathering processes.”).
181. For an example of such criticism, see State St. Glob. Advisors, Protecting LongTerm
Shareholder
Interests
in
Activist
Engagements
1
(2016),
https://web.archive.org/web/20180430162941/https://www.ssga.com/investmenttopics/environmental-social-governance/2016/Protecting-Long-Term-ShareholderInterests-in-Activist-Engagements.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (expressing
concern regarding “settlement agreements entered into rapidly between boards and activists
and without the voice of long-term shareholders”).
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directors (assuming general process requirements are met) is also consistent
with the incentives for index fund managers to be excessively deferential to
corporate managers that our agency-costs analysis identifies.182
3. Eliminating Divergences from Governance Principles
Supporters of index fund stewardship stress that index fund managers,
and in particular the Big Three, have substantial advantages in bringing about
similar governance improvements in a large number of firms, and that index
fund stewardship is a natural fit for that objective.183 For example, Fisch,
Hamdani, and Davidoff Solomon state that “the Big Three enjoy substantial
economies of scale with respect to corporate governance and market-wide
initiatives.”184 These authors also claim that contributing to similar
governance improvements in many companies is something that the Big
Three are both naturally well placed to do, and actually do.185
Similarly, Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock discuss the economies of
scale advantages that the Big Three have with respect to “recurring
governance issues,” where they obtain “information in the course of their
other votes . . . that is material to a current vote they are asked to cast.”186
These authors stress that, with respect to recurring governance issues, “the
Big Three are likely to have incentives and information that is superior to
those of advisors of actively managed funds” and “an inherent advantage”
that comes from their larger size.187
As these commentators discuss, a main way in which the Big Three
contribute to bringing about governance changes they favor is by voting in
support of shareholder proposals calling for such changes.188 Under Rule 14a8, promulgated pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, shareholders
182. See supra section I.E.
183. See, e.g., Appel et al., Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners, supra note 150, at

113 (stating that passive investors “might be effective at engaging in widespread, but lowcost, monitoring of ﬁrms’ compliance with what they consider to be best governance
practices”).
184. Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript at 15).
185. As the authors write, “[P]assive investors are particularly well-placed to evaluate
[corporate governance] provisions . . . and to determine whether these provisions are likely,
as a general matter, to increase or decrease firm value at the majority of portfolio companies.
They are more likely to internalize any spillover effects that may arise from governance
provisions.” See id. (manuscript at 18).
186. Kahan & Rock, supra note 16, at 44.
187. Id.
188. See, e.g., Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript at 18) (“Voting on [issues raised by
shareholder proposals] gives passive investors a powerful tool to pressure issuers for change
. . . .”).
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may submit proposals calling for governance changes to be voted on at the
company’s annual meeting.189 Shareholder proposals advocating governance
changes that receive majority support commonly lead to companies adopting
those changes.190 As a result, when governance changes are widely viewed
by investors as best practice, shareholder proposals advocating such changes
have been very successful in bringing those changes about in companies that
have not yet implemented them. For example, shareholder proposals have led
a large number of public companies to eliminate staggered boards, remove
supermajority provisions, and adopt majority voting—all governance
arrangements that have received broad support from investors.191
However, as we explain below, while the Big Three have contributed to
obtaining governance changes that their governance principles favor by
voting for shareholder proposals advocating such changes, they use their
power to bring about governance changes they favor only in a limited way.192
In particular, because the Big Three have chosen not to put forward for a vote
proposals advocating changes they favor and merely vote on proposals
submitted by others, they have forgone the potential for governance changes
that they favor in a large number of companies.193
189. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2019).
190. See Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & Stephen R. Stubben, Board of Directors’

Responsiveness to Shareholders: Evidence from Shareholder Proposals, 16 J. Corp. Fin. 53,
54, 62–64 (2010) (describing empirical evidence on the determinants of the likelihood of
implementation of shareholder proposals).
191. See, e.g., id. at 54 (regarding majority voting); Emiliano M. Catan & Michael
Klausner, Board Declassification and Firm Value: Have Shareholders and Boards Really
Destroyed Billions in Value? at 2 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working
Paper No. 17-39, 2017) (regarding declassification); Tara Bhandari, Peter Iliev & Jonathan
Kalodimos, Governance Changes Through Shareholder Initiatives: The Case of Proxy
Access 1 (Feb. 18, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2635695 (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (regarding proxy access).
192. The analyses in section II.B.3, including Table 9, are based on shareholder proposal
data and governance arrangement data from SharkRepellent.net (last visited June 10, 2019).
Russell 3000 constituent data is also from SharkRepellent.net (last visited June 10, 2019).
We exclude social responsibility proposals, and proposals that are part of proxy contests.
Proposals receiving majority support are those for which votes cast in favor represent a
majority of the votes cast in favor, against, and in abstention.
193. In advancing their views that the Big Three perform well with respect to governance
issues that recur in many situations, Fisch, Hamdani, and Davidoff Solomon cite to and rely
on Appel, Gormley, and Keim. See, e.g., Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript at 8) (citing
Appel et al., Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners, supra note 150, among others, as
preliminary evidence “that the effect of [passive investor stewardship] has been to improve
both governance and performance”). The Appel, Gormley, and Keim study reported that
increased holdings by index funds are associated with certain governance improvements,
including greater board independence, a removal of takeover defenses, and a lower
likelihood of unequal voting rights. See Appel et al, Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners,
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Table 9 reports data on shareholder proposals during the five-year period
2014-2018. As Table 9 indicates, during the five-year period from 2014
through 2018, approximately 1,500 shareholder proposals were submitted to
companies in the Russell 3000 index, and more than 300 of those proposals
received majority support. Table 9 also reports on the three types of proposals
that received majority support most frequently: (i) proposals to declassify the
board of directors, (ii) proposals to eliminate supermajority requirements to
amend certain provisions of the company’s charter or bylaws (or both), and
(iii) proposals to require that receiving a majority of votes cast, rather than a
plurality, be necessary for directors to be to elected. As Table 9 shows, there
were approximately 50 successful proposals of each kind over the five-year
period, and approximately 150 such successful proposals in total.

supra note 150, at 114. Importantly, however, a full acceptance of the findings of Appel,
Gormley, and Keim in no way addresses the concerns raised in this section about the failure
of the Big Three to advance governance changes they support by bringing shareholder
proposals in a large number of portfolio companies that do not have these improvements.
Appel, Gormley, and Keim find that increased holdings by index finds are associated
with some reduction in the incidence of governance arrangements that the voting guidelines
of the Big Three oppose. For example, they report that “[a] one standard deviation increase
in ownership by passive funds is associated with a 3.5 percentage point increase in the
likelihood of removing a poison pill and a 2.5 percentage point increase in the likelihood of
reducing restrictions on shareholders’ ability to call special meetings.” Id. Because such
eliminations of antitakeover defenses often result from the passage of shareholder proposals
calling for such removal, and because the Big Three commonly vote for such removal, such
an association is only to be expected. But our analysis in this section does not question that
the strong governance preferences of the Big Three—as expressed through their votes on
relevant shareholder proposals—have an effect. Rather, the main point of our analysis is to
raise concerns as to the extent to which the Big Three take actions to use their power to get
their preferences implemented, and to bring about governance improvements on the large
scale that their power and holdings would allow.
What we have explained is that, if the Big Three did not limit themselves to being merely
reactive and supporting the governance changes only in those situations in which other
shareholders submit shareholder proposals, and if they instead took an active role, they would
be able to bring about the changes that their own voting guidelines view as desirable at many,
or most, of the public companies in their portfolios that currently do not have the
arrangements they favor. The results reported by Appel, Gormley, and Keim are consistent
with, and do not question, the importance of this concern.
Finally, we note that the commentators relying on the Appel, Gormley, and Keim study
do not engage with subsequent empirical work that reports findings that increased holdings
by index funds is associated with certain adverse governance effects. See Cornelius Schmidt
& Rüdiger Fahlenbrach, Do Exogenous Changes in Passive Institutional Ownership Affect
Corporate Governance and Firm Value?, 124 J. FIN. ECON. 285, 293–94 (2017) (finding that
increases in passive ownership increase the likelihood that a CEO becomes chairman or
president and that fewer new independent directors will be appointed).
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Table 9. Submission of Shareholder Proposals
Year

Shareholder
Proposals

Shareholder Proposals Receiving Majority Support
All
Proposals

Declassify
Board of
Directors

Eliminate
Supermajority
Requirements

Require
Majority
Voting

2014

289

64

16

7

14

2015

377

105

13

8

8

2016

302

80

5

10

17

2017

245

55

5

13

9

2018

285

39

7

9

3

Total

1,498

343

46

47

51

The Big Three’s voting guidelines express broad support for proposals to
introduce annual elections, eliminate supermajority requirements, or adopt
majority voting.194 Consistent with these guidelines, our review indicates that
BlackRock and SSGA voted in favor of a majority the proposals in each
category each year for the five-year period we consider, and Vanguard voted
in favor of a majority of proposals to introduce annual elections and majority
voting each year for that period.
However, while the Big Three have been very active in supporting
proposals advocating governance changes favored by their governance
principles, they have completely refrained from initiating such proposals. Our
review of the approximately 1,500 shareholder proposals submitted during
the examined five-year period did not identify a single proposal submitted by
any of the Big Three. To be sure, it is unsurprising that none of the Big Three
submitted any proposals in the categories that they generally do not support.
Our concern, however, is that each of the Big Three also chose not to submit
any proposals of the type that they generally do support.195
We would like to discuss an argument that might be made in an attempt
194. For examples of proxy voting guidelines supporting such proposals, see BlackRock,
Proxy Voting Guidelines, supra note 158, at 2–6; State St. Glob. Advisors, Proxy Voting and
Engagement Guidelines 2019, supra note 111; Vanguard, Proxy Voting Guidelines, supra
note 111, at 16–17.
195. Consistent with the evidence we provide, a BlackRock release notes that “we have
never filed a shareholder proposal on any company’s proxy statement.” BlackRock,
Stewardship Ecosystem, supra note 29, at 10. But BlackRock does not explain how the
interests of investors in its funds are served by its choice not to file shareholder proposals,
even when companies have been persistently unresponsive to BlackRock’s concerns over a
long period.
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to “justify” and reconcile the Big Three’s avoidance of shareholder proposal
submissions reflecting their governance principles with the valuemaximization view. First, it might be argued that the Big Three have no need
to submit shareholder proposals because all the proposals that would serve
the interests of their beneficial investors are already being submitted by
others. But many shareholder proponents have much more limited resources
than the Big Three. As a result, many proposals that the Big Three would
support are not submitted at all or are submitted only after a delay of many
years.
In particular, a large proportion of the Big Three’s portfolio companies
have classified boards rather than annual elections, supermajority rather than
regular majority requirements to amend charters and bylaws, and plurality
voting rather than majority voting. As of June 30, 2019, 1,157 companies in
the Russell 3000 (39% of Russell 3000 companies) had classified boards;
1,681 (56%) companies required a supermajority to amend certain provisions
of the charter or bylaws (or both); and 1,440 (48%) companies had plurality
voting, rather than majority voting.
Annual elections, regular majorities for charter and bylaw amendments,
and majority voting are all arrangements called for by the Big Three’s voting
guidelines.196 But the great majority of those portfolio companies have yet to
receive shareholder proposals calling for such arrangements. Any of the Big
Three submitting proposals advocating those changes would likely have led
to their adoption by many companies. Given the Big Three’s focus on
governance arrangements in general, their support for these arrangements in
particular, and the effectiveness of shareholder proposals in obtaining such
arrangements, it would be natural to expect them to make extensive use of
shareholder proposals at those companies.197
By refraining from submitting shareholder proposals, the Big Three
enable many portfolio companies to maintain governance arrangements that
are inconsistent with the Big Three’s governance principles. As a result,
consistent with the agency-costs view, the Big Three’s stewardship activities
196. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
197. In discussing how shareholder proposals can bring about improvement in

governance arrangements, Fisch, Hamdani, and Davidoff Solomon note that “issuers are
responsive to the interests of large investors and will frequently modify their policies rather
than putting issues to a vote that they expect to lose.” Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript
at 19) (citing Rob Bauer, Frank Moers & Michael Viehs, Who Withdraws Shareholder
Proposals and Does It Matter? An Analysis of Sponsor Identity and Pay Practices, 23 Corp.
Governance 472 (2015)). Fisch, Hamdani, and Davidoff Solomon are correct that submission
of shareholder proposals sometimes brings about governance improvements without the need
for the proposal to go to vote. But they do not engage with the evidence that the Big Three
do not submit any shareholder proposals, and therefore do not lead companies to reach a
settlement that would avoid a vote.
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serve their beneficial investors significantly less than they could. Thus, the
Big Three’s practice of voting consistently for shareholder proposals
advocating certain changes yet never initiating such proposals is difficult to
reconcile with the value-maximization view.
This reactive-only approach, however, is both consistent with and can be
explained by the agency-costs view. Whereas corporate managers have come
to expect and accept the Big Three voting reactively for shareholder proposals
advocating changes consistent with governance best practices, corporate
managers might view the proactive submission of proposals as adversarial or
even confrontational. Although a reactive-only approach to shareholder
proposals does not serve the interests of the Big Three’s beneficial investors,
it is consistent with the deference incentives that we have identified.
4. Contributing to Corporate Governance Legal Reforms
The Big Three’s beneficial investors would benefit from having their
index fund managers contribute to corporate governance reforms that are
likely to have a material effect on their portfolio companies. The Big Three
could serve their investors’ interests by either facilitating desirable rule
changes or impeding undesirable changes. Commentators have long observed
that index fund investors have an especially keen interest in rule changes that
could enhance the value of a large number of companies, even by a small
amount.198
Supporters of index fund stewardship argue that index fund managers
have substantial advantages over other kinds of investors in bringing about
similar governance improvements in a large number of firms. This view also
implies that index fund stewardship would include facilitating legal reforms
that would apply to a large number of companies.199 Indeed, given the Big
Three’s focus on governance practices, supporters of index fund stewardship
have argued that the Big Three are well positioned to contribute in this way.200
For instance, Fisch, Hamdani, and Davidoff Solomon argue that “[p]assive
investors regularly comment upon and call for change to the rules adopted by
198. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director:
An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 863, 867 (1991) (“[I]ndexed
institutional investor[s] should seek a corporate governance system that . . . can improve the
performance of all companies.”).
199. See supra notes 183–187 and accompanying text.
200. For such arguments by supporters of index fund stewardship, see, e.g., Eckstein,
supra note 134 (manuscript at 30–38) (arguing that the broad ownership of the Big Three
gives them incentives to address “macro-legal risks” that apply to significant numbers of
their portfolio companies); Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript at 29–30) (discussing index
fund managers’ active influence on regulatory policy).
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SEC under the federal securities laws.”201 Yet these commentators do not
provide any empirical evidence in this study, and they do not engage with the
empirical evidence provided in this section that the Big Three’s participation
in the comment process is, in fact, very limited.
In this section we provide empirical evidence about two key ways in
which institutional investors can seek to influence legal rules regarding public
companies: by commenting on SEC proposed rules regarding corporate
governance, and by filing amicus curiae briefs in significant precedential
litigation in this field.202 We find that the Big Three have participated very
little in either of these activities. Instead, our analysis reveals a pattern of the
Big Three systematically staying on the sidelines on those decisions and
generally avoiding expressing any position or preference with respect to SEC
proposals and judicial precedential decisions under consideration. We explain
that systematically staying on the sidelines does not serve the interests of
index fund investors but is consistent with the private incentives of index fund
managers.
(a) SEC Comment Letters. By submitting comments on proposed SEC
rules, commenters can influence SEC rulemaking. Under the valuemaximization view, since the Big Three hold more than 20% of the equity in
large corporations,203 they should be expected to frequently express their
views on proposed SEC rules. Clearly, when a Big Three manager views a
proposed SEC rule as desirable or undesirable, submitting a comment would
help increase the value of portfolio companies, or avoid value decreases.
Furthermore, even if the index fund manager viewed a proposed rule as
practically insignificant for investor interests, expressing this view could still

201. Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript at 29).
202. The analyses in section II.B.4(a), including Table 10, regarding SEC comment

letters are based on a review of comment letters submitted for SEC proposed rules and which
are listed on the SEC webpage for each proposed rule. The total number of comments for
asset owners are less than the sum of comments by CalPERS and CalSTRS as several
comments were submitted jointly. The Big Three comments in Table 10 include two letters
from subsidiaries of State Street Corporation that operate different businesses from SSGA.
For SEC webpages of proposed rules, see Proposed Rules,
SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml [https://perma.cc/7UGK-LB5L] (last visited Sept.
8, 2019).
The analyses in section II.B.4(b) regarding amicus curiae briefs, including Table 11, are
based on a review of the dockets and decisions for the cases listed in Table 11. For the
Supreme Court decisions listed in Table 11, the amicus briefs considered include those
submitted regarding petitions for certiorari.
203. See Bebchuk & Hirst, Specter of the Giant Three, supra note 3, at 733–34
(presenting evidence that the Big Three held 20.5% of the equity of S&P 500 companies in
2017).

82

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 119:1

benefit the manager’s beneficial investors by directing the SEC’s limited
resources and attention to changes with greater potential to benefit investors.
We hand-collected from the SEC website all comments on SEC proposed
rules regarding corporate governance during the twenty-four-year period
from 1995 through 2018. We found 80 proposed rules regarding corporate
governance during this period, and we reviewed all comments submitted in
relation to each of these rules. As Table 10 indicates, each of the Big Three
submitted comments on only one or two of the twenty proposed rules that
attracted the most comments. By comparison, the two largest asset owners,
CalPERS and CalSTRS—whose assets are largely indexed but are very small
compared to those managed by the Big Three—submitted comments on
twelve and seven proposed rules, respectively. A similar picture emerges
when we examine the larger set of proposed rules that received relatively less
attention. Of those sixty proposed rules, each of the Big Three submitted
comments with respect to no more than four rules (less than 10%). In contrast,
CalPERS and CalSTRS submitted comments with respect to nine and eight
rules, respectively.204

204.
Some commentators who view index fund stewardship favorably have
noted that index fund managers conduct meetings with regulators. See Fisch et al., supra note
16, at 30 (discussing such meetings); Eckstein, supra note 134, (manuscript at 45) (same).
The SEC website discloses all meetings held by SEC personnel with respect to proposed
rules. We collected data from the website about meetings that the Big Three and the largest
asset owners conduct with the SEC regarding the universe of proposed rules considered in
Table 10. The Big Three conducted a total of 5 meetings with the SEC, regarding 2 proposed
rules, all of which were in the most commented 25% of rules: BlackRock conducted no
meetings, Vanguard conducted 3 total meetings on 2 proposals, and SSGA conducted 2
meetings on a single proposal. In contrast, the two largest asset owners conducted 14
meetings with the SEC, regarding 6 different proposed rules.
Considering how many SEC proposed rules the Big Three engaged with in any way—
either commenting or meeting with the SEC—increases their incidence of engagement with
proposed rules slightly but does not qualitatively change the results reported in Table 10; that
incidence remains low and considerably below that of the two largest asset managers. In
particular, when both comments and meetings are considered, out of the 20 proposed rules
that attracted highest number of comments, BlackRock engaged with 1 proposed rule,
Vanguard 3, and SSGA 3. Furthermore, because none of the Big Three conducted meetings
with respect to the proposed rules in less commented 75% of proposed rules, including
meetings in the analysis does not change any of the figures in Table 10 that relate to those
proposed rules.
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Table 10. Involvement in SEC Proposed Rules
Regarding Corporate Governance
Index Fund Managers

Asset Owners

BlackRock Vanguard SSGA Total

CalPERS CalSTRS Total

Most Commented 25%
of Proposed Rules (20)
Comments

1

3

2

6

19

16

34

Comments per
Proposed Rule

0.05

0.15

0.10

0.30

0.95

0.80

1.70

Proposed Rules
Commented On

1

2

2

5

12

7

12

Proportion of
Proposed Rules
Commented On

5%

10%

10%

25%

60%

35%

60%

1

3

1

5

14

9

22

Comments per
Proposed Rule

0.02

0.05

0.02

0.08

0.23

0.15

0.37

Proposed Rules
Commented On

1

3

1

5

14

9

15

Proportion of
Proposed Rules
Commented On

2%

5%

2%

8%

23%

15%

25%

Remaining 75% of
Proposed Rules (60)
Comments

It could be argued that another explanation for our findings is that the
Big Three consider filing comments with the SEC to be a futile exercise, since
they may expect them to have little effect on the SEC’s decisions.205
Following this view, the submission of a large number of comments by
others, rather than the infrequent submission of comments by the Big Three,
should be viewed as surprising. But the SEC releases issued following a
comment process often cite and discuss submitted comments,206 and there is
205. We are grateful to Stephen Davidoff Solomon and Stephen Fraidin for stressing the
usefulness of considering this objection.
206. To illustrate, the SEC’s final rule regarding Pay Ratio Disclosure referred to 250
different comment letters and its final rule regarding Conflict Minerals referred to 247
different comments. Pay Ratio Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 33-9877, 80 Fed. Reg.
50103 (Aug. 18, 2015); Conflict Minerals, Exchange Act Release No. 34-67716, 77 Fed.
Reg. 56273 (Sept. 12, 2012).
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little reason to view the submission of comments by many profit-making
players (such as issuers) as irrational or wasteful.
Moreover, and importantly, even if we were to accept that the average
comment submitted by investors should be expected to have no effect on SEC
decisions, it would be unlikely that a comment filed by one of the Big Three
would have the same lack of effect. Instead, if one or more Big Three
managers took a clear position on proposed SEC rule, the trillions of dollars
of their equity investments, and the breadth of their investments across all
significant U.S. public companies, would likely give substantial weight to
their comment and cause the SEC to give it significant attention.
We note that four of the six final SEC rules that resulted from the 25
most-commented rule proposals cited comments by the Big Three. For
instance, the SEC’s final rule in 2010 regarding proxy access, Facilitating
Shareholder Director Nominations, referenced Vanguard’s comment letter 16
times,207 and the SEC’s Amendments to Regulation SHO in 2009 referred to
two comment letters from Vanguard a total of twelve times.208 Views
expressed by the Big Three on corporate governance matters also often attract
substantial attention and commentary from prominent advisory firms, the
media, and other institutional investors.209 Thus, the common tendency of the
Big Three to stay on the sidelines and avoid filing SEC comments stating
their position is unlikely to be explained by a general expectation that doing
so could be expected to have no effect on SEC considerations.
(b) Amicus Curiae Briefs in Precedential Litigation. Supporters of index
fund stewardship have claimed that “[i]nstitutional investors now regularly
file amicus briefs.”210 We therefore examine the submission of amicus briefs
in cases important for protecting and enhancing the value of index fund
portfolios.
Table 11 presents data from 2008 through 2017 on the ten cases of
207. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 339136, 75 Fed. Reg. 56668 (Sept. 16, 2010).
208. Amendments to Regulation SHO, 75 Fed. Reg. 11232, 11238, 11246, 11248, 11251,
11272, 11292-94, 11313 (Mar. 10, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242 (2018)). In addition,
the SEC’s final rule, Strengthening the Commission’s Requirements Regarding Auditor
Independence, 68 Fed. Reg. 6006, 6020, 6029 (Feb. 5, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210,
240, 249 & 274), referred to Vanguard’s comment letter five times, and the SEC’s Securities
Offering Reform, 70 Fed. Reg. 44722, 44745, 44767 (Aug. 3, 2005) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 200, 228, 229, 230, 239, 240, 243, 249 & 274), referred to SSGA’s comment letter twice.
209. See, e.g., supra note 118 and accompanying text (detailing examples of prominent
law firms and media reports referring to changes in the corporate governance policies of the
Big Three).
210. See Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript at 30 & n.191) (citing a blog post as
“reporting that BlackRock signed an amicus brief to the U.S. Supreme Court arguing for
marriage equality for same sex couples”).
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precedential litigation regarding investor protection that the Council of
Institutional Investors identified as sufficiently important to warrant the filing
of an amicus brief.211 We reviewed the filings in each of these cases to identify
all of the briefs submitted. Eight of the ten cases gathered a significant
number of amicus curiae briefs, with six of the ten drawing between 10 and
30 briefs. Consistent with the possibility that amicus briefs could have an
influence, our review indicated that seven of the ten judicial decisions cited
amicus briefs, with five of those ten decisions citing more than one amicus
brief.
Reviewing the filed briefs, we find that the two largest asset owners,
CalPERS and CalSTRS, filed their own briefs or joined the Council of
Institutional Investors’ brief in four of the ten cases. Their assets are largely
indexed, although in each case less than 5% of the assets under management
were held by BlackRock. But our review of the filings indicated that none of
the Big Three filed a single amicus curiae brief in any of the ten cases of
precedential litigation that we consider. In these cases, the voices of the Big
Three, which represent more than 20% of corporate equities, were not heard.

211. We are grateful to the General Counsel of the Council of Institutional Investors (CII)
for providing us with this list. We did not include CII amicus briefs submitted in cases that
were not related to corporate governance, such as a case relating to stock market regulation,
or an amicus brief in support of a petition for certiorari that was denied. These exclusions
did not affect our results as none of the Big Three submitted amicus briefs in any of these
cases.
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Table 11. Amicus Curiae Briefs, 2007–2018
Amicus
Briefs

Briefs by
Two Largest
Asset Owners

Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta,
Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008)

31

✓✓

Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board, 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008)

4

Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477 (2010)

17

Merck & Co. v. Richard Reynold, 559 U.S. 633 (2010)

15

New York State Teachers’ Retirement System v. The Mercury
Pension Fund Group, 618 F.3d 988 (9 th Cir. 2010)

1

Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564
U.S. 135 (2011)

13

Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011)

6

New Jersey Carpenters Health Fund v. RALI Series 2006QO1 Trust, 477 Fed. Appx. 809 (2d Cir. 2012)

6

Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258
(2014)

26

Corre Opportunities Fund, LP v. Emmis Communications
Corp., 792 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2015)

3

Case

**

**

**

✓✓ Briefs filed separately by both of the asset owners
** Brief filed by both of the asset owners, jointly with CII

***
Thus, although supporters of index fund stewardship have argued that
the Big Three are well positioned to contribute to legal reforms affecting a
large number of public companies, our evidence indicates that their activities
in this regard are very modest. Indeed, the Big Three have collectively
contributed fewer comments on SEC proposed rules regarding corporate
governance, and fewer amicus briefs in precedential litigation, than the two
largest asset owners, which have corporate equities with an aggregate value
that is less than 5% of the assets under management of BlackRock or
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Vanguard.212
Under the value-maximization view, more involvement should be
expected from investors that collectively hold more than $5 trillion in
corporate equities. But the reluctance of the Big Three to contribute to
corporate governance reforms is consistent with, and can be explained by, the
incentives identified by the agency-costs view described in section I.C. The
incentives of the Big Three to defer to corporate managers discourage them
from supporting reforms that strengthen shareholder rights. At the same time,
the Big Three’s interest in reducing the salience of their deference gives them
incentives not to oppose such reforms. Thus, the interests of the Big Three
are likely served by generally staying on the sidelines and not lending their
influential support either in favor of or against such reforms.
5. Involvement in Securities Litigation
Securities litigation provides an important instrument for deterring
misconduct by corporate insiders, and for compensating investors if such
misconduct occurs. The “lead plaintiff” that is selected in any securities class
action plays a significant role in navigating the litigation. The lead plaintiff
chooses class counsel, sets the terms of engagement with class counsel, and
oversees the terms of any settlement, including monetary recovery and
prospective corporate governance changes required as part of the settlement.
Since the adoption of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(PSLRA) in 1995, securities law has followed a presumption that the plaintiff
with the largest financial interest in a class action should be the lead
plaintiff.213 This reflects a view that it is advantageous for investors to have
an institutional investor with significant “skin in the game” to play the role
of lead plaintiff, because such investors have the greatest incentive and ability
to monitor the litigation and ensure that it is conducted in the interest of
investors.214
212. As of June 30, 2018, CalPERS held U.S. equities with an aggregate market value
of $84.7 billion, and CalSTRS held U.S. equities with an aggregate market value of $65.0
billion. See 2017–2018 Annual Investment Report, Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. (2018),
https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms-publications/annual-investment-report-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N8RQ-XXPD]; Cal. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys., Comprehensive Annual
Financial
Report
117
(2018),
https://www.calstrs.com/sites/main/files/fileattachments/cafr2018.pdf?1546017967 [https://perma.cc/9YQE-TAUT] (listing a global
equity portfolio of $120.3 billion, of which 54% was held in U.S. equities).
213. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)
(2012).
214. For an influential article written during the debate leading to the passage of the
PSLRA that advocated having institutional investors serve as lead plaintiffs, see Elliott J.
Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors
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With over $5 trillion in corporate equities, the Big Three’s beneficial
investors have significant monetary interests in the outcome of many
securities class actions. The legal rules and policies of the PSLRA suggest
that the interests of these investors are best served by having the Big Three—
institutional investors with very substantial skin in the game—play the role
of lead plaintiffs in significant securities class actions. As lead plaintiffs the
Big Three could help to ensure that the outcome of those actions would best
serve investors. Among other things, they could ensure that class counsel has
adequate incentives and that corporate governance reforms are part of any
settlement where they are necessary.215 However, as we show below, the Big
Three have also chosen to “stay on the sidelines” with respect to the
leadership of securities litigation.
To identify the decisions made by the Big Three in this area, we examine
the extent to which the Big Three served as lead plaintiffs in significant
securities cases during the twelve-year period from 2007 through 2018.216
Table 12 presents data that we gathered regarding the incidence of securities
class actions over that period. To avoid marginal cases that are more likely to
be frivolous we focus on cases settled for more than $10 million, and the
subset of those cases settled for more than $100 million. These cases can be
expected to be brought regardless of who serves as lead plaintiff. As they are
likely to take place in any event, there are significant benefits for investors
from having the litigation overseen by a lead plaintiff with substantial skin in
the game. Table 12 shows that 408 class actions settled for more than $10
million from 2007 through 2018, with total recovery of $43.3 billion. Of these
Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 Yale L.J. 2053, 2121 (1995)
(“[I]nstitutional investors could realize substantial benefits by serving as lead plaintiffs in
class actions.”).
215. One commentator responded to our analysis in this section by arguing that there are
legal complexities, grounded in the difference between the characteristics of index funds and
those of other investors, which might preclude index funds from obtaining a lead plaintiff
position even when they have a large stake. See Alexander I. Platt, Index Fund Enforcement,
53
U.C.
Davis
L.
Rev.
(forthcoming)
(manuscript
at
40–41),
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3430643 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). But in
some well-known cases, public pension funds have served as lead plaintiffs, even though—
as John Coates explains—the equity portfolios of many public pension funds are largely
based on portfolios that are passively managed based on broad indexes. See Coates, supra
note 16, at 10–11. For an example of a class action led by CalPERS, see In re UnitedHealth
Group Inc. PSLRA Litigation, 643 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (D. Minn. 2019). Furthermore, Platt
does not cite any cases in which courts have turned down requests to appoint one of Big
Three as lead plaintiffs.
216. The analyses in section II.B.5, including Table 12, are based on securities class
action settlement data from Institutional Shareholder Services’ Securities Class Action
Database (last visited July 2, 2019). Cases involving multiple or partial settlements are
included in the year in which the settlement was made but only if the aggregate settlement
for that case has exceeded $10 million or $100 million, as appropriate.

2019] INDEX FUNDS AND THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

89

408 cases, 90 settled for more than $100 million, with total recovery of $32.8
billion.
Table 12. Securities Class Action Cases

Year

Cases Settled for
over $10m

Total Recovery in
Cases Settled for
over $10m ($m)

Cases Settled
for over $100m

Total Recovery
in Cases Settled
for over $100m
($m)

2007

39

$6,507

9

$5,501

2008

35

$1,896

5

$922

2009

42

$4,451

10

$3,656

2010

39

$2,013

6

$950

2011

29

$2,813

6

$1,910

2012

29

$2,816

8

$1,939

2013

34

$5,822

9

$5,000

2014

30

$1,776

4

$940

2015

34

$4,654

12

$3,993

2016

39

$4,692

13

$3,793

2017

30

$1,409

3

$527

2018

28

$4,485

5

$3,695

Total

408

$43,335

90

$32,827

For the reasons discussed above, the Big Three’s beneficial investors
could well have benefited from having their fund managers serve as lead
plaintiff in some of these significant securities class actions. But our review
of the data indicates that none of the Big Three served as lead plaintiff in any
of these securities class actions during the ten-year period that we
examined.217
217. Responding to our analysis in this section, Alexander Platt argues that, although the
Big Three have indeed avoided taking any lead plaintiff positions, they have in some cases
taken direct action, or opted out of class action litigation and pursued claims against
defendants separately. See Platt, supra note 215 (manuscript at 41–43). However, Platt notes
only a handful of cases in which such direct actions or opt-outs took place, and an empirical
study cited by Platt reports that, out of the 1,458 securities litigation cases reviewed between
1996 to 2014, only twenty cases involved opt-outs by “other institutional investors,” in which
broad category the study included mutual funds, hedge funds, and other investment
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The avoidance of any lead plaintiff positions by the Big Three is in
tension with the value-maximization view.218 But this pattern is consistent
with, and can be explained by, the agency-costs view and its incentive
analysis.219 First, the empirical pattern is consistent with the incentive to
underinvest in stewardship.220 If an index fund manager serving as lead
plaintiff in a significant class action would increase portfolio value by $1
million, doing so is efficient if the marginal investment in stewardship
required is less than $1 million. However, if the index fund manager has a
fractional share of 1%, serving as lead plaintiff position is not in the
manager’s interests if the additional marginal stewardship investment
required would exceed $10,000.
Similarly, the avoidance of any lead plaintiff positions is also consistent
with the Big Three’s deference incentives.221 Being an effective lead plaintiff
may require taking strong positions against certain corporate managers,
which corporate managers may view unfavorably. At the same time, because
decisions made in securities class actions are public, lead plaintiffs’ decisions
can be scrutinized. For a Big Three lead plaintiff to be excessively deferential
toward corporate managers would make that deference more salient to
outsiders. Avoiding lead plaintiff positions allows index fund managers to
avoid both frictions and undesirable perceptions.
In response to our analysis it could be argued that it is not surprising that
index fund managers avoid service as lead plaintiffs because they would not
consider serving as a lead plaintiff to be economically worthwhile.222
companies. See id. (manuscript at 17 n.100) (citing Amir Rozen, Brendan Rudolph &
Christopher Harris, Opt-Out Cases in Securities Class Action Settlements: 2012–2014
Update 3 (2016)). Likely many fewer than twenty of these cases involved opt-outs by any of
the Big Three. See id. (noting also that “the most common plaintiffs in opt-outs are pension
funds. Pension funds were present in 21 out of these 43 opt-out cases during 1996 to 2014.”).
Furthermore, the few cases of opt-outs do not explain why none of the Big Three took any
lead plaintiff positions in the very large number of cases in which such opt-outs did not take
place. In those cases, becoming the lead plaintiff would have enabled an index fund manager
to lead the litigation while having their litigation costs shared with the rest of the securities
class.
218. See supra section I.C.
219. See supra section I.C. For a related discussion of why large investment managers
do not become lead plaintiffs, see David H. Webber, Private Policing of Mergers and
Acquisitions: An Empirical Assessment of Institutional Lead Plaintiffs in Transactional Class
and Derivative Actions, 38 Del. J. Corp. L. 907, 920–33 (2013); David H. Webber,
Shareholder Litigation Without Class Actions, 57 Ariz. L. Rev. 201, 217–23 (2015).
220. See supra section I.D.
221. See supra section I.E.
222. For articles expressing such a view, see, for example, Platt, supra note 215
(manuscript at 41 n.209) (citing James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff
Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 Colum. L.
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However, this is exactly our point: Avoiding such positions is indeed
consistent with the cost-benefit analysis of the index fund manager from their
private economic perspective, even when taking such a position would serve
the interests of the index fund’s beneficial investors. It is for this reason that
the avoidance of lead plaintiff positions, like the other patterns documented
in this Part, is consistent with the agency-costs view of index fund
stewardship.
III. POLICY
Our analysis in Part I has identified the incentives of index fund
managers to underinvest in stewardship and to defer to corporate managers,
and Part II has shown empirical evidence consistent with the significant
influence of these incentives. In this Part we turn to the policy implications
of our analysis.
We begin in section III.A by discussing a number of regulatory measures
that would address these incentive problems, as well as some that should be
avoided. In each case, we do not aim to provide a comprehensive analysis of
each measure or to give a blueprint for its implementation; rather, we wish to
put these measures on the table for subsequent discussion as partial solutions
to the considerable problems that we have identified. Our aim is also not to
present an exhaustive identification of approaches that should be considered,
but to highlight the availability of a range of measures for consideration and
the potential benefits of reforms in this area.
In section III.B we turn to the significant implications that our analysis
holds for two important ongoing debates in the corporate law field. We
discuss the heated debates on common ownership (section III.B.1) and on
hedge fund activism (section III.B.2). In both cases, we explain how our
analysis undermines claims made in these debates, introduces new issues into
the debates, and calls for revision of positions taken in the debates.
Finally, in section III.C, we comment on a more direct avenue through
which our analysis could impact stewardship. We argue that, because index
fund managers care about how their stewardship is viewed and wish to be
perceived as good stewards, this is an area in which the mere recognition of
incentive problems by the public might have an effect on index fund manager
behavior. In particular, public recognition of the problems we analyze can
induce index fund managers to make changes that would reduce the force of
Rev. 1587, 1602–10 (2006)); Charles Silver & Sam Dinkin, Incentivizing Institutional
Investors to Serve as Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 57 DEPAUL L. REV.
471, 472 (2008). A similar point was raised by Stephen Fraidin, a discussant of this Article
at the 2019 NYU Roundtable on Corporate Governance.
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those problems.
A. Regulatory Reforms
We begin this Part’s analysis by considering what should and should not
be considered to address the incentive problems that we have identified and
documented in the preceding Parts of this Article. Section III.A.1 starts by
explaining why precluding index funds from voting, or requiring them to
adopt “pass-through” voting, should not be considered as solutions to the
problems we identify. In section III.A.2–III.A.6 we focus in turn on five types
of measures that should be considered, either individually or in combination:
measures to encourage the use of stewardship tools by index fund managers;
measures to address problems arising from business relationships; measures
to bring transparency to private engagements; reconsideration of the
application of Section 13(d) to index funds; and measures to limit the
aggregate amount of assets managed by each index fund manager.
1. Letting Index Fund Managers Vote
Before discussing regulatory reforms that would be worthwhile for
policymakers to consider, we would like to note two approaches that are not
worthy of further consideration as solutions to the problems we identify.
Given our analysis of the agency problems with the stewardship decisions of
index fund managers, a natural response may be to suggest eliminating or
reducing the power of index fund managers to make stewardship decisions.
In particular, we discuss below two alternative approaches in this direction:
One is to “disenfranchise” index funds by precluding them from affecting the
outcome of corporate votes; the other is to require index funds to adopt passthrough voting that would enable decisions to be made by beneficial investors
rather than index fund managers. We explain below why we view each of
these measures as unwarranted and counterproductive.
(a) Taking voting power from index funds. Dorothy Shapiro Lund has
made a provocative and widely-noticed proposal to address problems with
index fund stewardship by precluding index fund managers from voting.223
223. A proposal to preclude any voting by index funds was put forward in Lund, supra
note 16, as well as in a subsequent op-ed article, M. Todd Henderson & Dorothy Shapiro
Lund, Opinion, Index Funds Are Great for Investors, Risky for Corporate Governance, Wall
St. J. (June 22, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/index-funds-are-great-for-investorsrisky-for-corporate-governance-1498170623 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). For a
proposal that would preclude index fund voting on all matters other than contested elections,
see Sean J. Griffith, Opt-In Stewardship: Toward an Optimal Delegation of Mutual Voting
Authority (European Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 463/2019, 2019),
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Under one version of this approach, the votes associated with shares held by
index funds would not count at all.224 This would result in an increase in the
power of corporate insiders that could adversely affect all public investors.
Under an alternative version designed to address the pro-management voting
behavior of index fund managers, the votes associated with the shares held
by index funds would be voted in the same way and in the same proportions
as the votes cast by shareholders other than index funds and corporate
insiders.225 In this version, the voting power of index funds would essentially
pass to those shareholders that are not index funds or corporate insiders,
whom we refer to as the “nonindexed public investors.”
We do not support such a transfer of voting power from index funds to
nonindexed public investors.226 Although this Article has focused on the
problems with index fund stewardship, the existence of these problems does
not imply that the voting decisions of nonindexed public investors are, on the
whole, superior to those of index funds. Although supporters of this approach
oppose index fund voting on the grounds that index funds are insufficiently
informed,227 they fail to consider the problems with voting by nonindexed
public investors. However, most individual retail investors are likely to have
considerably weaker incentives to acquire information about the
consequences of upcoming votes than index funds, and as a result are likely
to be considerably less informed. Furthermore, we explain elsewhere that a
careful comparison of the incentives of active mutual funds managers and
those of index fund managers does not suggest that active mutual fund
managers are generally likely to invest more in informing themselves about
voting decisions than index fund managers.228 We therefore oppose taking
away voting power from index funds.
(b) Taking voting power from index fund managers. As an alternative to
taking voting power from index funds, several authors have suggested taking
voting power from the managers of index funds. These authors advocate
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3404298 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Concerns about
index fund voting have also been expressed by Weil, supra note 115 (arguing that because
passive investors dedicate limited energy to voting, “[t]he SEC should acknowledge the
diluting effect of these votes and reverse their guidance on abstentions”).
224. See Lund, supra note 16, at 528–30.
225. See id. at 530–31.
226. Unsurprisingly, neither do index fund managers. See, e.g., Booraem, What We Do,
supra note 34, at 7 (“If Vanguard didn’t speak on behalf of its more than 20 million investors,
whose voice would hold sway? That of activists? Company management? Proxy advisors?”).
227. See Lund, supra note 16, at 513, 529 (arguing that the “low-cost, unthinking
approach to governance” of index fund managers risks doing “more harm than good,” and,
more generally, that permitting index funds to vote hurts investors).
228. For our analysis of this issue, see generally Bebchuk & Hirst, Active Mutual Funds,
supra note 22.
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“pass-through” requirements that would enable the beneficial investors of
index funds to determine how the votes associated with the funds’ shares will
be cast.229 We view such requirements as also unwarranted, for three reasons.
First, implementing full pass-through arrangements would involve
substantial practical difficulties and expense.230 Consider an individual who
is a beneficial investor in an S&P 500 index fund. The individual would be
asked each year to make voting decisions on all the proposals that will go to
a vote at the annual meetings of each of the hundreds of companies in the
S&P 500, which would likely amount to thousands of proposals each year.231
Even putting aside the costs to index fund investors of informing themselves
about those proposals, merely communicating thousands of voting decisions
each year would not be feasible for most index fund investors.
Second, even if these index fund investors could hypothetically
determine their preferences with respect to each of a vast number of votes
without substantial effort or expense, the voting decisions of index funds
produced by this process would likely be based on very little information.
The great majority of individual beneficial investors would have little or no
information about the thousands of proposals on which the index fund would
have to cast votes. Having decisions made in a centralized fashion for the
portfolio as a whole produces large economies of scale compared with the
pass-through approach. By forgoing these economies, the pass-through
approach would produce a process that would be both costly and uninformed.
Finally, a pass-through approach to voting would not permit index funds
to use their substantial voting power to produce benefits through engagement.
If an index fund manager did not have the power to determine how to cast the
229. For other articles proposing pass-through voting as a mandatory or default
arrangement, see, e.g., Caleb N. Griffin, We Three Kings: Disintermediating Voting at the
Index Fund Giants, Md. L. Rev. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 34–35),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3365222 (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Griffith, supra
note 223, at 33–43; Lund, supra note 16, at 530–31. An earlier article by one of us explained
why investment managers may choose to poll their beneficial investors regarding their
preferences on certain matters to assist in determining their voting policies. See Hirst, supra
note 31, at 237–40.
230. For an earlier version of this objection to pass-through voting by one of us, see
Hirst, supra note 31, at 237–38.
231. Some authors suggest pass-through voting arrangements in which beneficial
investors would give general principles in advance or designate an agent to choose their
preferred vote, instead of reporting preferences on each decision. See, e.g., Griffin, supra
note 229 (manuscript at 34–35). But if index fund investors were to provide some general
principles or preferences, those would not determine many votes and thus would leave
significant discretion to the investment manager. And if index fund investors were asked to
choose an agent for selecting their preferred voting decision, this would require the investors
to inform themselves adequately regarding the agent and the quality of its decisions, which
would again be impractical for many index fund investors.
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votes associated with shares held by the fund, then portfolio companies would
have little incentive to listen to the index fund manager, and the index fund
manager would have commensurately little ability to influence the company
through such engagement. At the same time, the dispersed nature of the index
fund investors that would determine how votes are cast means that they are
unable to effectively communicate or engage with portfolio companies. Thus,
a pass-through approach would eliminate any potential benefits from
stewardship activities other than voting.
2. Encouraging Investment in Stewardship
We now turn to regulatory reforms that in our view should be considered.
The evidence that we presented in section II.A.1 shows that, consistent with
our incentive analysis, the Big Three make investments in stewardship that
are very small relative to the number of their portfolio companies and the
value of their equity assets: Each allocates to stewardship less than 0.2% of
their estimated fees and devotes, on average, only a few thousand dollars in
stewardship costs to large positions.232 These levels of stewardship are likely
to be less than optimal from the collective perspective of index fund
investors, who would be better off if all index fund managers were to increase
their investments in stewardship and pass on the costs to their beneficial
investors.
Policymakers should explore ways to encourage index fund managers to
move towards these higher levels of stewardship investment. As we explain
below, because current stewardship budgets are economically negligible
relative to the fee income of the Big Three, pressure from investors and from
the public alone could lead the Big Three to raise their stewardship budgets
considerably. Given the importance of increasing investment in stewardship,
it would also be worthwhile for policymakers to consider measures to
encourage such investment. We suggest that they consider three potential
measures.
(a) Charging Stewardship Costs to the Index Fund. One way to respond
to the identified incentive problems is to facilitate the ability of index fund
managers to charge stewardship costs directly to the index fund so they are
borne by the index fund investors that also capture the gains from stewardship
activity. This would mean that index fund managers would no longer have to

232. See supra section II.A.1(a).
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bear the cost of stewardship investments while capturing only a tiny benefit
of the gains such investments generate.233
As we explained above, the stewardship efforts of index fund families
are generally undertaken by a centralized department on behalf of all the
funds in the fund family.234 A significant impediment to charging stewardship
costs to index fund investors is the difficulty of allocating centralized
stewardship costs to the index funds in the fund family without risking
litigation. Regulators could help alleviate this problem. One solution could
be for the SEC to adopt a safe harbor that would allow fund families that have
a central stewardship unit to allocate its costs to the different funds in the
family, and to do so proportionately to the value of the portfolio of each
fund.235
(b) Sharing Outside Research Services. As section II.B.1 explained, it
would be desirable for index fund managers to monitor portfolio companies
to detect underperformance, to assess the characteristics and fit of their
directors, and—when appropriate—to identify which directors should be
added or removed. Such stewardship activities require close attention to the
particular circumstances of individual companies and, are therefore costly.
But such information acquisition could serve more than one index fund
manager. Policymakers should thus facilitate the pooling of research,
including having outside organizations undertake such research on behalf of
multiple index fund managers.236
Consider the following thought experiment. Suppose that there were
three substantial organizations that monitored each company in the major
indexes to reveal underperformance and identify changes—including choices
of directors—that could improve performance. Suppose also that the Big
Three and other index fund managers shared the costs of these organizations
and received reports from them to inform their stewardship decision making.
In our view such pooling of resources could also improve index fund
stewardship.
233. See Assaf Hamdani, Eugene Kandel, Yevgeny Mugerman & Yishay Yafeh,
Incentive Fees and Competition in Pension Funds: Evidence from a Regulatory Experiment,
2 J.L. Fin. & Acct. 49, 54 (2017) (advocating performance fees for retirement savings funds
as an alternative approach).
234. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
235. For example, the safe harbor could provide a precise formula, such as dividing the
cost proportionately by portfolio value at the end of each quarter.
236. For recent policy discussions about pooling of resources by institutional investors,
see Luca Enriques & Alessandro Romano, Institutional Investor Voting Behavior: A Network
Theory Perspective, 2019 U. Ill. L. Rev. 223, 254–57 (discussing the benefits of cooperation
among investors); and Sharon Hannes, Super Hedge Fund, 40 Del. J. Corp. L. 163, 182–89
(2015) (advocating greater pooling of resources).
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Policymakers should facilitate such pooling by making it clear that such
resource sharing would not create a “group” for the purposes of Section
13(d).237 We note that the European Securities and Market Authority provides
a safe harbor for certain collective efforts by shareholders, 238 and that some
form of pooling of resources is already taking place in Europe.239 We believe
that U.S. policymakers should also consider the adoption of a safe harbor to
encourage pooling.
(c) Mandating Minimum Stewardship Expenses. A third measure for
policymakers to consider is to require each index fund manager to invest an
amount in stewardship that is above a specified minimum fraction of its
indexed assets under management. Consider, as a thought experiment, a
requirement that all index fund managers allocate for stewardship an amount
equal to at least 0.0005% or 0.001% of their indexed equity assets under
management. Although this investment would remain an economically
negligible fraction of total index fund manager fee revenue, it would lead to
a substantial increase in stewardship budgets.
Of course, as with any such mandate, a difficult issue would be the
specific investment requirement. But as long as the required investment was
held to a multiple of existing stewardship investments, the risk of
overshooting the desirable stewardship level would remain relatively low
compared to the economic benefit from reducing underinvestment. Indeed,
even if policymakers did not adopt such a mandate, merely considering it
would likely encourage index fund managers to increase their stewardship.
3. Business Relationships with Public Companies
As section I.E explained, index fund managers’ business relationships
with public companies provide significant incentives for them to be
excessively deferential to corporate managers. Below we put forward two
alternative measures that could be considered to address this problem: limits

237. For a review of these rules, see Jacobs, supra note 91, §§ 2:21–28.
238. See European Securities and Markets Authority, Information on Shareholder

Cooperation and Acting in Concert Under the Takeover Bids Directive 2 (2019),
https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma31-65682_public_statement_concerning_shareholder_cooperation_and_acting_in_concert.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X9M6-FATT] (creating a “White-List” of permissible activities).
239. In the United Kingdom some pooling of stewardship is done through the Investor
Forum.
See
Investor
Forum,
About
the
Investor
Forum,
https://www.investorforum.org.uk/about [https://perma.cc/3DR8-PX9H] (last visited Aug. 7,
2019). For a detailed and insightful comparison of the U.K. and the U.S. approaches, see
Andrew F. Tuch, Proxy Advisor Influence, 99 B.U. L. Rev. 1459, 1464–503 (2019).
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on business relationships and disclosure requirements.240
(a) Limiting Business Relationships. One natural approach for regulators
to consider is constraining or prohibiting business relationships between
index fund managers (and potentially some other investment managers) and
their portfolio companies. Their substantial assets under management should
give index fund managers sufficient scale that they can operate solely as
investment managers without engaging in other business activities. Put
another way, there would not appear to be substantial efficiency gains from
investment managers also operating such other businesses, so precluding
them from doing so would not have significant social costs.241
For example, public officials should consider prohibiting investment
managers from administering 401(k) plans for employers. This is a business
that inherently places index fund managers into meaningful conflicts of
interest with a significant number of portfolio companies over which they
conduct stewardship.242 As explained earlier, empirical evidence suggests
that these conflicts of interest distort investment managers’ stewardship
incentives.243 More broadly, policymakers should review investment
managers’ range of business relationships with portfolio companies and
compare (i) the efficiencies that result from combining these businesses with
(ii) the adverse effects of these businesses on the incentives of investment
managers.
(b) Disclosing Business Relationships. A more moderate approach would
be to require index fund managers to disclose their business relationships
with portfolio companies with particularity. Index fund managers currently
provide some information about their policies and practices with respect to
conflicts of interest, but they do not provide particularized information about
the actual cases in which potential conflicts arise.244 Disclosure alone would
not preclude business relationships between index fund managers and their
portfolio companies, but it would shed light on those relationships, enabling
240. For early discussions of regulatory responses and reforms to address conflicts of
interest arising from business relationships, see Black, Agents Watching Agents, supra note
17, at 884–85; Jennifer S. Taub, Able but Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual Fund Advisers
to Advocate for Shareholders’ Rights, 34 J. Corp. L. 843, 887–92 (2009).
241. Indeed, in our view, public officials may wish to consider whether index fund
managers should also manage actively managed funds, as the Big Three currently do. We
leave detailed consideration of this question to future work. Cf. Griffith & Lund, supra note
80, at 1182–84 (noting the policy problems raised by mutual fund sponsors centralize voting
for both active and passive funds).
242. See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 81, 84–85 and accompanying text.
244. In particular, there is not such particularized information in the Big Three Annual
Stewardship Reports, supra note 127. Similarly, the release cited in supra note 82 and
discussing conflicts does not include such particularized information.
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outsiders to assess how they affect stewardship decisions. Such scrutiny may
help offset the undesirable incentives of index fund managers and thus have
positive effects on their stewardship activities. Transparency would also
provide a basis for regulators to make informed decisions regarding the
desirability of substantive restrictions on business relationships.
4. Bringing Transparency to Private Engagements
As we have discussed, the leaders of the Big Three consider private
engagements with portfolio companies as the major channel through which
they conduct stewardship.245 As we described in section II.A, private
engagement takes place with a very small minority of portfolio companies.246
Nonetheless, used effectively, private engagement by index fund managers
could have a powerful influence on portfolio companies. Our analysis
suggests that it would be desirable for index fund managers to provide much
more detailed disclosure regarding their private engagements.
Each of the Big Three publishes an annual stewardship report with the
number of its engagements, and the illustrative topics they covered.247 In
recent years each of the Big Three has started to list all of the particular
companies with which they engaged in the preceding year; Vanguard began
providing such information in its 2019 Annual Stewardship Report,
BlackRock in 2018, and SSGA in 2014.248 SSGA also issues quarterly
stewardship reports with lists of companies engaged with in the preceding
quarter.249 Whereas BlackRock’s disclosure is limited to a list of companies

245. See supra notes 140–141 and accompanying text.
246. For evidence of the proportion of portfolio companies that each of the Big Three

engage with, see supra section II.A.2 (showing that the average number of portfolio
companies that the Big Three engaged with over the last three years was 9.8%).
247. For recent stewardship reports from the Big Three, see BlackRock, Annual
Stewardship Report 2018-19, supra note 127; State St. Glob. Advisors, Annual Stewardship
Report 2018, supra note 52; Vanguard, Annual Stewardship Report 2018-19, supra note 127.
For SSGA’s disclosure regarding one such general category of engagement, regarding
executive compensation concerns, see State St. Glob. Advisors, Annual Stewardship Report
2018–2019, supra note 52, at 40–41.
248. See Vanguard, Annual Stewardship Report 2018-19, supra note 127, at 36–59;
BlackRock, Annual Stewardship Report 2017-18, supra note 144, at 25–31; State St. Glob.
Advisors, Annual Stewardship Report 2014 Year End 28–37 (2015),
https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-social-governance/2016/AnnualStewardship-Report-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/SG2X-PVQU].
249. See, e.g., State St. Glob. Advisors, Stewardship Activity Report Q1 2019, at 5–6
(2019),
https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/environmental-socialgovernance/2019/06/asset-stewardship-report-q1-july-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/LKD98EHA]. SSGA’s CEO has indicated that SSGA “believe[s] in the importance of full
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with which it had discussions,250 Vanguard and SSGA also include the general
categories for the subject of engagements.251 In this section we propose
bringing greater transparency to this important component of fund
stewardship for all index fund managers.
In particular, it would be worth considering having index fund managers
provide additional material details about each engagement, such as the
number of conversations, which side initiated them, what changes if any the
investment fund manager demanded, and what information the issuer
provided that could be material for the investment fund manager’s voting
decisions. It also would be worth considering whether such information
should be provided to other investors and the marketplace in a more timely
fashion than through a stewardship report that is published a substantial
period after the engagements take place. Below we do not attempt to put
forward a specific set of disclosure requirements, but rather explain the value
of expanding disclosure in this area.
(a) The Value of Transparency. We believe that making index fund
engagements more transparent would be desirable for two reasons. The first
reason is that transparency would provide all investors with material
information. Private engagements involve both information flows from
public companies to index fund managers, and vice versa.252 Index fund
managers seek information that they view as useful for their voting decisions:
For instance, during Vanguard’s engagements with two companies on climate
risk disclosure, corporate managers made commitments to improve
disclosure that caused Vanguard to vote against a shareholder proposal
requesting such disclosure.253 In BlackRock’s engagements, it “seek[s] to
better understand how boards assess their effectiveness and performance,
along with the skills and expertise needed to take a company through its
future . . . multi-year strategy” and “continue[s] to engage with companies to
better understand their progress on improving diversity in the boardroom.”254
If either BlackRock or Vanguard receives information that it deems material

transparency in terms of the issues we choose to highlight in our asset stewardship practice.”
Letter from Cyrus Taraporevala, supra note 34, at 1.
250. See BlackRock, Annual Stewardship Report 2018-19, supra note 127, at 31–37.
251. See Vanguard, Annual Stewardship Report 2018-19, supra note 127, at 36–59; State
St. Glob. Advisors, Annual Stewardship Report 2018, supra note 52, at 106–149.
252. See Mallow & Sethi, supra note 142, at 393 (“Engagement could take the form of
consultation for the purpose of enhancing two way information flow between shareholders
and management.”).
253. Vanguard, Annual Stewardship Report 2016-17, supra note 123, at 12.
254. BlackRock, Stewardship Engagement Priorities 2019, supra note 47, at 4.
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for its voting decisions, such information is also likely to be material to the
voting decisions of other investors.
In addition, private engagements also involve index fund managers
communicating their views that portfolio companies should change their
governance practices in certain ways. For example, SSGA provided feedback
to VeriFone Systems, Inc. and Exelon Corporation regarding their
compensation plans, as a result of which the companies made the desired
changes to those plans.255 Private engagement by the Big Three is predicated
on the belief that such communications increase the likelihood that requested
changes will occur. Information that the Big Three have made such requests
would thus be material for other investors.
The second reason why transparency would be desirable is that it should
lead to more meaningful engagement by index fund managers. Thus far we
have taken the stewardship decisions of index fund managers as given. But
transparency is likely to affect stewardship decisions in desirable ways. Once
investors are informed about the companies with which engagements took
place and the subjects of those engagements they will be better able to assess
the effectiveness of such engagements. This would motivate index fund
managers to achieve more significant outcomes from their private
engagements.
The SEC’s Regulation FD requires companies to disclose material
information that they provide to some investors.256 In our view, it would be
reasonable to interpret Regulation FD as requiring companies to disclose the
existence and contents of all of their significant engagements with major
investors. That Vanguard believes information from its private engagements
with a company to be material is highly suggestive that other investors would
regard it as material as well, and the information should therefore also be
considered material to the company. Vanguard knows what demands it has
communicated and how the company has responded; Regulation FD should
require the disclosure of this information to all investors. Counsel to public
companies and to the SEC should consider whether Regulation FD already
requires companies to disclose the existence and contents of their
engagements with index fund managers.
If the SEC does not consider such disclosure to be currently required
under Regulation FD it should consider amending Regulation FD or adopting
other rules to require such disclosure, either by companies or by investment
managers. In designing such disclosure rules, the SEC should aim to place
other investors on an equal informational footing with the index fund
manager undertaking the engagement. Such disclosure may include the
engagements that took place, their duration, whether they were by phone or
255. State St. Glob. Advisors, Annual Stewardship Report 2017, supra note 144, at 50.
256. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (2019).
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in person, the main topics discussed, the positions that the index fund
manager expressed, and the company’s responses. Were investors aware of
this information, they could assess how effectively index fund managers
wield their considerable power.
(b) Objections to Transparency? It might be argued by index fund
managers and supporters of index fund stewardship that the disclosure we
suggest could chill private engagement: Companies might not be willing to
engage privately with index fund managers if they know their
communications would be disclosed. We do not believe this to be a realistic
concern. Companies are unlikely to reject conversations with their largest
shareholders. All of the Big Three now disclose the identity of the companies
with which they engage; SSGA has also disclosed the topics of its
engagements since 2014 without any apparent effect on its ability to
engage.257 Indeed, if disclosure included whether particular companies
declined to engage, the possibility of such disclosure alone would likely
discourage any companies from declining engagement with index fund
managers.
In addition, it could also be argued that disclosure would make
engagements less effective in producing results. Companies may be more
willing to accept private requests because they would prefer not to appear
susceptible to outside pressure. But any promise to accede to or seriously
consider a request is even more likely to be material and therefore subject to
Regulation FD. If an engagement involves only a request by the index fund
manager, it is debatable whether disclosing the request would make the
company less likely to heed it. Following a long-term investor’s request may
be positively regarded. The willingness of companies to implement precatory
shareholder proposals that receive majority support demonstrates that the
visibility of shareholder pressure is generally not a barrier to management
responsiveness.258 While these costs should be considered, they do not appear
sufficient to maintain the lack of engagement transparency.
5. Rethinking Section 13(d) Rules
The analysis of the preceding Part took as given the application of
Section 13(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act and Rule 13d promulgated
thereunder, which require certain extensive disclosures in the event that an
investor crosses the 5% ownership threshold with the purpose of influencing

257. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
258. For empirical evidence that many shareholder proposals receiving majority support

are subsequently implemented, see, e.g., Ertimur et al., supra note 190, at 54, 62–64.
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the control of the portfolio company.259 In section I.E.3 we explained that this
rule deters the Big Three, each of which holds a very large number of
positions of 5% or more, from engaging in activities that could be regarded
as seeking to influence corporate decision making.260 Furthermore, in section
II.B.2 we presented evidence consistent with a strong deterrent effect: We
documented that, despite having each a vast number of 5% plus positions, the
Big Three have not filed a single Schedule 13D in the past decade,
presumably by avoiding any of the influence-seeking activities that could
trigger Rule 13d obligations.261 While the above analyses took Rule 13d as
given, they suggest that it would be worthwhile to reconsider the design of
Rule 13d or at least its application to index funds.
To begin, although Rule 13d might be regarded as a disclosure
requirement aimed at bringing certain information to the market, our analysis
makes clear that the application of Rule 13d to index funds has thus far not
provided any material information to the market. Whereas the application of
Rule 13d to activist hedge funds has led to the filing of hundreds of Schedule
13Ds providing the market with information,262 section II.B.2 explains that
the application of Rule 13d to index funds has not resulted in any Schedule
13Ds being filed by index funds.263
Indeed, section II.B.2 shows that, although each of the Big Three has
held stakes exceeding 5% in a large number of public companies during the
past decade, they have avoided filing even a single Schedule 13D.264 In our
view, these empirical patterns raise the concern that, to the extent that the
application of Rule 13d to index funds has had any practical effect, it has
done so by deterring index funds from taking certain potentially influenceseeking activities, such as communicating with the company about particular
directors that should be added to or removed from the board of directors, that
could require such a filing.265 Thus, in assessing the current operation of Rule
13d with respect to index funds, we should consider not whether providing
some information to the market in certain circumstances would be desirable,
but whether deterring index funds from engaging in activities that would
trigger disclosure obligations under the current design of Rule 13d is
259. See supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text.
260. See supra section I.E.3.
261. See supra section II.B.2.
262. For empirical evidence about the large incidence of Schedule 13D filings, see

Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Wei Jiang, Pre-Disclosure
Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy, 39 J. Corp. L. 1, 7–9 (2013).
263. See supra section II.B.2.
264. See supra section II.B.2.
265. See supra section I.E.3 (explaining that such communications could require a filing
on Schedule 13D).
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desirable. Our analysis raises concerns that such deterrent effects might be
undesirable.
Furthermore, a main policy goal underlying the adoption of Rule 13d and
Section 13(d), and the disclosure required thereby, is to alert the market
before an investor that seeks to influence corporate decisions rapidly acquires
a substantial stake in the company.266 Clearly, the application of Rule 13d to
the case of an activist hedge fund could reduce the risk that the fund would
rapidly accumulate a large stake. But index funds can be expected to increase
their stakes in individual portfolio companies only gradually, as funds flow
into the index fund over time, so there is no risk of the rapid accumulation of
a large stake.
A detailed analysis of the optimal redesign of Rule 13d, or at least its
application to index funds, is beyond the scope of this Article. However, our
analysis does suggest considerations that should be examined in any such
redesign. In particular, such considerations should include (i) the chilling
effect that the current application of Rule 13d to index funds has on
stewardship activities by index funds; (ii) the potential value of such
stewardship activities for the index fund investors; and (iii) the reasonable
expectations, grounded in the modus operandi of index funds, that an index
fund would increase its position in a particular portfolio company only
gradually. We believe that a reconsideration of the current application of Rule
13d to index funds that takes those issues into account would be warranted.
6. Size Limits
As we show in section I.A, the Big Three already owns 5% or more of a
vast number of companies.267 Furthermore, as noted in the Introduction, we
document in an empirical study supplementing this Article that the index fund
sector can be expected to continue growing and be dominated by the Big
Three, and the Big Three can be estimated to cast as much as 40% of the votes
in S&P 500 companies on average within two decades.268 We argue in this
section that this growing concentration of equity in the hands of three large
players raises significant policy concerns, and that policymakers should
consider measures to limit or reverse this trend.269
266. For a discussion of the legislative history and policy goals of Section 13(d), see
Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 90, at 44–46.
267. See supra section I.A.
268. See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text.
269. See also Coates, supra note 16, at 2–3 (expressing concerns about the rising
concentration of corporate equity in the hands of a small number of players). Although
Coates’s essay and this Article share a concern about the rising concentration of equity, our
approaches differ in key respects. To begin, Coates focuses on what he labels “the problem
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Measures to limit or discourage large financial stakes are not unknown
in the U.S. regulatory framework. Longstanding rules deter investment funds
from holding more than 10% of any portfolio company.270 However, these
rules apply only to individual funds and do not prevent investment managers
from advising fund complexes that cross these thresholds in the aggregate.271
We believe that policymakers should consider measures to prevent or deter
investment fund managers from managing investment funds that cross certain
thresholds in the aggregate, whether by fiat, tax penalties, or other means.
Such an approach would have an important effect on the trajectory of
index fund growth. Suppose that the proportion of U.S. equity in index funds
is expected to grow to 45%. As the Big Three can be expected to continue to
dominate the sector if there is no regulatory intervention, suppose that the Big
Three become the “Giant Three,” each owning approximately 15% of each
large public company. Consider a regulatory approach that would prevent
investment fund managers from managing funds holding, in the aggregate,
more than 5% of any company.272 Suppose also that this would lead to the
sector being divided equally among nine index fund managers—the “Big-ish
Nine”—each holding about 5% of each large public company.
In our view, policymakers should consider whether the Big-ish Nine
scenario is preferable to the Giant Three scenario. Having the sector in the
hands of three players rather than nine is unlikely to result in significant
incremental economies of scale. Each of the Big-ish Nine would likely
manage more than a trillion dollars, so each would still have substantial
economies of scale, similar to those of the current Big Three. Since
economies of scale are unlikely to significantly favor one of the scenarios
of twelve”—the possibility that twelve management teams will gain “practical power over
the majority of U.S. public companies.” See id. at 1. By contrast, we focus on the possibility
that a much smaller number of management teams—the Big Three—will come to dominate
ownership in most public companies, becoming the Giant Three. Furthermore, and
importantly, our view on the problems with the growing concentration of ownership
substantially differs from that of Coates. Coates seems to be concerned that investment
managers will make excessive use of the power that comes from their large ownership stakes.
See id. at 2–3. By contrast, as discussed in the preceding Parts, we have a very different
concern—that the Giant Three will have incentives to be excessively deferential to corporate
managers, and that their substantial proportion of equity ownership and incentives towards
deference may depress shareholder intervention overall, resulting in insufficient checks on
corporate managers.
270. For an account and discussion of these rules, see Roe, A Political Theory, supra note
89, at 20–21.
271. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 851(a) (2012) (defining “regulated investment companies,”
for the purposes of the Internal Revenue Code, as meaning an (individual) registered
investment company or unit investment trust).
272. Since our aim is to put this general idea on the table for discussion, we do not discuss
the design and implementation issues it would entail; instead, we focus on the basic
conceptual question of whether this regulatory direction is worth pursuing.
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over the other, comparing the two scenarios requires close attention to their
consequences for stewardship.
Because each of the Giant Three would capture a larger fraction of
generated governance benefits than would each of the Big-ish Nine, each of
the Giant Three would have a somewhat greater incentive to invest in
stewardship. Precluding the Giant Three scenario would forgo the benefits of
such increase. At the same time, however, the Giant Three scenario would
involve three significant costs, which would be reduced by precluding the
Giant Three scenario.
First, incentives to be excessively deferential would be greater in the
Giant Three Scenario than in the Big-ish Nine scenario. In the Giant Three
scenario, each of the index fund managers would be continually apprehensive
that its 15% block would raise concerns about its power and legitimacy,
triggering demand for regulatory intervention to impose size limits or to
break up the Giant Three. By contrast, in the Big-ish Nine scenario, with
reasonable size limits already in place and voting power divided among the
nine players, index fund managers would have significantly less concern
about additional regulatory intervention. On this view, because the desire to
avoid size limits currently provides the Big Three with incentives to be
excessively deferential to reduce the risks of such limits, putting these limits
in place could well have a positive effect on the stewardship of large index
funds by decreasing the force of such incentives.
Second, since their blocks would not exceed 5%, none of the Big-ish
Nine could be required to file on Schedule 13D, so they would not be
discouraged from interventions by a desire to avoid Schedule 13D filings.
These factors would substantially reduce the incentives of the Big-ish Nine
managers to be deferential to corporate managers, thereby allowing them to
be more effective stewards of the interests of index fund investors.
Third, having nine decision makers rather than three would substantially
reduce risks, and concomitant legitimacy problems. Consider what would
happen if one of the Giant Three were to make a stewardship decision with a
reasonable, good-faith expectation of increasing portfolio value that
nonetheless turned out to be detrimental to their portfolio companies. The
consequences would be large, because there is no feedback mechanism to
correct such a decision: The index funds of that manager would perform no
worse than those of any rival index fund manager, so they would not suffer
in the marketplace and their market share would not contract.
There is also no market mechanism that rewards index fund managers
for good judgment about stewardship for their portfolio companies. The
financial success of index fund managers depends on their prowess at
operating funds that mechanically track an index at low cost. Thus, there is
no necessary association between this ability and judgment with respect to
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the stewardship of portfolio companies. A Giant Three scenario, then, would
produce a significant risk (and accompanying legitimacy concerns) that the
stewardship judgments and attitudes of one managerial team would have a
major effect on our capital markets without any market mechanism that
would provide a check against serious flaws in these judgments and attitudes.
Clearly, precluding or discouraging a Giant Three scenario would
represent a major step in the regulatory intervention into the distribution of
control in the economy, a step that should not be taken lightly. The challenge
posed by the Giant Three scenario is unusual in its economic significance and
merits the consideration of such measures.
B. Implications for Key Debates
1. The Debate on Common Ownership
A significant body of recent academic work has expressed serious
concerns about one of the consequences of the rise of index funds: increases
in common ownership, whereby an investment manager holds positions in all
the companies in a given sector of the economy.273 These authors argue that
a rise in common ownership, whether from index funds or otherwise, can be
expected to produce significant anticompetitive effects that are detrimental to
the economy.274 This view has led prominent legal scholars and economists—
including Einer Elhauge, Herbert Hovenkamp, Eric Posner, Fiona Scott
Morton, and Glen Weyl—to propose strong measures to constrain the rise of
common ownership. Such measures include limiting investment managers to
holding only one company in each economic sector, and having antitrust
regulators scrutinize the behavior of index funds and other similar
investors.275
273. For comprehensive reviews of this literature, see Matthew Backus, Christopher
Conlon & Michael Sinkinson, The Common Ownership Hypothesis: Theory and Evidence
18–24 (2019) [hereinafter Backus et al., The Common Ownership Hypothesis],
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/ES_20190205_CommonOwnership.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5JP-SAGU]; Martin C. Schmalz, Common-Ownership
Concentration and Corporate Conduct, 10 Ann. Rev. Fin. Econ. 413, 419–40,
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3046829 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
274. For a review of the common ownership literature from the perspective that argues
that common ownership is likely to have a significant effect on the economy, see Schmalz,
supra note 273, at 417 (“Shareholder diversiﬁcation across competitors can therefore remove
ﬁrms’ incentives to compete and void Adam Smith’s idea that the pursuit of shareholders’
self-interest leads to maximization of social welfare.”).
275. For articles suggesting such policy measures, see generally Einer Elhauge,
Horizontal Shareholding, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1267 (2016); Fiona Scott Morton & Herbert
Hovenkamp, Horizontal Shareholding and Antitrust Policy, 127 Yale L.J. 2026 (2018); Eric
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The reform proposals put forward by the common ownership critics were
significantly motivated by, and have substantially relied on, recent empirical
work that claimed to find evidence that increases in common ownership bring
about anticompetitive effects and, in particular, higher market prices.276
However, other economic and empirical analyses have contested the findings
and conclusions of this empirical work and argued that it does not provide a
solid empirical basis for the concerns of the common ownership critics.277
Putting aside the debate on whether the empirical hypothesis of the common
ownership critics is consistent with the available empirical evidence, an
important question is whether, on a conceptual level, it is reasonable to expect
that an increase in common ownership in general, and such an increase due
to a rise of index fund ownership in particular, should be expected to bring
about anticompetitive effects. Our analysis questions the plausibility of this
key theory.278
We agree that, in a hypothetical world without any agency costs between
index funds and their beneficial investors (or more generally, between
investment fund managers and their beneficial investors), a rise in common
ownership could have anticompetitive effects. Suppose, hypothetically, that
A. Posner, Fiona Scott Morton & E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal to Limit the Anti-Competitive
Power of Institutional Investors, 81 Antitrust L.J. 669 (2017).
276. For an influential empirical study on the airline industry that has received a great
deal of attention, see generally José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Anticompetitive
Effects of Common Ownership, 73 J. FIN. 1513 (2018). For another empirical study reporting
similar findings with respect to the banking industry, see José Azar, Sahil Raina & Martin C.
Schmalz, Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition (May 4, 2019) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2710252 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
277. See, e.g., Backus et al., The Common Ownership Hypothesis, supra note 273;
Daniel P. O’Brien & Keith Waehrer, The Competitive Effects of Common Ownership: We
Know Less than We Think, 81 Antitrust L.J. 729 (2017); Matthew Backus, Christopher
Conlon & Michael Sinkinson, Common Ownership in America: 1980–2017 (Nat’l Bureau
of
Econ.
Research,
Working
Paper
No.
25454,
2019),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w25454.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Jacob
Gramlich & Serafin Grundl, The Effect of Common Ownership on Profits: Evidence from
the U.S. Banking Industry (Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series Working Paper
No. 2018-069, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3269120 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review); Jacob Gramlich & Serafin Grundl, Estimating the Competitive Effects of Common
Ownership (Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series Working Paper No. 2017-029,
2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2940137 (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Pauline
Kennedy, Daniel P. O’Brien, Minjae Song & Keith Waehrer, The Competitive Effects of
Common Ownership: Economic Foundations and Empirical Evidence (July 24, 2017)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3008331 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
278. For an in-depth response to our analysis as it relates to the debate on common
ownership, see Elhauge, The Causal Mechanisms of Horizontal Shareholding, supra note 19
(manuscript at 39–58).
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the Big Three could be expected to make stewardship decisions as if they
each had a sole owner acting to maximize the value of its portfolio. In this
hypothetical scenario, it would be reasonable to be concerned that three large
sole owners with large stakes in all significant public companies would have
incentives to encourage anticompetitive effects. But as Parts I and II have
shown, the world we inhabit is very far from such a hypothetical scenario.
In our world, the real worry is not that index funds might do too much,
but that they might do too little.279 This Article identifies significant
incentives of index fund managers, which common ownership critics fail to
take into account. In particular, as Parts I and II have shown, index fund
managers have inadequate incentives to engage in stewardship aimed at
enhancing the value of particular companies, and they have significant
incentives to defer to the preferences of corporate managers. Thus, contrary
to the concerns of common ownership scholars, index fund managers should
not be expected to push corporate managers to engage in business strategies
that they would not wish to pursue on their own.
Indeed, we believe that the alarmism over common ownership and the
scrutiny that such alarmism brings may have two important negative
consequences. First, they may push index fund managers to act even more
deferentially than they have to date. Such alarmism could move stewardship
even further in the wrong direction by pushing the Big Three to be even more
excessively deferential.
Furthermore, common ownership alarmism might push antitrust
regulators in the wrong direction. There is evidence that concentration in
many markets and the associated increases in markups have been on the rise
in recent decades.280 Dealing with such concentration requires antitrust
regulators to focus their attention on the decisions of corporate managers.
Common ownership concerns are a red herring that distracts antitrust
regulators by unnecessarily focusing their attention on ownership patterns
and the stewardship of index fund managers.
2. The Debate on Hedge Fund Activism
The past decade has witnessed a heated debate over the merits of hedge
279. For a somewhat more detailed discussion of our view on this subject than in the
current section, see Bebchuk & Hirst, Misguided Attack on Common Ownership, supra note
19.
280. For a study providing empirical evidence on the rise in market concentration, see
Gustavo Grullon, Yelena Larkin & Roni Michaely, Are US Industries Becoming More
Concentrated?, 23 Rev. Fin. 697, 698 (2019) (reporting evidence that, “over the last two
decades the Herfindahl–Hirschmann index [a measure of market concentration] has
systematically increased in more than 75% of US industries”).
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fund activism and how it should be governed.281 Supporters of hedge fund
activism contend that it brings about value-enhancing changes in activism
targets, and that it exerts a disciplinary force that induces incumbents to be
more attentive to shareholder interests.282 Opponents of hedge fund activism
claim that it pushes public companies to improve short-term outcomes at the
expense of long-term value, which is detrimental to investors in those
companies, as well as to the economy.283 This has led these opponents to
advocate for various measures to constrain activist hedge funds.284
Our analysis has significant implications for the ongoing debate on hedge
fund activism. As explained below, our analysis has implications for
understanding the interaction between index funds and activist hedge funds
and its expected consequences. We make two main points in this regard. In
section III.B.2(a) we explain that the rise of index funds in general, and the
Big Three in particular, cannot substitute for the important role that activist
hedge funds play in the corporate governance system. In section III.B.2(b)
we show that although activist hedge funds play a beneficial role, their
presence cannot fully make up for the significant problems that we identify
with index fund stewardship, since these problems mean that the combination
of index funds and activist hedge funds cannot fully address common
corporate governance failures.
(a) The Limits of Index Fund Stewardship. Given the long-term focus of
index funds, opponents of hedge fund activism view index fund stewardship
as a preferable substitute for the activities of activist hedge funds, and have
urged index fund managers to support companies against activist hedge
funds.285 However, the analysis in this Article suggests that understanding the
281. For articles putting forward policy arguments for and against hedge fund activism,
see, respectively, Bebchuk et al., Hedge Fund Activism, supra note 174, at 1147–54, and Leo
E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge
Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 Yale L.J. 1870, 1956–
70 (2017) [hereinafter Strine, Who Bleeds].
282. For works that provide a favorable assessment of hedge fund activism, see generally
Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 90; Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Hyunseob Kim, Hedge Fund
Activism: A Review, 4 Found. & Trends Fin. 185 (2009).
283. For works that analyze potential costs of hedge fund activism in detail, see, e.g.,
John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism
on Corporate Governance, 1 ANNALS CORP. GOVERNANCE (2016); Strine, Who Bleeds,
supra note 281; Martin Lipton, The Threat to the Economy and Society from Activism and
Short-Termism, Harvard Law Sch. Forum on Corp. Governance & Fin. Regulation (Jan. 22,
2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/01/22/the-threat-to-the-economy-and-societyfrom-activism-and-short-termism [https://perma.cc/ZD6X-R7ZZ].
284. For a review of such measures proposed by opponents of hedge fund activism, see
Bebchuk et al., Hedge Fund Activism, supra note 174, at 1147–54.
285. For example, Martin Lipton, a well-known opponent of hedge fund activism, has
stated that “[BlackRock CEO Larry Fink’s 2018 Letter to CEOs] is a major step in rejecting
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stewardship incentives and behavior of index fund managers should lead to
support for hedge fund activism rather than opposition. The shortcomings of
index fund stewardship that we identify mean that index fund stewardship
cannot be a substitute for hedge fund activism. To the contrary, these
shortcomings mean that hedge fund activism has a critical role in
stewardship.
The incentives of hedge fund managers differ from those of the index
fund managers that we have analyzed in three key ways. First, whereas index
fund managers capture a tiny fraction of the governance gains that they
produce, the so-called “2-and-20” compensation arrangements of hedge fund
managers enable them to capture a meaningful proportion of any governance
gains they bring about. Second, index fund managers hold the same portfolios
as rival managers tracking the same indexes and thus cannot improve
performance relative to rivals by bringing about governance gains. In
contrast, activist hedge funds have concentrated portfolios, and governance
gains in their main portfolio companies can thus greatly enhance their
performance relative to rivals. Third, hedge fund managers generally do not
have other business relationships with their portfolio companies, so they lack
the other types of incentives that we have identified as inducing index fund
managers to be excessively deferential to corporate managers.
These different incentives cause hedge fund managers to invest
substantial amounts in the stewardship of their portfolio companies.286 Hedge
fund managers closely follow the particular business circumstances of those
companies and identify ways to remedy underperformance. They can also use
the full toolkit of shareholder powers—including nominating directors—visà-vis companies that they identify as underperforming.
Given these substantial differences in incentives and consequent
stewardship behavior, index fund stewardship cannot substitute for hedge
fund activism, and especially not with respect to remedying the
underperformance of portfolio companies. The work of activist hedge funds
in targeting and remedying underperformance can partially address the
substantial gap left by the lack of stewardship by index fund managers, and
thereby benefit index fund investors. Conversely, opposition to hedge fund
activism and short-termism,” Lipton, New Paradigm for Corporate Governance, supra note
13, and that “BlackRock, State Street and Vanguard have continued to express support for
sustainable long-term investment,” Lipton, State of Play, supra note 43. For a review of the
opposition to hedge fund activism coauthored by one of us, see Bebchuk et al., Hedge Fund
Activism, supra note 174, at 1093–96.
286. For a more detailed analysis of why agency problems afflict the stewardship
decisions of activist hedge funds to a lesser extent than they do for the stewardship decisions
of index funds and other mutual funds, see Bebchuk et al., Agency Problems of Institutional
Investors, supra note 15, at 104–06.
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activism would be contrary to the interests of index fund investors.
(b) The Limits of Hedge Fund Activism. In a well-known and influential
article, Ronald Gilson and Jeffrey Gordon express a more optimistic view on
this subject and argue that the current interaction of index funds and activist
hedge funds works very well to address corporate governance problems at
portfolio companies.287 In the view of Gilson and Gordon, the actions of the
two types of players complement each other well: Hedge funds identify target
companies in which changes would enhance value, and index funds (and
other mutual funds) provide the activist hedge funds with support in those
cases where changes would be value-enhancing. Subsequently,
commentators taking issue with our work and evaluating index fund
stewardship more favorably than we do have also taken the view that the
interaction between activist hedge funds and index funds works well and
enables problems of underperformance to be effectively addressed. 288 The
assistance of these investment managers thus enables hedge fund activists to
bring about these value-enhancing changes.
Below we explain that, although hedge fund activism can partially
substitute for the shortcomings of index fund stewardship that we analyze,
such activism cannot fully make up for these shortcomings. In particular, the
current interaction of activist hedge funds and index funds cannot fully
address corporate governance problems as is hoped by Gilson and Gordon
and commentators taking issue with our view of index fund stewardship, for
three reasons.
First, an activist hedge fund can be successful at a company only if that
company’s management expects index fund managers to support the activist
hedge fund.289 However, as we have explained in the preceding Part, index
fund managers have incentives to be excessively deferential to corporate
managers, and the recent study by Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Tao Li, and James
Pinnington provides empirical evidence that index funds are indeed less
likely than other institutional investors to support activists in contested
elections.290 To the extent that index fund managers are expected not to
support some value-enhancing changes that activist hedge funds would like
to bring about, activist hedge funds would likely be unable to bring about
287. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 17, at 897–900.
288. For articles by such commentators, see, e.g., Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript

at 19) (“Passive funds also play a complementary role in the more focused engagement
provided by hedge funds”); Jahnke, supra note 60, at 3 (“[I]nterviews with activist investors
suggest that index investors do not pose barriers to successful campaigns.”).
289. For discussions of the need for hedge fund activists to obtain the support of
investment managers in order to be successful, see Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 90, at 52–
53; Gilson & Gordon, supra note 17, at 897–900.
290. See Brav et al., Picking Friends, supra note 167.
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such changes themselves.
Second, not only do activist hedge funds require the support of index
funds to succeed in engagements that they undertake, but the expectation of
a lack of index fund support might have an adverse ex ante effect: It could
discourage hedge fund activists with companies in the first place. Consistent
with this observation, the recent study by Alon Brav et al. shows that activist
hedge funds are less likely to engage with an underperforming company
when institutional investors are less likely to vote for activist hedge funds
nominees.291
Third, activist hedge funds have incentives to undertake stewardship
activities only when such activities could result in very large increases in
value. Activist hedge funds invest substantial resources in stewardship and
take on considerable risks in their activities, including liquidity risk and the
risk of unsuccessful engagements. To compensate, activist hedge funds’ own
beneficial investors demand higher returns, which must sustain first paying
the substantial 2-and-20 fees charged by the hedge fund manager. As a result,
activist hedge fund managers will take on engagements only where they
would likely bring about large returns, sufficient to compensate their
investors on a risk-adjusted basis after the managers’ high fees. There will be
many opportunities for smaller gains from stewardship—say, of
approximately 5% to 10% —that activist hedge funds will ignore but that
would significantly benefit index fund investors if they were realized.
291. See id. at 24–25. The findings of Brav et al. are consistent with those reported by
an earlier study by Appel et al., Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners, supra note 150, at
114.
In taking the view that activists and index funds interact well, Fisch et al. rely on an
empirical study by Ian Appel, Todd Gormley, and Donald Keim on the effect of passive
investors on activism. See Fisch et al., supra note 16 (manuscript at 28) (citing Ian R. Appel,
Todd A. Gormley & Donald B. Keim, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: The Effect of
Passive Investors on Activism, 32 Rev. Fin. Stud. 2720 (2019) [hereinafter Appel et al.,
Shoulders of Giants]). Appel et al.’s study reports that “the percentage of a ﬁrm’s stock held
by passive mutual funds is not associated with the likelihood of being targeted by an activist,”
but that “passive mutual funds signiﬁcantly affect activists’ strategic choices,” and in
particular “the presence of passive institutions increases activists’ willingness to engage in
costlier forms of activism.” Appel et al., Shoulders of Giants, supra, at 2723. However, Fisch
et al. do not engage with the findings that “a larger ownership stake by passive funds is
associated with a decline in hedge fund activism,” made by the same authors in an earlier
study. Appel et al., Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners, supra note 150, at 114. See also
Fisch et al., supra note 16. Moreover, and importantly, Fisch et al. do not cite or engage with
a subsequent and comprehensive study on the subject by Brav et al., which shows that, after
controlling for relevant characteristics, index funds are significantly and systematically less
likely to vote with activists, and that the expectation of such voting behavior affects activists’
choices of companies to target. See Brav et al., supra note 167; Fisch et al., supra note 16;
see also further discussion thereof supra section III.B.2(b).
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For these three reasons, activist hedge funds can be only a limited
substitute for the lack of stewardship by index fund managers. Consequently,
the problems with index fund stewardship identified in this Article will
remain of substantial concern—even if activist hedge funds are allowed to
continue to operate without the impediments sought by their opponents.
C. Recognition and Reality
Recognition by policymakers and the public of the problems that we have
analyzed in this Article would be necessary to bring about significant reforms
in this area. Sections III.A.2–III.A.6 have put forward several measures that
policymakers should consider to improve the stewardship of index fund
managers. Before we conclude this Part we wish to note that this is an area in
which improved understanding of problems can also directly contribute to
their solution.292 Thus, we hope that improving the understanding of current
problems can by itself contribute to improving index fund stewardship.
As we explained in section I.F, the Big Three have significant incentives
to be perceived as responsible stewards. A public perception that they are
otherwise might adversely affect their flow of funds or increase the risks of
backlash. The Big Three thus have reasons to communicate in ways that
portray their stewardship in a favorable light, and to make stewardship
decisions that reduce the salience of their underinvestment in stewardship and
their excessive deference to corporate managers. Therefore, recognition by
investors and the public of the incentive problems of index fund managers
could, by itself, lead to improved stewardship by the Big Three. In particular,
recognition of the extent of the Big Three incentives to underinvest in
stewardship might counteract their incentives to underinvest. Similarly,
recognition of the extent of the deference incentives of index fund managers
might constrain such deference.
To illustrate, the evidence that we have provided regarding the scale of
the Big Three’s investments in stewardship could contribute to public
pressure on the Big Three to increase their investments in stewardship.
Discussions of Big Three stewardship levels by Big Three leaders and
supporters of index fund stewardship have thus far paid close attention to the
significant increases in personnel in the Big Three’s stewardship departments
292. For a discussion of another context in which recognition of existing problems by
investors and the public can substantially contribute to improving matters, and where
academic work highlighting such problems can usefully contribute to such recognition and
improvement, see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: The
Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation 201–16 (2004) (explaining that recognition
of the problems with executive pay arrangements can by itself improve matters).
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in recent years and the significant number of people currently employed in
these departments.293 However, the evidence that we describe in Part II shows
that, notwithstanding the increases in personnel in recent years, the Big
Three’s investments in stewardship currently enable them to devote limited
resources to stewardship in the great majority of the companies in which they
hold positions of significant monetary value. Introducing this point could be
salient for public discussions.
To take another example, the evidence we describe in section II.B
regarding the Big Three’s failure to use certain potentially-valuable
stewardship tools could increase investor and public pressure on the Big
Three to use those tools. In particular, our analysis in section II.B.3 showed
that the Big Three have generally avoided any submission of shareholder
proposals of the type that they generally support and that could bring about
governance changes that the Big Three’s own governance principles consider
valuable. Public recognition of these findings could contribute to investor and
public pressure on the Big Three to consider active submission of shareholder
proposals to bring about these governance reforms. Similarly, our analysis in
section II.B.4 shows that the Big Three have commonly chosen to remain on
the sidelines in cases of SEC consideration of proposed rules and precedential
litigation; these findings could thus lead to investor and public pressure on
the Big Three to increase their involvement in such activities.
This is therefore an area in which recognition of problems might by itself
contribute to improving matters. We therefore hope that this Article, and the
analysis and empirical evidence that we provide, will contribute to investor
and public recognition of the problems afflicting index fund stewardship.
CONCLUSION
With index funds owning a large and steadily-increasing proportion of
the equity capital of all significant American public companies,
understanding the stewardship decisions of index fund managers—and how
they can be improved—is of critical importance for all interested in the
governance and performance of public companies. In this Article we have
sought to contribute to this understanding.
This Article has put forward an analytical framework for understanding
the incentives of index fund managers. Our framework has enabled us to
identify and analyze two types of incentives that could adversely affect the
stewardship decisions of index fund managers: incentives to underinvest in
stewardship, and incentives to defer excessively to the preferences and views
of corporate managers.
293. For such comments, see supra notes 10, 11, 122–125 and accompanying text.
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This Article has also provided a comprehensive empirical analysis of the
full range of stewardship activities that index fund managers do and do not
undertake. We have explained that the empirical evidence is, on the whole,
consistent with the predictions of our incentive analysis. The empirical
evidence thus reinforces the concerns raised by our analysis.
Finally, this Article has considered the significant policy implications of
the incentives problems that we identify analytically and document
empirically. We propose a set of significant measures that policymakers
should consider to address the concerns that our analysis and evidence have
highlighted. We also show that our analysis undermines the arguments that
critics have made against common ownership by institutional investors and
activism by hedge funds, thereby contributing to these important policy
debates.
We hope that the analytical framework, evidence, and policy proposals
we have put forward for consideration will all prove useful for policymakers
and market participants in considering the opportunities and challenges posed
by the rise of index funds. How well those policymakers and market
participants assess and respond to these opportunities and challenges will
have profound effects on the governance and performance of public
companies and, in turn, on the prosperity of investors and the success of the
American economy.

